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Your Christ, Jewish 
Your car, Japanese 
Your pizza, Italian 
Your democracy, Greek 
Your coffee, Brazilian 
Your vacation, Turkish 
Your numbers, Arabic 
Your handwriting, Latin 
And your neighbor is just a foreigner? 
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As Europe has struggled to adapt to the modern reality of mass migration in 
recent decades, the question of citizenship has emerged as an increasingly salient 
political topic across the continent. Numerous scholars have begun to analyze the 
evolution of citizenship regimes in Europe, the politics of citizenship policymaking, 
and the consequences of such policies for citizenship acquisition and immigrant 
integration. This dissertation advances a new theoretical understanding of 
citizenship policymaking and citizenship acquisition together within a framework of 
supply and demand. According to the theory, naturalization rates, and the 
corresponding level of integration required to naturalize, are the equilibrium result 
of the interaction between the political forces supplying citizenship and the varying 
determinants of immigrant demand for citizenship. This dissertation examines both 
in turn. On the supply side, I first argue that citizenship policy in Europe results not 
simply from the influence of radical right parties, but from broader modes of party 
competition that provide electoral incentives to either liberalize or restrict access to 
citizenship. Using a new quantitative measurement of citizenship policies across 
sixteen European countries from 1970 to 2014, I reveal how left party competition 
 viii 
is associated with more liberal citizenship policy change, while right party 
competition and radical right electoral threats engender more restrictive policies. I 
then utilize my citizenship policy index alongside other political, economic, and 
social variables on the demand side to examine the aggregate level structure under 
which citizenship acquisition occurs across European countries and across time. 
Finally, through a combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence gathered on 
two federal countries in Europe, Germany and Austria, I show that these same 
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The Challenge of Integration and Citizenship in Europe Today 
On the evening of November 13, 2015, Parisians were enjoying another 
relaxing Friday night in the City of Lights: dinner and drinks in street cafes near the 
Canal Saint-Martin, an international football match at the Stade de France, a musical 
performance at the historic Bataclan theatre. This otherwise tranquil European 
scene was suddenly shattered, however, by a coordinated series of suicide bombings 
and mass shootings, leaving 130 people dead and nearly 400 people seriously 
injured. Then, just four months later on March 22, 2016, as travelers at Brussels 
Airport were checking in for their flights and commuting to work near the Maalbeek 
metro station, three additional suicide attacks similarly ripped apart this pedestrian 
European morning, killing many others.  
In the weeks following these heinous attacks, it became clear that an Islamic 
terrorist cell located in the Molenbeek neighborhood of Brussels with links to 
Islamic State (ISIS) had planned and implemented the carnage. These highly trained 
and well-equipped jihadists, many of whom had experience fighting alongside ISIS 
in the Syrian civil war and had developed networks that crisscrossed the European 
continent, had forcefully and dramatically inserted the dangers of Islamic terrorism 
into the heart of Europe. However surprising many of these revelations have been 
for Europe, perhaps most shocking was the identity of the known terrorists. They 
were neither immigrants nor asylum seekers. They were European citizens. 
This sobering fact has led many to raise questions about immigrant 




French and Belgian citizens of immigrant descent to perform such carnage? Why did 
Belgium and France even grant these clearly unassimilated individuals nationality? 
While attacks by homegrown Islamic extremists are a rather recent phenomenon in 
Europe, attempts to incorporate immigrants and their native-born descendants in 
Europe are not. Indeed, from the earliest models of incorporation identified by 
scholars through the present day, European governments have long endeavored to 
manage and integrate immigrant populations (Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 
2003; Favell 1998). In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, countries such as the 
Netherlands and Germany employed ad hoc measures to accommodate guest 
workers while concurrently seeking to prevent their long-term integration in favor 
of their return migration. In the 1980s and 1990s, many countries, such as the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden, adopted more multicultural approaches, 
whereby immigrant minorities are accommodated not on the basis of their 
assimilation but their ethnic or racial group membership. More recently, especially 
since the 1998 Dutch Newcomers Integration Act (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers), 
governments seem to have converged on formal integration programs to 
incorporate immigrants into their political, economic, and social systems (Joppke 
2007b, 2007a; De Hart and van Oers 2006; Goodman 2010a). 
Whether the origins of these immigration flows were post-colonial in nature 
or more strictly labor-based, whether countries’ policies have been open or 
restrictive, the size and diversity of this immigrant population and its descendants 
have increasingly frustrated European publics and challenged European 




attacks were planned is a tragic if not extreme example of this challenge: many in 
this predominantly Muslim community do not speak the local language, do not 
attend Belgian schools, have little contact with native Belgians and little 
understanding of Belgian values or culture. This so-called Parallelgesellschaft, or 
parallel society, is likewise plagued by exceptionally high unemployment rates and 
suffers from crippling poverty. The poorly integrated and disaffected youth of these 
unassimilated communities are more often lured into criminal gangs or jihadist 
networks rather than recruited to participate in broader Belgian society. Yet, like 
those perpetrators of the Paris and Brussels attacks, most of those living in 
Molenbeek are Belgian citizens, with the same rights and obligations and formal 
political ties as those who can trace their familial heritage to the revolution of the 
1830s. The same situation occurs to varying degrees within most countries across 
Europe today. And, as a decade of homegrown Islamic terrorist acts in Europe – 
from the 2005 London bombings to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris to the 
2016 attacks in Brussels – demonstrates, the challenge of integrating Europe’s 
immigrant population and forging new citizens is increasingly consequential.  
That native-born French and Belgian citizens, and not immigrants, carried 
out these recent acts of terrorism highlights the intricate relationship between 
integration and citizenship in Europe today and underscores the necessity of 
ensuring Europe’s citizens are integrated members of society. Because citizenship 
demarcates an important legal boundary between member and non-member in a 
self-governing political community, countries across Europe have increasingly 




communities, especially in recent years. While some countries tend to view 
citizenship as a means to integrate immigrants, others view it as a reward for 
successful integration. In either case, these new efforts aim to link immigrant 
integration with citizenship. Indeed, from the introduction of formal language 
requirements in countries as disparate as Portugal and Finland, to robust civic 
integration tests in the once avowedly multicultural Netherlands, to the 
introduction of partial jus soli in a once ethnocentric Germany, few states in Western 
Europe have left citizenship policy unaltered in recent years as they endeavor to 
stipulate the precise terms of membership. But in this context, the focus on 
citizenship and coupling of formal integration requirements with it also raises 
questions about political membership, national identity, and democratic 
inclusiveness with a population whose citizenship status is a double-edged sword: 
an opportunity for inclusion and advancement, yet too often a miscarried formality. 
The Causes and Consequences of Citizenship Policy 
In this increasingly tense political context, what are the causes, and what are 
the consequences of citizenship policy in Europe? This is the focus of this study. Yet 
within this single question are embedded a number of puzzling, interrelated 
phenomena. The first involves citizenship policy as a dependent variable. What 
determines the institutional contours of citizenship policy requirements that 
regulate immigrant acquisition of citizenship across countries and across time? 
European citizenship laws have evolved significantly since World War II, provoking 
scholars to debate whether policies have converged or remained historically distinct 




2010; De Hart and van Oers 2006; Joppke and Morawska 2003). One vast literature 
on this subject has examined these national citizenship orientations and the various 
historical and macrostructural determinants of citizenship in Europe (Brubaker 
1992; Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Favell 1998; Castles and Miller 2003; Joppke 
2003b; Schain 2008; Howard 2009; Janoski 2010; Joppke 2010), while another has 
focused more acutely on the proximate electoral correlates of citizenship policy 
change in recent years (Schain 2008; Howard 2010; Goodman 2014; Janoski 2010). 
However, few of these existing studies entail systematic analyses of the direction, 
content, or timing of such policy change. In addition, despite the development of a 
number of policy indices in recent years to compare these policies,1 their utility for 
assessing the patterns of long-term continuity, change, and convergence remains 
limited in theory and scope. 
Second, given variation in citizenship policies across countries, who acquires 
citizenship, and under what conditions? Many scholars across the social sciences 
have investigated aspects of the naturalization question empirically (Yang 1994; 
Jones-Correa 2001b; Diehl and Blohm 2003; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink et al. 
2013; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Janoski 2010; OECD 2011; Koopmans et al. 
2012). Explanations typically focus either on individual factors such as the level of 
economic, social, or cultural adaptation to the receiving country, or on institutional 
and other structural factors such as toleration of dual citizenship or distinct 
characteristics of the country of origin. However, there is much about naturalization 
                                                        
1 These indices include the CITLAW indicators (Jeffers et al. 2012), MIPEX (Huddleston et al. 2011a), 
CIVIX (Goodman 2010a), Howard’s (2010, 2009) Citizenship Policy Index (CPI), Koopmans et al.’s 
(2005; 2012) Index of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI), and Janoski’s (2010) Barriers to 




that remains poorly understood.2 How does citizenship policy change affect 
naturalization? What political, economic, and structural forces shape naturalization 
trends? Without detailed cross-national and longitudinal measures of citizenship 
policy, the relationship between these policies and naturalization across European 
countries and time has largely evaded the attention of scholars (although see 
Janoski 2010). More strikingly, because of what Rokkan (1970) long ago termed 
“whole-nation bias,” a focus on national-level policies and factors has glossed over 
the local context that shapes naturalization and integration decisions in a given 
country. Thus variation in naturalization patterns within countries has received 
even less scrutiny (Worbs 2008; Thränhardt 2008). 
Finally, how does citizenship acquisition affect immigrant integration? Is 
citizenship a means to immigrant integration, or does citizenship signal the 
completion of the integration process? Do higher acquisition rates correspond with 
more integrated immigrants, or less? As more and more states attach integration 
prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship, these questions have begun 
generating an increasingly extensive body of research (Bijl and Verweij 2012). 
However, disentangling the causal relationship between citizenship acquisition and 
integration is complex due to selection effects. For example, because one’s level of 
attachment to the country of settlement is a significant factor in predicting one’s 
proclivity to naturalize, it may be that immigrants who naturalize are already better 
integrated economically and socially prior to naturalization (Liebig and Von Haaren 
                                                        
2 I define naturalization in this study as the acquisition of citizenship by an individual who was not 
born in the country granting such citizenship. Unless noted, I include jus soli acquisitions under this 
definition. I thus use the term naturalization, citizenship acquisition, and nationality acquisition 




2011). It may also be that citizenship policies that include numerous integration 
requirements automatically ‘screen’ those less integrated from the pool of those 
eligible for naturalization. Each of these problems means that citizenship acquisition 
may be inherently associated with the better integration outcomes among 
naturalized migrants, and would lead to the biased conclusion that citizenship is 
associated with better integration outcomes. 
This dissertation seeks to address the first two of these questions regarding 
the causes and consequences of citizenship policy in Europe, and apply its findings 
to our understanding of the third. While the project’s focus may appeal specifically 
to scholars of the immigration and citizenship subfield of political science, 
understanding the causes and effects of citizenship acquisition is of profound 
academic significance and is arguably foundational for comparative study of politics. 
In the beginning of Book III of Politics, Aristotle suggests that we cannot assess the 
attributes of states and governments without first answering the question, “who is 
the citizen?” Citizenship lies at the heart of democratic governance in particular: as 
Linz and Stepan (1996) argue, “[w]ithout a state, there can be no citizenship; 
without citizenship, there can be no democracy” (28). Indeed, definitions of 
democracy that center on the notion of ‘rule by the people’ presuppose the 
identification and delineation of who ‘the people’ are.3 Yet in an increasingly 
interconnected world with borders too porous to prevent the migration of workers 
or families fleeing war and poverty abroad, immigration challenges our 
                                                        
3 Dahl (1989, 120; 2005, 189) maintains that ‘inclusive citizenship’ is one of the required institutions 
of modern democracy. For O’Donnell (2001), “the individual correlate of a democratic regime is 
political citizenship, which consists of the legal assignment of the rights entailed by the democratic 




understanding of the relationship between citizenship and democracy. How should 
democracies accommodate their foreign citizens? What rights should they have, 
what freedoms should they enjoy? In what political decisions should their voice be 
heard? On the one hand, excluding foreign residents on a permanent basis may be 
more akin to tyranny than democracy (Walzer 1983). Yet including immigrants on a 
maximalist basis, with all the rights, freedoms, duties, and expectations of 
citizenship without the formal acquisition of it, although more in line with a liberal 
conception of democracy, is usually politically unsustainable in practice due to 
nativist pressures over time. Between these two extremes democracies must 
fluctuate, and their location along this spectrum in many ways defines one critical 
level of their democratic inclusiveness. In this sense, the policies regulating the 
acquisition of citizenship, and the myriad factors that structure these decisions, are 
thus decisive elements of any democratic polity, serving as powerful political 
instruments of inclusion and exclusion, and reflecting in part how representative its 
institutions are of those living under them. The questions investigated in this 
dissertation – who may acquire citizenship, who may not, and what criteria are used 
to adjudicate between the two – are thus central questions for any modern 
democracy. As Europe faces the challenge of resettling and incorporating millions of 
asylum seekers from abroad, the questions are especially timely. 
The Plan of the Dissertation  
This study is organized into seven chapters. In Chapter 2, I will situate the 
current study within the relevant literature on citizenship policy change, 




extensively. Because it treats a number of theoretically ambiguous concepts, the 
next chapter will also address these conceptual concerns. 
 In Chapter 3, I will advance a new theoretical framework for understanding 
the relationship between citizenship policy, naturalization, and integration in 
European societies. I first argue that citizenship policy in Europe results not from 
national models of incorporation or policy path dependence, but from both 
immediate electoral competition among political parties and demographic 
pressures. I then situate citizenship policy alongside varying ideological and 
electoral contexts, all of which contribute to what I call the political supply of 
citizenship. Finally, I theorize how different socioeconomic, legal, and political 
contexts structure the lives of immigrants and create what I call an immigrant 
demand for citizenship. Naturalization rates, and the corresponding level of 
integration required to naturalize, are the equilibrium result of the interaction 
between this varying immigrant demand for citizenship and the respective political 
supply of citizenship. The framework offers a number of testable hypotheses that 
will guide the empirical analysis of subsequent chapters.  
In Chapter 4, I discuss my conceptualization and measurement of a country’s 
citizenship policy, which I use to capture the institutionalized component of political 
supply. This new theoretical conceptualization and measurement of citizenship 
policies spans sixteen Western European countries from 1970 to present. This 
integration cost of citizenship index (ICCI) casts citizenship policies in terms of their 
integration-based criteria of membership and captures what I consider to be their 




according to different state strategies of incorporation. I then present an empirical 
analysis of European citizenship trends over the last 45 years that offers new 
insights to a number of unanswered questions within the citizenship literature.  
I begin testing my hypotheses regarding the causes and consequences of 
citizenship policy in Chapters 5 and 6. First, using citizenship policy as my 
dependent variable, I show how citizenship policy change in Europe results not 
from left or right party power as suggested in previous research, but from 
interparty competition. Using several measures of electoral competition, I find that 
countries with stronger competition among left parties are associated with more 
liberal citizenship policies, while countries with more party competition and 
electoral threat from the right of the political spectrum engender more restrictive 
policies. However, the effect of politics on citizenship policy change are more 
nuanced than previous research suggests. I then show that alternative explanations 
for citizenship policy change - principally one of path dependence from citizenship 
starting points - largely fails to account for the contours or direction of change 
today. However, the size of the foreign born population, especially in the early 
postwar decades, may compel changes in citizenship policy in subsequent decades 
by means of a limited path-dependent mechanism. In Chapter 6, I then employ 
citizenship and its components as independent variables of political supply in 
several time-series cross-sectional analyses of naturalization across fifteen 
European countries since 1980. The primary determinant of immigrant demand that 
I draw upon is the socioeconomic context in the settlement country drawn primarily 




citizenship policy, the political orientation of governments, and socioeconomic 
contexts largely structure naturalization outcomes in Europe. The final section of 
the chapter then investigates how the changing value of citizenship vis-à-vis the 
country of origin and the country of settlement in the wake of the Euro crisis both 
alters the demand for citizenship and bolsters naturalization incentives among 
Europe’s intra-EU migrants. 
The subsequent chapter, Chapter 7, examines these acquisition dynamics 
through a more comparative approach. Here I will first apply my supply and 
demand framework to a within-case analysis of naturalization at the Land (state) 
level in Germany and Austria. The federal political system in each of these countries 
means that the Länder maintain some administrative control over the 
implementation and interpretation of national citizenship and integration policy, 
leading to interesting variation in naturalization rates within Germany and Austria. 
Such a within-case analysis at the Land-level of two countries very similar in terms 
of history, culture, and political system permits me to compare very similar cases 
that differ primarily with respect to the dependent variable. This facilitates 
identification of the remaining independent variables that may cause the variation 
on the dependent variable. It also helps identify the more proximate determinants 
of naturalization that may be significant subnationally but are often obscured or 
indistinguishable in large-n cross-national comparisons. In other words, this 
investigation permits me to hold many national-level variables like citizenship 
policy constant, while focusing on local political context and socioeconomic factors 




qualitative evidence gleaned from interviews of policymakers and immigrants 
across several German and Austrian Länder that most clearly exhibit the desired 
variation in naturalization rates as well as relevant contexts of interest to my 
project. By demonstrating that the relationship between my independent variables 
of interest and citizenship acquisition holds in the qualitative evidence gathered for 
these cases, I find further confirmation of my theory. 
Chapter 8 presents my conclusions from the previous chapters and discusses 
the contributions of the study to the literature on citizenship and integration in 
Europe. It then discusses some of the implications of my theory for the politics of 
citizenship in Europe today, showing how the tradeoffs between citizenship and 
integration are problematic for the long-term incorporation of immigrants. Finally, 
on the basis of the theory, I explore briefly some of the implications of the theory for 
European citizenship policymaking during a critical time in the continent’s collective 




 Situating the Supply and Demand of Citizenship in 
Europe 
Immigration is a modern reality in Western Europe. According to Eurostat 
(2015f), some 48 million residents, or 12 percent of the fifteen pre-2004 accession 
states of the European Union (EU-15) population, were foreign-born in 2014, and 
two-thirds of them originated from outside the EU. The current asylum crisis has 
brought over a million newcomers from abroad, and promises to bring more. 
Though the distribution of this foreign population is diverse. The relative size of this 
foreign-born population ranges from 5.5 percent in Finland to 43.3 percent in 
Luxembourg. Roughly one in ten people in Austria, Luxembourg, and Sweden were 
born outside the EU. Furthermore, given the relative ethnic homogeneity within 
most European countries at the end of World War II and a lack of non-European 
immigrants, this demographic shift has been a remarkably dramatic development 
over the course of six short decades. For many post-colonial states, decolonization 
accounts for much of this shift. In 1951, just over 3 percent of the British population 
was born outside the UK and Ireland; that number of foreign-born had nearly 
doubled by 1981. In 2011, foreign-born residents numbered 7.5 million, comprising 
13 percent of the resident population (British Office for National Statistics 17 
December 2013). Similarly, France’s foreign population roughly doubled from 2 
million in 1946 to nearly 4 million in 1975. Today some 8.7 percent of the French 
population are immigrants (INSEE 2012, 2005).  
Other European countries actively recruited foreign guest workers in the 
postwar decades. Germany, desperate for workers to fuel its postwar 




According to the German Federal Statistical Office (2015), there were 686,000 
foreigners in Germany in 1960; by 1975 there were 4 million foreigners living in the 
country, and by 2010, more than 7 million. Austria similarly signed labor 
recruitment agreements with Spain (1962), Turkey (1964) and Yugoslavia (1966), 
leading to a similarly sharp increase in foreigners living in Austria. The size of the 
foreign worker population drastically grew from 1.6 percent in 1965 to 7.2 percent 
a decade later (Stern and Valchars 2013). Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and 
Sweden also recruited foreign labor after the war, mostly from Southern Europe and 
the Mediterranean. The Netherlands experienced mass immigration through both 
post-colonial flows and active guest worker channels. The foreign populations in 
each of these countries have also increased starkly in the last few decades. 
Given the different historical trajectories of Western European states and 
their diverse experiences with immigration and foreigners in the modern period, it 
is not surprising that citizenship policy on the continent varies widely and has 
evolved markedly. Modern citizenship policy in the United Kingdom, for example, 
strongly reflects its imperial past. The British Nationality Act of 1772 granted 
birthright citizenship (jus soli) to anyone born within the empire, and the British 
Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914 standardized this comparatively liberal 
regime throughout the empire in the early twentieth century (Janoski 2010; Hansen 
2000). Furthermore, the first citizenship policy of the post-war period, the 1948 
British Nationality Act, preserved this status of British subjecthood, effectively 
maintaining a generally open citizenship regime for several subsequent decades 




increased, Britain has enacted at least six major revisions to its citizenship policy. 
The citizenship policy trajectories of other post-colonial states, such as France and 
the Netherlands, largely follow this trajectory.  
On the other hand, a state like Germany situates its citizenship tradition in 
the years of ethnonational consolidation in the late 19th century, when the Prussian-
led government sought to establish the inner homogeneity of the German nation. 
The resulting 1913 Imperial Citizenship Law, and its reliance on descent-based 
citizenship (jus sanguinis), “was designed as a defensive measure to prevent the 
naturalization of foreigners deemed inassimilable and culturally inferior rather than 
as a means to promote the integration of foreign residents” (Klusmeyer and 
Papademetriou 2009, 45; see also Brubaker 1992; Goswinkel 2001). Despite the 
rapidly increasing immigrant population after the 1960s, however, this highly 
restrictive 1913 law remained largely unaltered until the turn of the century, with at 
least seven major policy revisions occurring since 1990.4 
Explaining Citizenship Policy 
What determines the institutional contours of citizenship policy that regulate 
immigrant acquisition of citizenship across countries and across time? Despite the 
theoretical importance of citizenship for our understanding of immigration politics 
and the widespread scholarly attention the subject has attracted, the question of 
citizenship policy and policy change remained relatively undertheorized and 
inductive, rather than deductive, in nature. The literature examining the contours of 
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citizenship policy focus on various historical, structural, and electoral factors, but as 
we will see, few entail systematic analyses of the direction, content, or timing of 
such policy change. 
Extant explanations for the choice of citizenship policy fall into either broadly 
macrohistorical or domestic-political categories. One early comparative perspective 
on citizenship policy explains variation by situating different contemporary 
institutions within dissimilar macrohistorical legacies. Drawing on the literature of 
national models (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998; Castles and Miller 2003; Koopmans et 
al. 2005; Schain 2008), this perspective maintains that institutions governing access 
to nationality reflect the resiliency of national historical differences that limit policy 
change within nationally defined paths. Some situate this starting point during early 
nation-building periods. Whereas a country like France developed an assimilationist 
and inclusive form of citizenship based on its statist, revolutionary past, a country 
like Germany developed an ethnic form of citizenship based on its more Volk-
centered definitions of nationhood (Brubaker 1992). Others such as Howard (2009, 
2006) and Janoski (2010) adopt slightly different variables of departure, suggesting 
that early democratizers or former colonial powers will have more liberal and less 
onerous barriers to citizenship. In either case, the rules for membership in the 
political community, and the policy instruments like jus sanguinis or jus soli for 
granting it, reflect and perpetuate the contours of these long-established national 
orientations over time. 
However, as many scholars have analyzed extensively (Joppke 2007b, 2007a; 




departures from earlier national models, such as the 1998 Dutch Newcomers 
Integration Act (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers) and Germany’s watershed 
Nationality Act (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) in 2000. Furthermore, that many 
governments in recent years have actively begun coupling new civic integration 
requirements to the acquisition of citizenship – in the form of language tests, 
economic restrictions, or civic exams - has reinvigorated debates over national 
models and possible mechanisms of policy change. For some, the shift to integration 
requirements represents restrictive convergence at the further expense of national 
models of citizenship as earlier trends had. As Joppke (2007a) argues, the rise of 
civic requirements represents ‘the weakening of national distinctiveness, and a 
convergence with respect to the general direction and content of integration policy. 
The notion of national models no longer makes sense, if it ever did’ (1-2). Similarly, 
Freeman (2004) concurs that “the staying power of these national models looks 
more and more dubious” (948).  
In response to these recent changes in citizenship policy underway in 
Europe, a growing body of work has begun to examine the domestic politics of 
citizenship. From a strictly ideological perspective, leftist parties generally favor 
more open citizenship policies. These parties tend to favor social egalitarianism and 
solidarity among the working class of which many immigrants are part, and may be 
more prone to see immigrants as constituents or potential constituents. As Messina 
(2007) notes, “the left’s traditional policy agenda tends to dovetail with the 
perceived interests of immigrants” (208). They also tend to favor citizenship 




in efforts to stimulate their integration into society (Joppke 2003a, 430-31; Ersanilli 
and Koopmans 2010, 774; Bird et al. 2011). Conversely, conservative and right-of-
center parties are more likely to favor more restrictive citizenship policies, in part 
because of concerns about the negative impact of immigration on social services, 
crime and terrorism, or national identity (Bale 2003; Ireland 2004). Conservative 
parties also tend to advance the idea that citizenship is a personal incentive to 
integrate and should serve as a reward for successful integration. Eased access, such 
as permitting dual citizenship, undermines the incentive to integrate (Schuck 1998). 
Electorally, because the median voter in advanced democracies tends toward 
restrictionism, conservative parties often have an interest in playing on these 
sentiments and highlighting immigration and nationality issues as strategies in 
party competition (Cornelius et al. 2004; Lahav 2004; Ivarsflaten 2005). Hence by 
this straightforward logic, citizenship policy should liberalize when leftist parties 
are in power, and become more restrictive when conservative parties are in power.  
Electoral threats may complicate these dynamics. The rise of far right parties 
has attracted widespread attention from scholars in recent years (Givens 2005; 
Mudde 2007). The mobilization of anti-immigrant public opinion by these parties on 
the extreme right is thought to present a challenge to both left-of-center and right-
of-center parties on the immigration and citizenship issue. Drawing on spatial 
theories of party and voter behavior (Downs 1957; Meguid 2005), conservative 
parties that may prefer to take a neutral stance on immigration can risk losing 
segments of their base to populist parties on the far right over the issue, and may 




draw support from the native-born working class as well as immigrants, any leftist 
party perceived to favor immigrant issues at the expense of native-born labor could 
lose constituents to far right parties and possibly empower the formation of center-
right governments (Bale et al. 2010). Alonso and Fonseca (2012) go so far as to 
conclude from their study that the extreme right’s effect on conservative parties is 
likely minimal, and its “main impact is not on the mainstream Right but on the Left” 
(880; see also Bale 2008). More generally, Howard (2009) finds that “the issue is not 
simply whether a center-left or center-right government is in power, but whether 
the far right is active and mobilized on the issue of immigration and citizenship 
reform” (61; see also Givens and Luedtke 2005; Schain 2006). In the presence of 
electoral competition from far right parties, then, this ‘contagion from the right’ 
thesis predicts that neither mainstream conservative nor leftist parties would favor 
policy liberalization, and that policies may in fact become more restrictive. 
Others draw different conclusions. Citizenship policies may change over 
time, but the inclusive or exclusive policy legacies inherited from the past set the 
parameters of political debate and constrain change within institutionally defined 
paths. Electoral configurations and the ideological positions of governments 
motivate policy change within lasting and resilient national models. The observed 
diversity of approaches to civic integration ‘do not signal departures from national 
approaches to citizenship, but rather fortify them’ (Goodman 2012a, 692). In other 
words, policy change reinforces distinct national approaches of incorporation. 
A growing number of scholars have combined these dynamic models of 




Mouritsen 2013).5 This perspective maintains that domestic politics interacts with 
the inclusive or exclusive policy legacies inherited from the past. From this 
perspective, all countries have pre-existing institutional orientations of national 
belonging, but rather than remain relatively static fixtures over time, they structure 
the decisions and choices of politicians seeking new policies. Left- and right-
oriented governments may articulate preferences on citizenship and belonging in 
response to new realities, but previous institutional decisions have an important 
feedback effect on their policy-making, setting the parameters within which they 
debate and enact policy change. Citizenship policies may thus change over time, but 
the inclusive or exclusive policy legacies inherited from the past set the parameters 
of political debate and constrain change within institutionally defined paths. For 
example, in her meticulous case-study analysis of civic integration policies across six 
European countries, Goodman (2014) argues that “[c]itizenship orientations not 
only reflect state priorities for inclusion or exclusion through formal rules, but also 
implicit understandings of nationhood and other scripts of belonging” inherited 
from past institutional legacies (78). In this way, new civic integration policies and 
membership requirements ‘do not signal departures from national approaches to 
citizenship, but rather fortify them’ (15).  
Existing explanations for citizenship policy change contain a number of 
ambiguities that require theoretical clarification. First, the more structural and 
macrohistorical explanations seem appropriate for assessing policy starting points 
and defining broad institutional groupings, but it is unclear how they might account 
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for year-to-year policy adjustments or even more radical changes that deviate from 
long-standing institutional origins. Electoral explanations focus on the political 
preferences of domestic policymakers in determining citizenship policy, and the 
ideological orientation of governments in particular, but the relationship between 
party politics and policy change leave a number of questions unanswered. First, if 
leftist parties are consistently pro-immigrant, how do we account for the 
liberalizations that do not occur – the dogs that do not bark – when leftist parties 
are in government? Norway was governed by the left-of-center Norwegian Labour 
Party (DNA) during much of the 1980s and early 1990s without any significant 
threat from the far right, for example, yet no policy liberalization of its rather 
exclusive policy occurred. Second, when is far-right mobilization relevant to actual 
policy change? The liberal VVD in the Netherlands helped pave the way for the 
overtly restrictive turn away from multiculturalism long before Pim Fortuyn and 
Geert Wilders arrived on the far right to advocate a restrictionist agenda. The UK 
Conservatives have had little difficulty pursuing a restrictionist agenda in the 
absence of far-right party pressure. In Denmark, the anti-immigrant Danish People's 
Party has long helped activate restrictive public sentiment, yet their presence did 
not forestall the significant Social Democrat-led policy liberalization in 2014.  
Furthermore, a focus on the right and far right in particular omits any 
consideration of the effects that Green and other parties with clear pro-immigrant 
agendas might have from the far left. On immigration issues generally, left parties 
are threatened electorally not only by conservative and far-right demands for 




multicultural polices. Mainstream Social Democratic and Socialist parties thus risk 
losing conservative working class constituents to an ascendant far right if they 
appear as too pro-immigrant, but also risk alienating their more progressive and 
left-libertarian voters toward other emergent left parties if they adopt a harder line 
(Bale et al. 2010). This competition, and attempts to resist and later adopt right-
wing positions, have caused the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA) to lose core voters to the 
Green Left (GroenLinks) and Socialist Party (SP) throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s, in part while also fending off a growing threat from the right-wing List Pim 
Fortuyn. The Austrian Social Democrats (SPÖ) and Danish Social Democrats 
(Socialdemokratiet) have likewise been squeezed by the populist challenge of 
Haider’s Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Danish People’s Party (DF) on the 
right and the Austrian Greens and Danish Social Liberals (Radikale Venstre) on the 
left. For this reason, explanations of citizenship policy change in Europe arguably 
need to incorporate the electoral threat from the left as much as they do that from 
the right. 
Recent adaptations of the national model/path-dependent literature also 
have their ambiguities. Goodman (2014) discounts as underspecified those 
approaches that give pride of place to government preferences, stating “an exclusive 
focus on the ideological orientation of government can overlook who the real actors 
are behind membership policy” (75). Instead, government orientations are 
constrained by the national understandings of membership, where traditionally 
exclusive citizenship legacies set the parameters of acceptable policy that leftist 




inclusive policy environments (77-80). However, aside from the problem of 
identifying what qualifies as a restrictive or inclusive membership setting, the 
mechanism by which this policy context actually impinges on the preferences and 
actions of elected officials is not altogether clear. It seems unlikely that non-
conservative parties censor their favorable positions toward dual citizenship based 
on what policies were handed down to them from governments of decades prior. 
Indeed, despite operating in the archetypically exclusive Germany, four of the five 
national parties (i.e. all but the right-of-center Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU)) had 
by the early 1990s begun calling for combinations of jus soli and dual citizenship 
where neither existed before. On the other hand, despite inheriting a long legacy of 
easy access to Belgian nationality, the Christian Democrats and conservative-liberal 
VLD parties have shown little equivocation in recent years advancing and passing 
more stringent integration requirements attached to naturalization. As I argue in 
Chapter 3, the context of government ideology does indeed matter, but operates 
through a much more proximate electoral mechanism. 
Finally, aside from detail-rich qualitative accounts, testing these arguments 
empirically has been difficult. In the absence of useful data covering a sufficient 
number of years or countries, much of the quantitative empirical work has been 
confined to assessments of official party positions on immigration derived from 
manifestos and expert surveys (Downs 2001; Bale 2003; Green-Pedersen and 
Krogstrup 2008; Van Spanje 2010; Alonso and Fonseca 2012). While the use of these 
indicators as dependent variables of analysis has yielded important insights about 




party positions, they tell us little about actual policymaking across countries or over 
time. How do party positions on immigration and citizenship translate into policy? 
Do radical right parties matter for policy outputs, or simply for party positions? The 
only scholar to test the relationship between citizenship policy change in particular 
and radical right parties quantitatively is Howard (2010), but finds a positive 
relationship between radical right party strength and restrictive policy change on 
the basis of only two data points, one in the 1980s and one in 2008. Whether the 
extreme right has any substantive effects on actual policy outputs beyond these two 
dates remains an unanswered question that existing analyses are unable to address.  
To answer these questions more precisely, I advance a theory in Chapter 3 
that focuses on when policymakers have an electoral incentive to liberalize (or 
restrict) access to citizenship and the conditions compel them to do so. I incorporate 
more straightforward considerations of the ideological orientation of governments, 
the contagion of radical right parties, or the effects of membership context. Instead, 
this domestic politics approach that I present situates citizenship policy change 
within a proximate electoral context that structures nearly all government 
policymaking and that serves as the causal mechanism for factors such as 
ideological orientations, radical right preferences, and national membership settings 
to play a role in policy outputs. 
Explaining Naturalization 
Thus far I have focused more on the main component of the political supply 
of citizenship in Europe, i.e. the formal policies that regulate immigrant access to 




given variation in citizenship policies across countries, who acquires citizenship, 
and under what conditions? Like citizenship policy, naturalization rates have varied 
widely since the 1970s across European countries. We observe this variation in 
Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, which graphically depict naturalization rates by European 
country and by mean naturalization rate across time. As we see in Figures 2.1 and 
2.2, for example, countries such as Luxembourg, Italy, Germany, and Greece have 
had consistently lower naturalization rates over time, while others such as the 
Netherlands, Great Britain, Portugal, and Sweden exhibit much higher naturalization  





rates over time. Furthermore, naturalization rates vary much less over time in 
countries like Luxembourg, Italy, and France than they do in Belgium, Netherlands, 
or Portugal. In addition, the mean naturalization rate in Europe has varied across 
years as well, as Figure 2.3 reveals. Immigrants acquired citizenship at a very low 
rate in the mid-1970s and in the late to early 1990s, while the acquisition rate 
reached its decades-long high point of 38.44 citizenships per 1,000 immigrants in 
2000. What accounts for such variation? 
Extant explanations to account for variation in naturalization rates have 
drawn from a diverse literature spanning geographic regions and social science 
disciplines. Generally, however, there are three theoretical approaches to explaining  






Figure 2.3: Naturalization Heterogeneity across Time 
 
such variation. One approach largely focuses on the individual-level characteristics 
and motivations of immigrants. Drawing on theories of political participation (Verba 
and Nie 1972), this tradition finds generally that higher socioeconomic status and 
higher levels of education and language proficiency are the main predictors of 
immigrant naturalization (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986, 1990; Portes and Curtis 
1987; Yang 1994; Jones-Correa 1998; Bevelander and Veenman 2006; Chiswick and 
Miller 2008). Length of stay, not surprisingly, has also been shown to increase the 
propensity to naturalize. The reason is that, as Yang (1994) argues, the “costs, 
benefits and meaning of naturalization are the most immediate considerations in 
immigrants' decisions to naturalize” (451). At the individual level, there are a 
number of political, civic, economic, and social rights and privileges that accrue to 




financial and procedural costs that must be born in order to naturalize. Thus, as 
successful economic, social, and cultural adaptation to the receiving country 
increase and those same ties to the country of origin diminish, the benefits of 
acquiring political membership in the receiving country increasingly outweigh the 
costs of severing former country ties or applying for citizenship. Naturalization 
implies a formal commitment to a country, and those with higher levels of 
integration and adaptation in the country of settlement should be more likely to 
formalize this commitment.  
However, with a few exceptions, the political science literature on this 
subject has been predominantly developed from the US case, and thus has not been 
able to assess the potential institutional and structural determinants of 
naturalization and integration from a more systematic and cross-national 
perspective. Rather, this body of literature has largely incorporated naturalization 
and immigrant integration into broader existing models of minority political 
participation, rather than treat these processes as distinct phenomena subject to 
changing institutional and structural variables.6 
One variant of this individual-level work examines the economic incentives 
of naturalization. If immigrants perceive that citizens earn more, perform better, or 
are more upwardly mobile in the labor market than non-citizens, the economically 
motivated immigrant may opt for naturalization to earn this potential premium. The 
premium may take any number of forms: reduced hiring costs for citizens, more 
access to certain types of employment or educational opportunities reserved for 
                                                        





citizens, or less potential job discrimination based on citizenship status. It may serve 
as a device that naturalized immigrants may use to signal a level of integration, 
investment in a country, and reliability to employers who may otherwise question 
an applicant’s commitment to stay in a country. It could also give naturalized 
immigrants access to better wages over time, as well as housing and credit 
(DeVoretz 2008; OECD 2011, 17-18).7 
The majority of attention has gone to individual-level characteristics of 
immigrants themselves. Most of these studies explain variation in naturalization by 
citing the various costs and benefits that accrue to immigrants based on their 
relative access to personal resources (education, income, and language) or their 
degree of socialization and adaptation in the country of destination. But as Jones-
Correa (2001a) argues, these costs and benefits derive from institutional and 
contextual factors “that set constraints and boundaries for political participation, 
and therefore encourage the selective mobilization of political actors” some of 
whom have the resources to participate in naturalization, some of whom do not. In 
other words, immigrants’ decisions to naturalize are structured in large part by the 
institutional and contextual incentives and disincentives they face. For this reason, 
he argues that scholars should “pay significantly more attention to the institutional 
and social context in which immigrants make decisions about participation” (Jones-
Correa 2001a, 54). 
                                                        
7 Although few political scientists have examined the economics of naturalization, a number of 
economists have explored this citizenship premium in both the North American and European 
context (Bratsberg et al. 2002; Bevelander 2000; DeVoretz 2008; DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2004; 
Bevelander and Veenman 2008; OECD 2011). However, the evidence for any post-naturalization 
wage premium or labor-market participation is so far mixed, likely because citizenship acquisition 




To this end, a second theoretical approach examines contextual determinants 
of naturalization. Many scholars have investigated country of origin factors that 
serve as ‘push’ factors of migration that also might determine immigrant proclivities 
toward naturalization. Some have stressed the cultural and linguistic differences 
between immigrants’ countries of origin and destination, physical distance from the 
country of settlement, the comparative benefits of living in a developed country 
versus returning to a poorer and less secure developing one, or the regime type of 
the country of origin (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Yang 1994; Bueker 2005; 
Chiswick and Miller 2008). Because these country of origin factors vary according to 
immigrant subpopulation, they often interact with individual-level characteristics to 
affect naturalization and integration outcomes (Liang 1994; Bueker 2005; Vink et al. 
2013). 
Similarly, the characteristics of the country of settlement may also serve as 
‘pull’ factors of citizenship acquisition. Socioeconomic context, for example, may 
incentivize or disincentivize naturalization. This receiving country factor has found 
very mixed empirical support however. Dronkers and Vink (2012) test GDP per 
capita in the receiving country but find it has no significant effect on citizenship 
acquisition, while Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers (2013) conversely find that 
employment status matters for naturalization, but only for immigrants from less 
developed countries. Janoski (2010) includes economic variables in his study of 
naturalization rates in Europe, but they function only as controls and have no 
substantive effects on naturalization in his analysis. The social context of immigrant 




the size of the ethnic group, the residential segregation, and opportunities for social 
contact between co-ethnics and the native-born (Portes and Curtis 1987; Liang 
1994; Bueker 2006).8 Although the evidence regarding these determinants is also 
quite mixed, recent studies suggest that ethnic isolation diminishes the propensity 
to naturalize, while higher numbers of naturalized co-ethnics increases this 
propensity (Logan et al. 2012). They also find that a context of welcoming attitudes 
encourages naturalization.  
A third and final group of explanations instead emphasizes the role of 
institutional variables. This perspective, more predominant in the comparative than 
in the exclusively American-centered literature, has examined the effects of differing 
institutional approaches to citizenship that define varying opportunity structures 
and barriers to citizenship and integration. Work deriving from Brubaker’s (1992) 
seminal comparative study of the ethnocultural and civic-republican national 
models of Germany and France exemplifies this approach (see also Favell 1998; 
Castles and Miller 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005; Schain 2008). Empirically, most 
studies within this approach focus on the citizenship policies of states themselves. 
More than any other institutional factor, citizenship policy directly stipulates the 
conditions under which immigrants may acquire citizenship and reflect different 
state approaches and strategies of incorporation. They also varies widely across 
                                                        
8 The role of Islam in Europe has generated enormous discussion in recent years (Pauly 2004; 
Modood et al. 2006; Klausen 2009, 2005; Caldwell 2009), a factor whose effect on naturalization has 
not been extensively investigated but may be highly relevant. To my knowledge, only Dronkers and 
Vink (2012) have tested the relationship empirically, and find that while Muslim immigrants are no 
less likely to naturalize than other non-Muslim immigrants, second-generation Muslims are less 
likely. That naturalization and integration outcomes vary significantly across jurisdictions among the 





countries, from provisions for dual citizenship to birthright citizenship (jus soli), 
from language exams to welfare requirements (Vink and de Groot 2010; Goodman 
2010b).  
The empirical work investigating the institutional determinants of 
citizenship acquisition remain in its infancy, but these factors have generated a 
growing literature in recent years. The incentivizing role of dual citizenship has 
attracted the most attention (Jones-Correa 1998, 2001b; Bloemraad 2004; Faist 
2007; Chiswick and Miller 2008; Mazzolari 2009; Vink et al. 2013), although the 
provision of birthright (jus soli) citizenship has now been tested as well (Dronkers 
and Vink 2012). Required years of residence, language exams and civic integration 
tests, welfare and legal requirements function according to a similar logic. Others 
have looked beyond citizenship policy at other institutional factors, such as the 
relative availability of government welfare services to immigrants in the United 
States (Jones-Correa 2001b; Bloemraad 2002; Logan et al. 2012).9 
One strength of this theoretical perspective is that it permits analysis of the 
institutionally-induced costs and benefits of citizenship acquisition that may 
interact with individual-level resources and incentives. According to Yang (1994), 
the benefits of citizenship often include the right of voting,10 family sponsorship, a 
new passport and travel flexibility, as well as improved access to employment, 
welfare, and educational benefits, while the costs entail additional national 
                                                        
9 In the United States, for example, scholars have examined how the passage of Proposition 187 and 
the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, both of which limited 
welfare benefits to non-citizens, affected immigrant interest in naturalization.  
10 Given that many European countries now grant local voting rights to immigrants regardless of 
citizenship status, whether such rights affect the incentives to integrate into receiving countries and 




obligations to the receiving country, such as military service, loss of homeland 
rights, the psychological cost of renouncing one’s homeland, residency 
requirements, language requirements, and administrative costs related to 
applications and naturalization exams. Within the political opportunity structure of 
citizenship law, or what Freeman (2004) calls ‘the intersection of institutional 
incentive structures and the strategic decisions of migrants themselves’ (950), 
immigrants must navigate the legal contours of state policy that shape immigrant 
behavior and strategy regarding integration and citizenship acquisition. Citizenship 
requirements and other institutional factors provide this structure and facilitate 
access for some and impose restrictions on others, from the cultural cost of giving 
up one’s former citizenship to the linguistic cost of learning a new language. These 
rules of the nationality acquisition game, to paraphrase North (1990), incentivize 
some able and willing migrants to pay the respective cost of citizenship for 
membership, while they discourage or screen altogether others from doing so.  
While these institutional drivers of citizenship acquisition have received 
some theoretical and empirical treatment in the literature, much of the empirical 
work focused on Europe has been based on country case studies (Diehl and Blohm 
2003; Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012; Euwals et al. 2010) or cross-national 
survey data limited to a single year (Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink et al. 2013). But 
evaluations based on single years or a handful of cases constrains our ability to 
evaluate the correlates of citizenship policy across countries and across time, 
rendering it difficult to draw inferences about the institutional effects of policy.11 
                                                        




Furthermore, as diverse and extensive as this institutional and context-focused 
literature has become, a number of questions remain, the answers to which would 
greatly enhance our understanding of citizenship acquisition. The first set of 
questions regards the effects of policy. How exactly does policy matter for 
naturalization outcomes? Which specific citizenship requirements affect 
immigrants’ incentives to naturalize, and which do not? How do policy changes over 
time affect acquisitions over time? The second set of questions regards the effects of 
context in the country of settlement. How might the context in which immigrants 
find themselves incentivize or disincentivize their citizenship acquisition? Can 
politics affect citizenship acquisition beyond policy?  
Citizenship Policy Indices 
To assess citizenship policies empirically and avoid subjective and untestable 
generalizations made by the national models literature, there has been a 
proliferation of efforts to quantify citizenship policies across countries and over 
time. The comparison and analysis of these indices has even attracted attention, 
leading one observer to muse skeptically that with ‘almost as many indices as there 
are such studies… one might wonder whether it matters which indices we use’ 
(Helbling 2013, 555). But while each of these indices contributes valuable empirical 
insights into the specific phenomena for which they were developed, their utility for 
assessing the causes and consequences of long-term citizenship policy change 
remains limited. Some are coded for single years and are thus limited in their ability 
to measure long-term temporal change (CITLAW by Jeffers et al. (2012); MIPEX by 




CIVIX focus meticulously on the extent and sequencing of the single dimension of 
citizenship acquisition. A number of recent indices do measure citizenship policy in 
select years over longer spans of time, including Howard’s (2009, 2010, 2006) 
Citizenship Policy Index (CPI), Koopmans et al.’s (2005; 2012) Index of Citizenship 
Rights for Immigrants (ICRI), and Janoski’s (2010) Barriers to Nationality Index 
(BNI). There remain however a number of limitations in these indices that impede 
our ability to draw inferences about policy changes, their proximate and long-term 
causes, and their immediate effects on integration and naturalization.  
First, examining diachronic change on the basis of a few years may lead to 
inaccurate conclusions about the stability and homogeneity of different regime 
types. For example, although the CPI records net restrictions for Austria between 
two data points in the 1980s and 2008, the ICRI and BNI also measure citizenship in 
1990 and 2002 and reveal Austria liberalized in the 1980s while it restricted access 
in subsequent decades. All three indices indicate net liberalization for the 
Netherlands, but the two latter indices suggest that this liberalization occurred 
primarily in the 1980s, followed by a subsequent restrictive backlash. The CPI codes 
France as a net liberalizer from the 1980s to 2008, while overlooking the important 
restrictions imposed in the 1980s that the BNI and ICRI discern. In order to make 
inferences about how electoral politics and other time-bound variables reinforce or 
upend national citizenship orientations, or how these policies affect immediate 
naturalization and integration outcomes, we cannot simply assume that countries 





Second, abbreviated time frames may be problematic for the inferences that 
we draw about continuity and change. Howard (2006, 2010) treats the 1980s as the 
starting point for the CPI, with an effective cut-off date of 1990, since ‘in most cases 
the laws in the 1980s were identical to – or closely in line with – the historical 
origins of each country’s laws’ (2010, 738). But the BNI codes an additional year, 
1970, which suggests that six of the countries in Howard’s study changed their 
policy sharply during the 1970s. Sweden’s initial post-war citizenship law, for 
example, was among the more restrictive in Europe, institutionalizing the principle 
of jus sanguinis, avoidance of dual citizenship, and requiring language proficiency, 
good conduct, and proof of economic self-sufficiency, before it began to liberalize in 
the 1970s and 1980s (Sandesjö and Björk 2005, 1996; Bernitz 2012). Belgium 
occupies the second-most liberal position in the CPI if we take the 1980s as a 
starting point, but begins as the most restrictive with the BNI’s 1970 reference 
point. As a consequence, one would conclude from the former that Belgium’s 
trajectory has reinforced its liberal orientation over the period, while Belgium 
would appear as among the strongest deviators from its starting point according to 
the latter. 
This critique may suggest that more recent indices such as the BNI and ICRI 
which include additional years as data points thus fill in any necessary temporary 
gaps left by earlier indices such as the CPI. On its face this is true, yet they too leave 
decades-long spans of time unaccounted for. While this may not be a problem for 
assessing long-term continuity and change over the course of decades, it is 




policy within those decades. For example, France and the Netherlands both altered 
their citizenship policies several times during the course of the 1990s, including 
both restrictions and liberalizations, neither of which are necessarily measured by 
existing indices. Over the last decade, citizenship policies have changed on a nearly 
annual basis in many European countries. What specific electoral motivations have 
caused these changes? Have these changes affected immigrants’ proclivity to acquire 
citizenship? Taking measures of policy at the bookends of each decade mean that we 
miss these intra-decadal dynamics, meaning that scholars currently lack the 
measures to sufficiently answer these questions. In order to draw inferences about 
how electoral politics or other proximate variables reinforce or upend citizenship 
orientations, or how these policies affect immediate naturalization outcomes, we 
cannot simply assume that countries retain their comparative levels of 
restrictiveness or accessibility within wider intervals. 
Finally, the theoretical underpinnings of existing indices often remain 
ambiguous. As Helbling (2011) notes, ‘existing citizenship indicators seem to 
measure the same theoretical concept but that it is unclear what this concept is… 
scholars seldom specify what they really seek to explain’ (4). Some indices, for 
example, are conceptualized in terms of policy inclusiveness (Howard 2006, 452; 
Koopmans et al. 2012, 1223). But conceptualizing citizenship policies as inclusive or 
non-inclusive may be problematic theoretically since, as Goodman (2012b) 
effectively argues elsewhere, “policies may not necessarily or neatly graft onto an 
inclusive-exclusive scale” (177). The ICRI, for example, measures policy on two 




is not theoretically straightforward. Residential requirements and welfare and 
social security dependence, for example, are used to indicate either an ethnic or 
civic-territorial conception of citizenship, but it is unclear how these indicators 
relate to either ethnicity or civic-territoriality. Dual citizenship is an indicator of 
individual inclusiveness in an earlier version of the ICRI but an indicator of cultural 
inclusiveness in a more recent version, calling into question just how independent 
the two dimensions are.  
Measures of inclusiveness also beg the questions, inclusive for whom, and by 
what metric? Indices like MIPEX measure nationality polices according to whether 
they “facilitate or hinder participation” and to their impact on integration 
(Huddleston et al. 2011a, 7-8) without specifying the mechanism by which this 
occurs. MIPEX awards low scores for citizenship tests or restrictions on dual 
citizenship that purportedly undermine successful integration. But as Goodman 
(2012b, 177-78) points out, these impediments to integration may actually enable it. 
Language requirements may be exclusive for some immigrants, but foster inclusion 
for others. Tests and restrictions on dual citizenship may hinder participation, but 
they might also facilitate it. Immigrants who acquire citizenship easily in France 
may be more, or less, integrated than immigrants in Germany who acquire it after a 
rigorous screening process. The causal relationship between citizenship 
requirements and integration is then arguably an empirical question for 
investigation rather a basis for an index, and comparing citizenship policies in terms 
of their presumed effects could lead analysts to generate misleading hypotheses 




to integration. Specifying measures of the underlying institutional structure of 
citizenship acquisition is necessarily and logically prior to creating measures in 
terms of their outcomes. 
Conclusion 
As the preceding review reveals, a prodigious amount of work exists on the 
causes and consequences of citizenship policy. The literature examining the causes 
of citizenship policy focus on various historical, structural, and electoral factors, but 
few entail systematic analyses of the direction, content, or timing of such policy 
change. The literature examining the consequences of citizenship policy on 
naturalization and integration focus on individual, contextual, or institutional 
factors, but are likewise limited in their assessments of these trends over significant 
amounts of time or space. Neither the literature on the causes nor on the 
consequences of citizenship policy speak to one another, but as I posit in the next 
chapter, these causes and consequences are interrelated and need to be understood 
as different sides of the same coin.  
However, to draw inferences about policy changes and their causes and 
effects, we first need a more theoretically precise conceptualization of citizenship 
policy. As I argue in Chapter 4, citizenship policies are not so much inclusive or 
exclusive, but differentially inclusive according to varying state strategies of 
integration. They are non-inclusive in that they purposefully disincentivize 
citizenship acquisition for certain immigrant populations, but inclusive in that they 
incentivize acquisition among others. Likewise, they are differentially integration-




form of integration in others. Once we have a more theoretically precise and 
methodologically expansive measure of citizenship, we will be better positioned to 




 The Supply and Demand of Citizenship  
As diverse and extensive as the citizenship literature has become, I argued in 
the previous chapter that a number of questions about the causes and consequences 
of citizenship remain, the answers to which would greatly enhance our 
understanding of citizenship policymaking and citizenship acquisition. In terms of 
citizenship policymaking, structural and macrohistorical accounts seem limited for 
assessing policy change on an annual basis, while electoral explanations tend to 
focus too strongly on the ideological preferences of domestic policymakers, and the 
preferences of the far right in particular, in determining citizenship policy. But these 
accounts fail to explain the circumstances under which far-right mobilization is 
relevant for policy change, or the role that other parties, especially those on the left, 
might play in citizenship policymaking. Testing these arguments empirically has 
further been hampered by the lack of measures of policy covering a sufficient 
number of years or countries. In terms of citizenship acquisition, I suggested that 
more attention needs to be paid to institutionally and contextually-induced costs 
and benefits that structure the naturalization decisions of immigrants, but absent 
detailed policy measures, we still know relatively little regarding the impact of 
policy on naturalization outcomes. We also know relatively little about other 
political factors beyond formal policy that might affect these outcomes.   
In this chapter I advance a new theoretical framework for understanding the 
incentive structure governing citizenship policymaking, citizenship acquisition, and 
immigrant integration in Europe. I first argue that citizenship policy in Europe 




demographic pressures inherited from past citizenship policy legacies. I then situate 
citizenship policy alongside varying ideological contexts that comprise what I call 
the political supply of citizenship. Finally, I theorize how different socioeconomic, 
legal, and political contexts structure the lives of immigrants and create what I call 
an immigrant demand for citizenship. Naturalization rates, and the corresponding 
level of integration required to naturalize, are the equilibrium result of the 
interaction between this varying immigrant demand for citizenship and the 
respective political supply of citizenship. The framework here generates a number 
of testable hypotheses that guide the empirical analysis of subsequent chapters. I 
also discuss some additional implications from the theory that may contribute to 
our understanding of citizenship policymaking and the politics of immigration in 
Europe today. Figure 3.1 below captures my theoretical framework. 
Explaining Citizenship Policymaking: Party Competition and Demographic 
Change 
My explanation for citizenship policymaking is located in the upper-left 
corner of the theoretical framework in Figure 3.1. Building on the theoretical and 
empirical literature reviewed in Chapter 2, I situate citizenship policy outcomes 
within a proximate electoral context that structures nearly all government 
policymaking and that gives policymakers an electoral incentive to liberalize (or 
restrict) access to citizenship when certain conditions compel them to do so. In the 
most straightforward interpretation of the model without feedback from previous 
naturalization and integration outcomes, citizenship policy as a variable results 




immigrant population. First, rather than focus on the particular ideological 
orientation of the government, or the strength of the radical right in particular, I 
argue that concerns about electoral competition on both sides of the spectrum 
drives citizenship policymaking. Let us first consider the right of the political 
spectrum. Here, mainstream conservative and Christian Democratic parties in many 
country contexts face competition from other right parties, especially but not always 
from the far right. Other ascendant mainstream right-of-center parties may also 
provide this threat. As Bale (2008) forcefully argues, “to privilege ‘reacting to the far 
right’ as the explanatory variable for policy change on migration and 
multiculturalism effected (or urged on other parties) by the centre right is a 
mistake.” In the competition for vote share, all right-of-center parties may be 
tempted to politicize the immigration issue if it strengthens their electoral hand. 
Consequently, in an electoral atmosphere dominated by electoral competition on 
the right, I would expect right-of-center governments to be most likely to enact 
policies that restrict access to citizenship and increase the requirements to acquire 
it. Where far right parties join the government, citizenship policy is highly likely to 
be restricted. Because left-of-center parties may likewise be tempted toward 
restrictive positions where the immigration issue is politicized, I would also expect 
centrist governments and grand coalitions to be more prone to restrictive change 
where right party competition is high.  
At the opposite end of the political spectrum, I expect electoral competition 
on the left to incentivize left-oriented governments to liberalize citizenship policy. 









for traditional socialist and labor/working-class political parties, but other new 
parties on the left are increasingly adopting pro-immigrant and multicultural 
positions on the issue as well.  In recent decades, as new parties such as the Greens 
have arisen to create new competition for traditional left parties, mainstream and 
traditional left-of-center parties find themselves facing smaller vote margins on the 
left caused by increased left-of-center party competition. In contexts with 
heightened left party competition, left-oriented governments and governments with 
far left party participation should be more likely to liberalize citizenship policy in an 
attempt to curry favor with left-libertarians and potential immigrant voters. 
Because parties of the far left do not usually threaten to steal votes from traditional 
right-of-center parties, left party competition should have little effect on right-of-
center governments. 
This theoretical intuition about citizenship policymaking leads to my first 
general hypothesis:  
H.CP1: Policy change should be most likely to occur under governments that 
emerge from the side of the spectrum where competition is strongest.  
Right-of-center governments emerging in party systems with greater right 
party competition should be more likely to restrict their citizenship policies in a 
given year, while left-of-center governments in contexts of greater left party 
competition should be more likely to liberalize their citizenship policies. What 
happens in the absence of significant right or left party competition, or in the 
presence of both? In the absence of strong right party competition, all parties should 




restriction diminishes. Where little substantive left party competition exists, I 
likewise expect the likelihood of liberalization to be much lower. When both are 
absent, few governments should have the electoral incentive to politicize the issue, 
and thus I expect little policy change from the current status quo. When competition 
is heightened on both sides of the political spectrum, however, the predictions are a 
bit more nuanced but follow a similar logic. Policy change should still occur most 
frequently under governments facing the acute electoral threat, but source of 
competition is more relative. Thus stronger competition on the right relative to the 
left should compel right-oriented governments to restrict policy, and vice versa with 
left-oriented governments. 
Second, the size of the naturalized immigrant population in liberal 
democracies may function as an additional and potentially alternative mechanism 
for citizenship policy stasis and liberal change. As Freeman (1995) argues, “the 
direction of policy in liberal democracies is mostly a function of which fragments of 
the public have the incentives and resources to organize around immigration issues” 
since “immigration tends to produce concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, giving 
those who benefit from immigration greater incentives to organize than persons 
who bear its costs” (885).12 In other words, vote-maximizing elected officials have 
every incentive to cater to vocal and well-organized constituents at the expense of 
the restrictionist but generally unorganized mass public, and well-organized pro-
                                                        
12 This argument builds on an earlier work by Wilson (1980) investigating the type of politics that 





immigrant constituencies have every incentive to vocalize their interests over those 
of the public. 
Among those that have such an incentive are the democracy’s previously 
naturalized immigrants themselves. Countries that initially had relatively open 
immigration and citizenship regimes in the post-war period, such as the United 
Kingdom or France, developed sizable and increasingly organized immigrant 
electorates in the subsequent decades, whereas countries such as Germany did not. 
These immigrants who acquired citizenship then also acquired the right to vote, and 
in many cases developed tight-knit constituencies in favor of immigrant rights 
(Koopmans et al. 2012, 1234). These organized immigrant electorates in such 
countries became better able to encourage pro-immigrant policy reforms, or at least 
help sustain previously pro-immigrant policies. My expectation is that sizable 
immigrant populations in the earlier postwar period should affect future policy 
change, but the effect should be conditional. Countries with initially accessible 
citizenship regimes enabled a sizable and increasingly organized immigrant 
electorate to develop in the subsequent decades that may help sustain pro-
immigrant policies over time. Conversely, restrictive countries like Germany, 
Denmark, or Greece lacked the initial development of organized immigrant 
constituencies that would serve as a powerful electoral incentive to legislate pro-
immigrant policies in later periods. Even a restrictive country like Austria with a 
larger immigrant population in the early postwar period might witness not an 




backlash against a large non-citizen population, creating an incentive to formulate 
even more restrictive policies. This leads to my second hypothesis: 
H.CP2: Larger immigrant populations in countries with generally liberal 
citizenship policies in the post-war years will help sustain accessible, liberalized 
policies in subsequent decades, while larger immigrant populations in countries 
with generally restrictive citizenship policies in the post-war years will be 
unable to forestall pressures for restrictive policies in subsequent decades. 
An alternative explanation to the one just discussed stems from a path 
dependency perspective (Goodman 2012a; Mouritsen 2013). Adopting the 
perspective of Pierson (1993), the effects of a previous policy becoming causes of 
later policy outputs, and domestic politics interacts with the inclusive or exclusive 
policy legacies inherited from the past. Left- and right-oriented governments may 
articulate preferences on citizenship and belonging, but previous policy decisions 
set the parameters within which they debate and enact policy change. As Goodman 
(2014) argues, “[c]itizenship orientations not only reflect state priorities for 
inclusion or exclusion through formal rules, but also implicit understandings of 
nationhood and other scripts of belonging” inherited from past institutional legacies 
(78). In this way, government orientations are constrained by the national 
understandings of membership, where traditionally exclusive citizenship legacies 
set the parameters of acceptable policy that leftist governments may pursue and 
enact, and vice versa with conservative parties in inclusive policy environments 




explains the future development of it. The general path-dependent hypothesis as an 
alternative explanation for citizenship policy stasis would be formulated as follows: 
H.CP3: Citizenship policies will remain largely similar in their degree of 
accessibility or restrictiveness to citizenship policies of the postwar period. 
In Chapter 5, I discuss the theory in more detail, offer more specific empirical 
implications of the theory, and test the theory across sixteen European countries 
from 1970 to the present using the Integration Cost of Citizenship Index as my 
dependent variable. I now turn to the second component of my broader theoretical 
framework, the political supply and immigrant demand for citizenship.  
Explaining Citizenship Acquisition: Overview and Definitions  
Variation in naturalization across European countries and over time can be 
explained by what I describe as the integration context of naturalization. In this 
study I use the term integration to refer to the process by which immigrants achieve 
equal and permanent membership in the requisite domains of life as defined by the 
receiving country.13 The degree of integration is simply the extent to which 
immigrants have assumed membership within these domains. However, as Joppke 
and Morawska (2003) and Freeman (2004) both point out, any discussion on 
integration presupposes the existence of a well-integrated society. Thus the 
particular integration context – the economic, political, and social milieu within 
which immigrants live, naturalize, and ultimately integrate – may not be so 
                                                        
13 These domains may entail belonging in economic, social, linguistic, cultural, civic, and/or legal 
domains of belonging. This process entails both the agency of individual immigrants as well as the 
larger institutional structures that facilitate access for these immigrants. For further discussion of 




coherently integrated itself. If this is the case, then any discussion of naturalization – 
the process of acquiring citizenship in a country by meeting some threshold of 
integration-related criteria – should consider how this integration context 
conditions this process. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine significant interest in 
acquiring citizenship among immigrants living in economically depressed, post-
industrial communities, or likewise much interest in offering it among populist 
politicians who thrive on the nativist, xenophobic sentiment of their disillusioned 
and socially atomized constituencies. Naturalization rates then may reflect the 
conduciveness of the immigrant’s environment for acquiring citizenship as much as 
his or her individual attributes or willingness to acquire it. 
Unlike previous work that examines the effects of citizenship policies on 
naturalization or integration, or individual-level correlates of naturalization 
decisions, I seek to uncover how these forces operate in tandem. I argue that 
naturalization as a phenomenon cannot be understood without reference to the 
broader structures and contexts that affect their perceptions of and demand for 
citizenship, and the political interests of policymakers who supply citizenship 
according to legislated criteria. I thus seek to explain naturalization as a product of 
immigrant responses to their integration context and the political interests of 
policymakers responsible for citizenship and naturalization decisions, as 
represented in Figure 3.1 above.  
My theory conceptualizes the citizenship acquisition process in terms of a 
kind of marketplace for citizenship, with an immigrant demand for citizenship and a 




given time period and place.14  Immigrant demand for citizenship can be high or 
low, and political willingness to supply citizenship to immigrants can be likewise 
high or low. The number of naturalizations varies from high to low according to the 
intersection of these two variables. The variable naturalization rate also entails a 
certain cost at which immigrants will be willing to acquire citizenship and political 
actors will be willing to supply it. Although this cost can be understood at a basic 
level in terms of the monetary and administrative costs that must be paid in order to 
acquire a new passport, there are other non-monetary and non-administrative costs 
(see Yang 1994). The requirements for citizenship increasingly reflect the 
immigrant applicant’s level of integration into the society. Examples include 
learning a new language, which may be viewed as a form of cultural integration, or 
giving up one’s former citizenship, which may be interpreted as a form of civic, 
economic, or psychological integration. Even paying the required application fees 
may reflect one’s economic integration.  
Therefore, I define the integration cost of citizenship as the net price in terms 
of integration that an immigrant must ‘pay’ in order to acquire citizenship in a given 
naturalization context. In some contexts policymakers may demand that a high 
integration cost be paid, while in other cases a lower integration price will suffice. 
Like the naturalization rate, the equilibrium integration cost is endogenous to the 
supply and demand of citizenship and thus the same variables that determine their 
                                                        
14 By casting naturalization in supply and demand terms, I am not arguing that citizenship 
acquisition is a purely economic decision subject to purely economic forces. As the subsequent 
explication reveals, the theorized price of citizenship, as well as the factors that affect immigrant 
demand, political supply, and the equilibrium price, reflect political, social, psychological, and 




values. The variables that shift the demand and supply of citizenship, which I 
elaborate upon below, are thus factors that indirectly determine the naturalization 
rates and integration cost in a given context. In other words, I hypothesize that the 
political supply of citizenship and the immigrant demand for citizenship determine the  
naturalization rate and level of integration expected of new citizens in any given 
country context.  The dynamics of this unregulated marketplace are illustrated in 
Figure 3.2 below. 
Immigrant Demand for Citizenship Acquisition 
While citizenship acquisition is not exactly conducted within a formal 
marketplace, and a passport is not exactly a good or service to be demanded by a 
purchasing public in the same way that vehicles or appliance repairs are demanded, 
I argue that this framework is nonetheless quite useful for understanding why some   
immigrants may naturalize while others do not. As the law of supply and demand 
demonstrates in basic microeconomics, the quantity of any good or service 
demanded increases as the price of the good or service decreases. I expect the 
demand schedule for citizenship to follow a similar trend: as the integration cost 
required for naturalization increases, immigrant demand for citizenship should 
generally decrease. This makes intuitive sense, since fewer immigrants should 
choose to naturalize when it is relatively more costly to do so, and more immigrants 









Graphically, this correlation between rate of naturalization and costliness of 
naturalization suggests a negatively sloped curve, as depicted by the line D in Figure 
3.2 above.15 
Holding price constant, immigrant demand for citizenship also changes in 
response to exogenous variables, similar to the shifts in the demand schedule 
postulated in economics. In economics, these shifts may result from changes in one’s 
level of disposable income, in one’s expectations about the future value of the good 
or service, in the value of other substitutable options, or in one’s tastes for the good 
or service. Similarly, when analyzing citizenship, I argue that similar shifts in 
demand may result from exogenous changes in one’s socioeconomic or political 
circumstances, in one’s assessment of the future value of citizenship for 
socioeconomic and political prospects, in the value of other citizenship status 
options (namely retaining the citizenship of the country of origin), or in one’s 
cultural or identity-related ‘tastes’. 
First, let us explore the first exogenous determinant of demand shifts. How 
might socioeconomic and political context affect the immigrant demand for 
citizenship and thus shapes naturalization decisions? In areas with strong economic 
growth and high employment rates, and where immigrant skill level corresponds to 
job availability, immigrant unemployment and immigrant dependence on welfare 
                                                        
15 I do not make any assumptions regarding the elasticity of citizenship demand, or the 
responsiveness of demand for citizenship to changes in the costliness of naturalizing. However, to the 
extent that immigrants are eligible for acquiring citizenship in a given country, I assume that such 
immigrants will behave rationally to the extent that they are responsive to the costliness of 
citizenship in the host country vis-à-vis their permanent resident status or their citizenship in their 
country of origin. In other words, I assume that immigrants will respond to changes in relative 





should be lower. I interpret this as an indicator of higher socioeconomic attachment 
to a given society. Concurrently, incidence of xenophobia and discrimination against 
foreigners should remain lower and marginalized, which eliminates a major social 
and cultural obstacle to seeking citizenship. Ceteris paribus, I would expect demand 
for citizenship to increase, because high socioeconomic integration means that one 
can and will afford the commensurate costs of political and cultural integration 
required to naturalize. Unencumbered by scarce resources, immigrants in such 
dynamic contexts may find that the benefits of naturalization outweigh its costs.  
However, in poor socioeconomic contexts, the result is just the opposite, and 
more tragic. Because of deindustrialization since the 1970s across the developed 
world, and in many areas in which Europe’s early waves of migrants settled, the 
once abundant factories that offered Europe’s predominantly low- and middle-class 
immigrants the prospects for socioeconomic advancement and participation have 
disappeared, leaving behind a population of generally low-skill labor that is ill-
prepared for a post-industrial, services-based economy. All members of this class 
feel these effects, but the non-native segment is more dramatically impacted. Fewer 
places of employment offer immigrants and their offspring less economic stability, 
fewer opportunities for social interaction, less social capital, and fewer avenues for 
political engagement. To paraphrase Hirschman (1970), for many immigrants exit - 
return migration or social ghettoization - may be a more preferable strategy to 
loyalty – in this case, citizenship acquisition. Within these socioeconomic 
circumstances, I would expect demand for citizenship to decrease, because low 




commensurate costs of political, economic, and social integration necessary to 
acquire citizenship. Simply put, immigrants in such circumstances could find better 
uses of their scarce resources and better returns for their cultural and political 
loyalties. Furthermore, citizenship in the receiving country may be essentially 
valueless in the present: it delivers no additional socioeconomic benefits or security, 
nor would it help validate or reflect a certain socioeconomic status. The costs of 
citizenship would seem to outweigh its benefits. 
Second and relatedly, immigrant demand for citizenship in one year should 
increase as the perceived future economic or political value of citizenship status 
increases, or the expected future cost of citizenship increases. For some immigrants, 
changes in one’s assessment of the future value of citizenship may affect the demand 
for citizenship today. If an economically integrated immigrant believes that 
naturalizing in the country of residence will enhance his or her socioeconomic, 
political, or cultural prospects in the future rather than remain an immigrant or 
return to his or her country of origin where the prospects for the future are worse, 
we might expect that more immigrants will desire citizenship. Citizenship likely 
brings greater economic opportunity and future job security, as suggested by 
existing empirical evidence (Bevelander and Veenman 2006; Euwals et al. 2010; 
OECD 2011). It might also enhance one’s sense of belonging and reflect a certain 
social status (Diehl and Blohm 2003). To the extent that one becomes economically 
well-integrated in a society, political citizenship is one’s means of participating as a 
full and permanent member of that society in the future. I expect this optimism to be 




Conversely, an immigrant facing more bleak socioeconomic prospects in the country 
of settlement in the future may be equally pessimistic that naturalizing in the 
country of residence will not enhance his or her socioeconomic, political, or cultural 
prospects in the future. With high unemployment among natives and immigrants 
alike, citizenship may only have a marginal effect on future employment 
opportunities.  
In other cases, expected changes in the cost of citizenship in the future may 
incentivize citizenship acquisition in the present. If immigrants anticipate that 
citizenship will be more or less expensive in the future, then citizenship acquisition 
might appear more or less valuable today than waiting until the cost of it changes. 
Because countries are adjusting citizenship policies with increased regularity in 
Europe today, such policy changes are potentially newsworthy items, especially 
among immigrant communities. Assuming at least some immigrants are well-
informed about national policies affecting their own status and that of their 
community, it may well be the case that knowledge of future changes in the 
requirements for citizenship – of higher or lower language standards, a new 
citizenship exam, future acceptance of dual citizenship, or higher or reduced fees to 
acquire citizenship – affect the rationale motivating naturalization decisions. 
Citizenship today without the rigors of a citizenship exam or relinquishing your 
original citizenship appears much more valuable than the same nationality status 
next year acquired after hours of studying for a citizenship exam or giving up your 
original citizenship. Furthermore, as xenophobia and radical right party support 




changes in the cost of citizenship might incentivize additional acquisitions today, 
rather than delays until the political climate worsens and citizenship becomes more 
costly. In this fluid policy environment, I expect more immigrants to demand 
citizenship ahead of more restrictive citizenship policy changes, and more 
immigrants to demand citizenship after waiting for more liberal and accessible 
changes. 
Third, the relative value of non-citizenship vis-à-vis other legal status options 
may change today or in the future, causing shifts in overall immigrant demand for 
citizenship. These may take the form of either changes in the value of non-
citizenship status in the country of residence, or the value of retaining citizenship 
status with the country of origin. On the one hand, changing the value of non-
citizenship may affect the demand for naturalization in a country. The growing 
importance of jus domicilii in immigrant-receiving democracies, whereby 
permanent residents are granted domestic rights on the basis of their domicile in 
the country rather than their birthright or citizenship status, is perhaps the most 
important factor here. Many receiving countries have extended a number of civil, 
political, and social rights to legal permanent residents in recent years, leading to a 
decoupling of formal citizenship from much of its substance (Hollifield 1992; 
Bauböck 1994; Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1998; Joppke 1999, 2001). 
According to Hammar (1990), this trend has resulted in a status called denizenship, 
whereby immigrants enjoy a relatively secure residence status as well as rights 
nearly commensurate with citizens. In addition, seventeen European countries now 




2008; Hayduk and Wucker 2004). While national elections still remain largely 
reserved for citizens only, this trend may likewise reduce the value of citizenship 
vis-à-vis denizenship. Moreover, since the introduction of EU citizenship for intra-
EU migrants, the benefits of naturalizing in another European country are in most 
circumstances negligible compared to the benefits of retaining citizenship in the 
country of origin. Not surprisingly, such trends that increase the value of non-
citizenship should dampen immigrant demand for naturalization. Rendering non-
citizenship more costly may have the opposite effect on demand. For instance, the 
heated public rhetoric and political discussions in the United States surrounding the 
rights and privileges of non-citizens during the 1990s, and numerous ensuing 
efforts to curtail those rights and privileges, contributed to an increase in 
naturalizations in the years prior to the policy changes, as previous research has 
found (Jones-Correa 2001a; Escobar 2004). Likewise, if the future status of non-
citizens becomes less hospitable, then such conditions may incentivize more 
acquisitions. Thus I expect decreases in the value of non-citizenship should bolster 
demand for citizenship and increase naturalization rates. 
On the other hand, changes in the value of citizenship in the country of origin 
may have similar effects on immigrant demand for citizenship in the receiving 
country. Countries of origin vary in their citizenship policy toward their immigrants 
abroad, and many may attempt to render their own passports more valuable as an 
attempt to maintain immigrant loyalty and transnational ties from abroad. An 
increasing number of sending countries are extending dual citizenship or additional 




Ogelman 1998; Itzigsohn 2000; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001; Jones-Correa 
2001a; Escobar 2004; Faist and Kivisto 2007; Faist 2007; Bloemraad et al. 2008). 
These range from property and inheritance rights to welfare benefits to the right to 
vote from abroad (Itzigsohn 2000; Bauböck 2006). This may have the effect of 
diminishing demand for citizenship in the receiving country. In addition, the 
economic or political circumstances in the country of origin may affect demand for 
citizenship in the country of settlement. If economic conditions become especially 
dismal or the political context more precarious back home, immigrants may desire 
to severe ties to such a context, increasing the demand for citizenship in the country 
of settlement. Conversely, if the economic performance of the country of origin 
exceeds that of the host country, immigrants may be incentivized to return home in 
greater numbers rather than naturalize. Hence immigrants may consider retaining 
citizenship in their country of origin as valuable insurance should their prospects in 
the country of settlement diminish, or acquire it in their country of settlement if 
conditions back home deteriorate. In this case, demand for citizenship in the 
receiving country varies according to alternative status options. 
Fourth, it may be that immigrants choose to naturalize or not simply due to 
changing cultural identities or preferences for the culture of the receiving country. 
Stronger identification with the host country may increase demand for citizenship in 
the host country. Thus it may be that second-generation immigrants ‘feel’ more 
German or Dutch than their parents and thus opt for citizenship in their respective 
country. Likewise, weakened identification with or cultural preference for the host 




terms, as ‘tastes’ or preferences regarding the host country change, demand for that 
citizenship should change accordingly. 
Each of these factors then may increase or decrease overall demand for 
citizenship among immigrants, at a given integration price. The changing level of 
demand for citizenship is illustrated by the curves labeled D1 and D2 in Figure 3.2. 
My hypotheses for the demand for citizenship are based on how immigrants 
respond to these factors deriving from their integration context: 
H.D1: The strength of the socioeconomic context of a country should be 
positively associated with the immigrant demand for citizenship, which should 
increase commensurate naturalization rates. 
H.D2: As the perceived future economic or political value of citizenship status 
in the country increases, or as the expected future cost of citizenship increases, 
immigrant demand for citizenship in the current year should increase, reflected 
in increased naturalization rates.  
H.D3: As the relative value of non-citizenship decreases, immigrant demand for 
citizenship – and consequently naturalization rates – should increase.  
H.D4: As identification with the host country’s culture increases, immigrant 
demand for citizenship should increase alongside naturalization rates.16  
In Chapter 6, I revisit and operationalize these hypotheses in more detail in order to 
test the theoretical framework. 
                                                        
16 Because identification with the host country’s culture is a variable not readily discernible at the 
national level, I do not test this hypothesis in this project. However, the expectation is fully in line 





The Political Supply of Citizenship and the Cost of Integration 
Determining rates of citizenship acquisition also requires us to assess the 
integration context in terms of the willingness of political actors to provide 
citizenship, i.e. the political supply of citizenship. In economics, as the price of a 
quantity of a good or service increases, the willingness of firms to supply that good 
or service increases. Similarly, in a state without a national citizenship policy, I 
would expect the willingness of that state to supply citizenship to immigrants to 
increase as the level of integration achieved by immigrants increases, as depicted by 
the S curve in Figure 3.2. In other words, the extent to which a state naturalizes new 
citizens in a given context is increasing in the degree of immigrant assimilation 
within that context.  
I make the assumption that in such a context, policymakers would be 
relatively willing and able to adjust the number of naturalizations granted in 
response to the costliness of citizenship, since the costs of increasing or decreasing 
naturalizations are negligible for policymakers. Thus supply of citizenship is 
relatively elastic, in that relatively small changes in the costliness of citizenship (in 
terms of integration) cause observable changes in the quantity policymakers are 
willing and able to supply.  
In a model without citizenship policy regulations, my explanation for shifts in 
political supply at a given integration cost mirrors the determinants of citizenship 
policy making and follows a logic similar to the shifts in supply postulated in 
economics. Specifically, I argue that two political motivations alter policymakers’ 
preferences for higher or lower citizenship acquisitions among immigrants: political 




Green parties should favor more open citizenship policies and are more likely to be 
pro-immigrant in orientation because of their traditional ideological association 
with the interests of the working class and socioeconomically disadvantaged, a 
constituency of which immigrants are often a part (Joppke 2003a; Lahav 2004; 
Breunig and Luedtke 2008; Messina 2007; Bird et al. 2011). Ideologically, these 
policymakers locate the causes of socioeconomic disadvantage and hardship of 
immigrants in the structural obstacles of society, and thus tend to support policies 
that grant immigrants greater access to political, economic, or social structures in 
efforts to overcome these obstacles and stimulate integration into society (Ersanilli 
and Koopmans 2010). Citizenship acquisition, by this view, would be a significant 
means of increasing immigrant access. Independent of citizenship policy, I would 
expect to see the supply of citizenship increase in ideologically amenable and left-
oriented contexts. 
Conversely, conservative parties are more likely to favor restrictive 
citizenship policy (Joppke 2003a). While not inherently opposed to immigration or 
immigrants, conservative parties tend to be more anti-immigrant because of 
constituent concerns about the negative economic impact of immigration, the 
increased burdens on social services, increased crime rates, and the threat posed to 
national identity from increased diversity (Ireland 2004). Ideologically, 
conservative policymakers locate the causes of immigrants’ socioeconomic 
disadvantage and non-integration in the interests, motivations, and cultural 
orientations of individual immigrants and communities. Consequently, rather than 




citizenship should act as a personal incentive to integrate, and thus citizenship is a 
reward for successful integration for which immigrants should aspire (Ersanilli and 
Koopmans 2010; Schuck 1998; Renshon 2001). Thus the expectation is that the 
supply of citizenship will be lower in contexts where ideologically conservative 
policymakers are in power. 
Electoral competition may also affect the political supply of citizenship as 
well. I theorize that closer and more intense party competition generally creates 
narrow margins of victory for political parties in elections, and such competition 
may lead political actors to seek additional votes among groups such as immigrants 
and newly naturalized voters. Because Labor, Social Democratic, and Green parties 
tend to see immigrants as constituents or potential constituents, and tend to favor 
legislation that addresses their concerns and maintains their loyalty, electoral 
competition among them may lead to increasingly open and less restrictive 
citizenship policy proposals. To the extent that political actors and bureaucracies 
have some discretion over citizenship policy implementation and naturalization 
decisions, I hypothesize that greater party competition on the left of the political 
spectrum should compel more permissive policy interpretations and emphasis on 
naturalization, creating a hospitable context for citizenship acquisition. 
Conversely, because the median voter in advanced democracies tends toward 
restrictionism, conservative parties often have an electoral interest in playing on 
these sentiments and highlighting immigration and nationality issues as strategies 
in party competition (Cornelius et al. 2004; Lahav 2004; Faist et al. 2004). 




such as threats from radical right parties, should compel more restrictive policy 
interpretations, creating a context that seeks to control naturalizations and 
citizenship conferral (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Givens 2005). The radical right 
might also create an inhospitable context even with left parties in power. Because 
leftist parties draw support from the native-born working class as well as 
immigrants, any leftist party perceived to favor immigrant issues at the expense of 
native-born labor will lose many of these constituents to radical right parties. Leftist 
parties may then be forced to take more restrictive positions on citizenship than 
they otherwise would in order to avoid the loss of core working-class constituents. 
Thus in electoral contexts with strong radical right parties, one would expect that 
the supply of citizenship may be significantly lower than in contexts where they are 
absent.  
In this baseline model without citizenship policy, as portrayed in Figure 3.2, 
the equilibrium level of naturalizations and the integration price required in such a 
country would be located at the intersection of the demand and supply curves, at N* 
and IC* respectively. The expected naturalization rates established by immigrant 
demand and political supply described above assumes a kind of ‘marketplace’ for 
citizenship without national political regulation or standardization. However, no (at 
least modern democratic) state grants citizenship based exclusively on 
policymakers’ largesse, generosity, or political ideology alone. Instead, most 
countries legislate citizenship laws that stipulate the conditions under which 
immigrants may join the political community. Such laws define the membership 




members. Drawing an analogy between the economic theory of clubs and club goods 
and the state, the members of states may offer collective benefits to its members and 
those willing to bear the costs and responsibilities of membership, as well as admit 
or exclude whomever they choose by whatever criteria they choose.17 In this sense, 
citizenship policies are the entry criteria for membership in the political community. 
In some countries, policymakers may demand that potential immigrant members 
meet stringent criteria in order to acquire citizenship, while others may offer 
membership on more accessible terms.  
Across Europe, such citizenship policies establish a nationally uniform 
minimum threshold in terms of a certain integration price required for membership, 
increasingly above what many might suggest is the equilibrium price as depicted in 
Figure 3.2. These laws thus become a ‘price floor’ in economic terms, an established 
minimum level of integration that any immigrant must achieve in order to acquire 
citizenship, independent of the number demanding naturalization. This is 
represented by a constant, horizontal curve located at a given integration price, and 
for the moment we can simply interpret this as the effective supply curve, labeled S 
in Figure 3.3. 
To locate the relative position of a country’s citizenship policy, we simply 
examine the net costliness of integration requirements that policymakers embed 
within a given citizenship policy. For example, we might classify a policy that  
                                                        
17 On the economic theory of clubs, see Buchanan (1965). As applied to countries and citizenship, 
see Walzer (1983, 35-63) and Straubhaar (2003). By drawing this analogy between club membership 
and state membership, I wish to highlight the parallels between these concepts rather than 
presuppose that public states function in exactly the same manner as private clubs. Nor do I claim 
that states should function like clubs, or that clubs approximate the appropriate membership criteria 









permits dual citizenship and requires no native language skill or civic knowledge as 
a minimally costly threshold of supply such as S2, while a policy that proscribes dual 
citizenship and requires language and civic proficiency is a more stringent supply 
threshold, such as S1. Given a national citizenship policy, the equilibrium number of 
naturalizations and equilibrium integration cost is depicted at the intersection of the 
solid lines in Figure 3.3. In Chapter 4, I will classify European citizenship policies 
according to different integration-related criteria so that we can begin assessing 
how these varying cost thresholds affect naturalization rates in Europe. 
One may initially think that the inclusion of a national citizenship law 
renders political determinants less important than the legal stipulations of a 
respective policy for naturalization rates. However, even in contexts with nationally 
legislated citizenship policies, we might still expect exogenous shifts in political 
ideology or electoral incentives to affect equilibrium naturalization rates. This 
relationship may occur through two related mechanisms. First, shifts in political 
ideology and electoral incentives may cause explicitly liberal or restrictive changes 
in the various dimensions of citizenship policy and hence shift naturalization rates 
in a positive or negative direction.  Depending on the political orientation of the 
respective government, policymakers may legislate new dimensions of integration 
within citizenship policy as prerequisites of immigrant naturalization. Left-of-center 
governments may perceive low rates of naturalization, high immigrant 
unemployment, and high rates of welfare use among immigrants as evidence that 
immigrants require additional support in acquiring citizenship and integrating into 




acquisition, less stringent integration requirements, a lower integration cost 
threshold, and a more liberalized citizenship policy, resulting in higher 
naturalization rates following such a change. Any policy that renders permanent 
resident status less costly vis-à-vis national citizenship – a change in the relative 
value of citizenship - would have the opposite effect. 
Conversely, conservative governments perceive high immigrant 
unemployment and welfare use as evidence that immigrants need to integrate or be 
more willing to integrate into the host country, and respond with more stringent 
integration requirements, a higher integration cost threshold, and a more restrictive 
overall citizenship policy. The net result is an overall decrease in naturalization 
rates following a restrictive change in citizenship policy. Similarly, any policy that 
renders permanent resident status more costly vis-à-vis national citizenship would 
have the effect of increasing naturalization rates. 
The second mechanism through which shifts in political ideology and 
electoral incentives may cause changes in the supply of citizenship is more subtle. 
This stems from the level of administrative and regulatory capacity of governments 
to decide how best to implement citizenship law in practice, or the ambiguity built 
into many national citizenship policies that grant policymakers significant political 
discretion and flexibility in interpreting and implementing citizenship law. 
Governments enjoy significant leeway in the administrative application of the law: 
some may choose to increase the fees for naturalization on an annual basis or 
reduce them, subsidize language and civics courses for immigrants or require them 




order to naturalize, or make efforts to streamline them. Such changes can heavily 
influence access to citizenship beyond the formal scope of the law itself. Another 
source of potential political influence might be in the realm of policy ambiguity. 
Until the last decade, for example, most countries with language requirements 
assessed an applicant’s proficiency by means of an oral interview. The topic of 
conversation, the length of the interview, and the level of fluency and 
comprehensibility was either regulated by administrative regulations handed down 
by governments, or left to the discretion of the local government, the local 
citizenship office, and even the interviewer herself. What passes for proficiency 
under a left-oriented government may not meet the standards of a more 
conservative government.  
Each of these factors then may increase or decrease overall political supply of 
citizenship, at a given integration price. My hypotheses for the political supply of 
citizenship are based on how politicians’ motivations develop: 
H.S1: As the costliness of citizenship supplied increases, the commensurate 
naturalization rates should decrease. 
H.S2: As the result of political influence beyond formal citizenship policy, left-
oriented governments should be positively associated and right-oriented 
governments negatively associated with naturalization rates. 
H.S3 As the degree of legal discretion over the implementation of citizenship 
policy decreases, naturalization rates should decrease under left-oriented 




H.S4: Left party competition should be positively associated with 
naturalization rates and right party competition should be negatively 
associated with naturalization rates. 
Hypothesizing the Equilibrium Naturalization Rate and Integration Cost 
This theoretical framework offers a number of hypotheses regarding the 
determinants of demand and supply of citizenship in European countries. While it is 
the supply and demand curves that directly determine the equilibrium 
naturalization rate and integration cost in a given country or region, each comprises 
a number of diverse contextual factors which shift these curves and thus indirectly 
affect naturalization rates and integration. Before examining how shifts in supply 
and demand determine the equilibrium naturalization rate and integration price, 
however, I summarize my hypotheses here in Table 3.1.  
The combination of these socioeconomic and political contextual dynamics 
generates several predictions regarding rates of citizenship acquisition as well as 
the level of integration required to acquire it. These predictions can be located at the 
numbered intersections in Figure 3.3. First, at point 1 where demand and supply are 
both lower – for instance in contexts with weak economies and conservative/radical 
right party strength – I expect, not surprisingly, naturalization rates that are 
correspondingly low. At point 4, conversely, where demand and supply are both 
high – for instance in dynamic socioeconomic regions with strong left party 






Table 3.1: Determinants of Demand for and Supply of Citizenship 
 
In between these two extremes, I expect a more median naturalization rate where 
there is significant political willingness to confer citizenship to immigrants but weak 
interest among immigrants to acquire it, and median naturalization rates where 
there is high immigrant interest in citizenship but lagging political interest in 
granting it. 
Second, the political supply of citizenship alone regulates the integration cost 
of citizenship in a given context.18 Where there is low political willingness to grant 
citizenship, perhaps due to strong conservative ideology or radical right party 
presence, policymakers may impose a higher integration cost on immigrants for 
                                                        
18 To see why, compare Figures 3.2 and 3.3. In Figure 3.2, those supplying citizenship respond to 
changes in the integration cost by increasing or decreasing naturalizations. In Figure 3.3, however, 
citizenship policy renders the political supply curve horizontal, meaning that in theory an infinite 
range of naturalizations is associated with the given cost set by the citizenship policy, and changes in 
overall cost stipulated by the policy have no effect on quantity supplied. 
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citizenship acquisition. Thus I would expect only those immigrants who are highly 
integrated in socioeconomic, political, and cultural terms to acquire citizenship. By 
the reverse logic, where there is high political willingness to grant citizenship, for 
instance due to a stronger left-of-center party presence, policymakers will be less 
exacting in terms of the integration price required for citizenship. Hence the average 
level of socioeconomic, political, and cultural integration among naturalized 
immigrants will be much lower in these contexts than among naturalized 
immigrants in the aforementioned areas. These relationships are graphically 
represented in Figure 3.3 and in Table 3.2 above. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I advanced a theoretical framework for understanding 
citizenship policymaking, citizenship acquisition, and immigrant integration in 
Europe. I first investigated what I called the political supply of citizenship, specifically 
arguing that unique electoral competition among political parties and demographic 
pressures inherited from past citizenship policies shape contemporary citizenship 
policy outcomes. I then situated this political supply of citizenship alongside the 
different socioeconomic, legal, and political contexts that structure the lives of 
immigrants and create what I termed the immigrant demand for citizenship. Using a 
basic supply and demand market model, I revealed how naturalization rates, and the 
corresponding level of integration required to naturalize, are the equilibrium result 
of the interaction between this varying immigrant demand for citizenship and the 
respective political supply of citizenship. The framework in this chapter not only 




evaluated empirically in the following chapters. It also raised several additional 
implications about citizenship policy making and the integration of immigrants 




 Quantifying Policy: the Integration Cost of Citizenship 
Index 
European governments have been feverishly debating and restructuring 
citizenship policy over the last few decades as they seek to manage the effects of 
mass immigration to their societies. As the pace of this political activity has 
intensified, it has provoked widespread scholarly interest in this policy area. Have 
policies regulating access to citizenship converged upon a shared or similar set of 
requirements, or diverged in their orientations? Have they become more inclusive 
or restrictive, and why? Do they reflect new state strategies of incorporation or 
rather demonstrate the resiliency of long-standing national approaches? Scholars 
have taken up the challenge and produced a large body of work conceptualizing and 
quantifying citizenship acquisition policies across Europe (Howard 2009, 2010; 
Janoski 2010; Huddleston et al. 2011b; Koopmans et al. 2012). The proliferation of 
these comparative measures has yielded valuable tools for analysis as well as many 
important insights into this dynamic and ever more critical policy area. The 
comparison and analysis of these indices has even attracted academic attention, 
leading one observer to muse skeptically that with ‘almost as many indices as there 
are such studies… one might wonder whether it matters which indices we use’ 
(Helbling 2013, 555).  
As I discussed in Chapter 3, whatever the logic and utility of existing indices, 
none offers a fully satisfactory framework that facilitates the analysis of citizenship 
trends across cases, time, and policy requirement categories. Scholars who examine 
many countries in a single year cannot shed light on changing dynamics over time, 




components miss valuable dynamics that occur beyond or within the scope of their 
studies. Other quantifications rest on theoretically ambiguous definitions and 
assumptions that may be problematic for generating hypotheses about citizenship 
policies or for drawing inferences about their effects. In response, I advance a 
conceptualization and measurement of citizenship policy that captures what I 
consider to be its underlying purpose: to structure immigrant incentives to acquire 
citizenship according to different state strategies of incorporation. The criteria for 
membership, an incentive structure that I call the integration cost of citizenship, 
stipulate the terms of access to the national ‘club’ and represent the net ‘entrance 
fee’ immigrants must pay for such access in terms of their integration. The costs 
differ in terms of the state strategies of incorporation they reflect and the incentives 
they create for potential members of the political community.  
In this chapter I present my theoretical framework for understanding 
citizenship policy and integration and introduce a new comparative quantification 
of citizenship policies that spans sixteen Western European countries from 1970 to 
present. To illustrate its utility for assessing citizenship policy across recent decades 
in Europe, I then use my Integration Cost of Citizenship Index (ICCI) to perform 
what I believe to be the most extensive quantitative analysis to date of recent trends 
in European citizenship policy. The investigation reveals contrasting trends of 
simultaneous convergence and divergence over the last four decades. I also find that 
while a few European states have reinforced their traditional strategies of 
citizenship and incorporation, most states have abandoned their post-war policy 




new realities. The final section then situates the ICCI within the larger study of 
citizenship policy making and citizenship acquisition and discuss its use in 
subsequent chapters. 
The Integration Cost of Citizenship 
I advance a conceptualization of citizenship policy that specifies theoretically 
what citizenship policy does: structures the incentives of immigrants seeking to 
acquire citizenship through formal state strategies of integration. In order to avoid 
ambiguity, I regard citizenship as giving formal ‘institutional expression to the 
state’s prerogative of inclusion and exclusion’ (Hansen and Weil 2001, 1). 
Citizenship, in this view, is the institutional device that denotes and distinguishes 
membership in a political community. Rather than a set of rights, duties, or 
identities that link individuals to the nation-state, I treat citizenship as a legal status, 
‘a second gate that migrants have to pass in order to become full members of the 
polity’ (Bauböck 2006, 18-19). Attaining citizenship is, in short, attaining political 
membership. Furthermore, I use the term integration to refer to the process by 
which immigrants achieve equal and permanent membership in the requisite 
domains of life as defined by the receiving country.19 The degree of integration is 
simply the extent to which immigrants have assumed membership within these 
domains. 
                                                        
19 These domains may entail belonging in economic, social, linguistic, cultural, civic, and/or legal 
domains of belonging. This process entails both the agency of individual immigrants as well as the 
larger institutional structures that facilitate access for these immigrants. For further discussion of 




While some theorize the regulation of citizenship as one dimension of 
immigrant rights or as a mechanism of integration, I posit that citizenship policies at 
a minimum formalize the degree of integration an immigrant must exhibit as 
qualification for membership.20 In other words, these policies define the integration-
related membership criteria that structure the lines of inclusion and exclusion in a 
polity. These various criteria to attain membership comprise what I call the 
integration cost of citizenship. Following the logic of clubs,21 states use citizenship 
policy to regulate access to the national ‘club,’ and the integration cost of citizenship 
is simply the ‘entrance fee’ for membership in the national community in terms of 
one’s integration. In some countries, policymakers may demand that immigrants 
exhibit high levels of integration in many domains of life in order to acquire 
citizenship, and thus they assign a high social, cultural, or civic cost to citizenship 
acquisition. In this case, the acquisition of citizenship is a relatively costly signal to 
the state and public that the membership criteria have been met. In other countries, 
a presumption of integration, or a low level of observable integration, suffices for 
political membership in the community, and thus the assigned cost that immigrants 
must pay in that country is markedly lower.  
                                                        
20 As Goodman (2013) notes, for most political scientists and sociologists, ‘citizenship acquisition is 
one type of integration (legal integration), and sits laterally to other kinds of integration-promoting 
policies… [t]herefore, we can interpret citizenship policy indices as fitting into integration policy 
indices as a subset category’ (49). This is, however, only an assumption about the relationship 
between citizenship and integration, rather than a statement of empirical fact. Nonetheless, even if 
citizenship is a mechanism of integration in some states, these states only grant citizenship to those 
immigrants that complete, or pay the cost of, that integration process. Thus we can reasonably 
assume citizenship acquisition is a signal of integration by the immigrants seeking it; whether or not 
it helps to integrate is an empirical question to which the following analysis is largely agnostic. 
21 On the economic theory of clubs, see Buchanan (1965) and Sandler and Tschirhart (1997). As 





Conceptualizing citizenship in these terms is theoretically advantageous over 
previous efforts. It first permits us to analyze citizenship according to the 
opportunity structures and the institutionally-induced incentives toward citizenship 
acquisition without the normative bias built into indices of inclusivity. As many 
scholars have observed,22 a vast range of requirements shapes citizenship 
acquisition and integration outcomes among immigrants, yet these requirements 
may be inclusive for some, exclusive for others, and neutral for still others. Within 
what Freeman (2004) calls ‘the intersection of institutional incentive structures and 
the strategic decisions of migrants themselves’ (950), these requirements function 
not as markers of inclusivity but as legal contours of state policy that shape 
immigrant behavior regarding nationality acquisition and integration. The 
integration costs of citizenship provide this structure and facilitate access for some 
and impose restrictions on others, from the cultural cost of giving up one’s former 
citizenship to the linguistic cost of learning a new language. Such institutionally 
defined costs incentivize some able and willing migrants to pay the respective price 
of membership, while they discourage or screen altogether others from doing so.23 
                                                        
22 For empirical work on this topic see Yang (1994), Bevelander and Veenman (2006), DeVoretz 
(2008), OECD (2010, 2011), Dronkers and Vink (2012), and Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers 
(2013). 
23 Some may object that conceptualizing citizenship policy in terms of cost is inappropriate, since 
acquiring citizenship may derive from more than simple rational economic calculus. However, the 
theory advanced here makes no claims about the material or economic interests of immigrants which 
operate under different citizenship policies, only that immigrants respond to the institutional 
parameters stipulated by these policies. As I discuss in the following section, institutionally 
structured costs are broadly defined and may also be social, cultural, linguistic, or civic, and entail 
factors such as time, commitment, relationships, and status. Furthermore, as nearly any immigrant or 
naturalization officer in Europe will confess, the relative costs and benefits associated with 





Assuming citizenship policies are the rules of the nationality acquisition 
game in a state, to paraphrase North (1990), they actually then serve a dual 
purpose: not only do they function as the institutional rules that shape the choices 
and strategies of the immigrant population vis-à-vis citizenship, but they also reflect 
states’ strategies vis-à-vis that population of potential citizens. State approaches 
have varied between costly, illiberal, and particularistic thresholds to preserve 
membership for ethnic kin, to accessible, liberal, and universalist criteria to enable 
assimilation through civic membership. With this conceptualization, we are able to 
capture and compare these state approaches to incorporation with reference to the 
distinct constellations of costs they impose rather than vague notions of inclusivity. 
For example, Kraler (2006) identifies two distinct paradigms in recent decades, ‘one 
that sees citizenship as a means to integrate newcomers more fully into the national 
community and therefore welcomes the timely acquisition of citizenship, and a 
second which sees citizenship as a “prize”, a reward and honour granted by the 
state’ for successful integration (47). In the former paradigm, states craft liberal and 
accessible citizenship policies with low cost thresholds to facilitate immigrant 
integration. The 1983 Dutch Minderhedennota advanced such an integration policy, 
and the government’s 1994 Contourennota further strengthened the formal 
relationship between citizenship and integration whereby the latter was the goal of 
the former (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1983, 1994). Likewise, the 1984 
Belgian Law on Nationality granted citizenship on the basis of ‘evidence of a real 
desire to integrate into Belgian society’ in the future and a ‘willingness for 




Justitie 1984). By lowering the integration cost of citizenship, both countries 
explicitly intended to incentivize integration by means of citizenship, a state 
strategy of integration-through-citizenship.  
Other states at other times have used integration requirements to elicit a 
costly and observable signal of one’s integration, whereby citizenship is granted at 
the end point of the integration process. This has long been the perspective of the 
German CDU/CSU, for example, asserting since the 1990s that citizenship 
acquisition is ‘the completion of successful integration’ and ‘is not a means of, but 
the strong expression of, successful integration.’24 Austrian policymakers have long 
regarded citizenship as the ‘highest good’ rewarded at the end of a successful 
integration process, and the Dutch government declared in 2003 that ‘naturalization 
can only been seen as the crown of integration’ rather than a form of it.25 For such 
policymakers, certain costs are imposed to screen, if not fully prohibit, certain 
immigrants from membership on the basis of low levels of integration. This reflects 
a citizenship-through-integration strategy. 
By conceptualizing citizenship policies in terms of their integration-based 
incentive structures, we can understand more objectively the purpose of citizenship 
policy: to structure immigrant incentives to naturalize according to state strategies 
of membership. In addition to a better understanding of these state strategies, 
however, we can also use the constellations of costs captured in the index to derive 
a number of observable implications regarding the policies’ effects on citizenship 
acquisition and the degree and type of integration they yield. In this way, the 
                                                        
24  CDU-CSU (1998), 3; CDU-CSU (2013), 41. 




relationship between citizenship and integration is not assumed, but rather 
mediated by the integration cost associated with acquisition. 
Quantifying the Integration Cost of Citizenship 
To comparatively evaluate the costliness of citizenship policy in terms of 
immigrant integration, I have coded an Integration Cost of Citizenship Index (ICCI) 
for 16 European citizenship policies from 1970 to the present.26 The ICCI scores 
citizenship policy requirements in terms of nine cost domains: linguistic, economic, 
civic, legal, social, cultural, lineal, familial, and ethnic. As stipulated in Table 4.1, 
most indicators are scored on an ordinal scale with 0.5-point intervals between 0 
and 2, with some limited exceptions. A total ICCI score for a given country-year is a 
straightforward additive aggregation of these component costs.27 However, I 
employ two sub-dimensions for theoretical and methodological reasons. One 
dimension captures what I call latent integration costs, which prioritize relational, 
group-based criteria for membership. These are fundamentally ascriptive and reflect 
a state’s presumption of integration rather than an observation of it directly. 
Policies that score high on this dimension exact high standards of latent integration 
                                                        
26 The countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Great Britain. Data came primarily 
from formal legislation and legal texts accessed from government ministries and websites and from 
EUDO Citizenship Observatory’s National Citizenship Laws database. Secondary accounts, especially 
EUDO’s individual Country Reports, were also instrumental in filling in some annual gaps where legal 
sources were unavailable or ambiguous. The values reported here correspond with policies in force 
rather than simply passed by the legislature, although both sets of data as well as a full disclosure of 
the methodology can be found on the author’s website. 
27 In keeping with the prevailing practice of other indices in the field, I weight each component 
equally and impose no relative weighting scheme on the various components of the total ICCI score. 
Both theoretically and empirically, I know of no reason to weight certain costs more than others, 
since different integration requirements should assume different degrees of costliness for different 




on those acquiring citizenship, incentivizing acquisition for groups such as coethnics 
abroad, while pricing others out of the market entirely. Nonetheless, latent cost 
criteria render it difficult for immigrants to demonstrate their level of integration, 
and difficult for the state to observe it. Dual citizenship in Germany has been highly 
contentious exactly because of assumptions about the lack of cultural integration it 
signals. That Rotterdam’s first Muslim mayor had retained his Moroccan citizenship 
was galling to the local Livable Rotterdam party in 2009 exactly because it 
suggested an incomplete integration into Dutch society. Thus latent integration 
costs send crude signals of integration to those granting membership. 
Latent integration criteria include social, cultural, lineal, and ethnic costs. I 
measure social cost as one’s length of residence in country, taken as the normalized 
average number of years in residence per type of naturalization, up to a total of two 
points. The assumption here is the longer the residence, the more socially integrated 
an immigrant should be. I measure cultural cost in terms of dual citizenship, with 
full acceptance of dual citizenship coded zero for least costly cultural integration, 
and a ban on dual citizenship coded two, with gradations for partial toleration. 
Provisions on jus soli and jus sanguinis measure lineal cost, with exclusive jus soli 
coded zero as least costly to acquire, and exclusive jus sanguinis coded two for being 
much more presumptive about one’s integration by descent alone. Finally, I include 
an additional ethnic cost if the state grants special accessibility for ethnic kin or 
ethnic familiarity. 
The other dimension includes what I call manifest integration criteria. Policies with 




qualifications for membership. Instead, states attempt to observe and measure 
integration directly. Governments can specify integration thresholds to be met and 
grant membership accordingly. States need not infer one’s integration, but rather 
rely on gathered evidence through active assessments, or as Goodman (2012) puts 
it, “through performance and behavior” (p. 665). Policies with high manifest scores 
thus reflect strategies to incentivize citizenship acquisition among immigrants who 
can bear the demonstrable costs of membership. Furthermore, as opposed to latent 
integration criteria, it is easier for immigrants to signal their level of integration as 
the cost of membership, and easier for the state to observe the type of immigrant 
seeking that membership.  
Manifest integration criteria include linguistic, economic, civic, legal, and 
familial costs of citizenship. Linguistic cost captures the degree of linguistic 
integration required for naturalization, based primarily on the Common European 
Framework of Reference for Languages. Economic cost measures the financial 
prerequisites for naturalization, such as dependence on public welfare. Civic cost 
measures the extent of country or civic knowledge required for naturalization, as 
well as mandatory oath and ceremony requirements. Legal cost represents whether 
or not authorities must consider an immigrant’s behavior or criminal past in the 
naturalization process. Finally, a familial cost captures whether the state confers 
citizenship automatically on spouses, or requires spouses to demonstrate their 




Table 4.1: The Integration Cost of Citizenship Coding Rules 
 
SOCIAL COST CULTURAL COST LINEAL COST ETHNIC COST LINGUISTIC COST ECONOMIC COST CIVIC COST LEGAL COST FAMILIAL COST
Years of legal 
residence
Dual citizenship
Jus sanguinis / jus 
soli













0-2 0-2 0-2 0-2 0-2(+) 0-2 0-2(+) 0-2 0-2
Averaged number of 
years residence per 
naturalization track / 
10
0 = Full dual 
citizenship 
0 = Full jus soli
0 = No privileged 
access for ethnic kin
0 = No explicit 
language requirement
0 = No explicit 
income requirement 
or restrictions on 
public assistance 




0 = No explicit 
character or criminal 
record requirement 
for naturalization
0 = Familial 
acquisition automatic 
for spouses




+1 = Partial toleration 
of dual citizenship
+/-0.5 = jus soli  after 
birth via declaration
1=Accommodated or 
privileged access for 
ethnic kin
0.5 = Informal or 
discretionary 
interview, or A1 exam 
level
0.5 = Vaguely defined 
income requirement 
or discretionary 
restrictions on public 
assistance




















+/-0.5 = Double jus 
soli  provisions
0.5 = Privileged 
access and extension 
of citizenship to 
ethnic abroad
1 = Language exam 
level A2
1 = Explicit Income 
and/or restrictions on 
public assistance
1 = Formal 
integration exam or 
naturalization exam









2 = Enforced or 
attempted full ban on 
dual citizenship 
+/-0.25 = Jus soli or 
declaration 
accommodations for 
certain groups (e.g. 
Algerians in France, 
Nordics in Denmark)
2 = Automatic 
citizenship for ethnic 
kin
1.5 = Language exam 
level B1
+/-0.5 = More/less 
rigorous income level 
requirements, 
restrictions on public 
assistance, or 
exceptions to such 
requirements
+0.5 = More explicit 
civic integration, or 
more rigorous 
naturalization exam




than twelve months 
in duration 





-0.5 = partial 
relaxations of full jus 
sanguinis




2 = Language exam 
level B2
+0.5 = formal oath or 
required public 
ceremony
+0.5 = Criminal record 
and restrictions on 
imprisonment more 
than six months in 
duration 






2 = Jus sanguinis 
only
+0.5 = Additional 
language levels




than three months in 
duration 
2 = full naturalization 
requirements (no 
facilitated access for 
spouses)
TOTAL CITIZENSHIP POLICY




Measurements of qualitative data require difficult choices regarding scoring, and the 
decisions made in the compilation of this index are no exception.28 Although these 
two dimensions were derived theoretically, the configuration of the two dimensions 
are a methodologically appropriate means of capturing citizenship policy. A 
principle component analysis of these policy indicators confirms the reliability of 
this two-dimensional framework. The two-dimensional model accounts for 57 
percent of the variance (the first manifest dimension accounting for 32 percent), 
and respective Cronbach’s α scores of 0.80 and 0.64 for the respective manifest and 
latent dimensions confirm their high degree of internal consistency.29 Furthermore, 
the aggregate ICCI scores a high degree of reliability when juxtaposed with other 
similar indices and measures. As we can see from Table 4.2, the ICCI is highly 
correlated with other comparable indices in the field, which suggests it is a reliable 
measure of citizenship policy generally across time and countries. As a measure of 
external validity, the ICCI also correlates with annual naturalization rates across the 
country-years under analysis, and much more robustly than any other existing index 
given the differences in the number of observations in the respective samples. This 
demonstrates its utility for assessing not only citizenship policies themselves, but 
also their potential effects. 
 
 
                                                        
28 See Michalowski and van Oers (2012), Goodman (2012b), and Helbling et al. (2013) for a 
discussion of these coding and measurement issues. 
29 Compared to the only other principle component analysis of citizenship policy configurations 
performed by Vink and Baubock (2013), these scores are highly confirmatory of the underlying 




Table 4.2: Pearson's Correlations with the ICCI 
 
Assessing the Trends 
Using these ICCI scores, we can now undertake a more nuanced and 
systematic evaluation of various hypotheses regarding citizenship policy trends. I 
begin with policy convergence. If states are converging in the content of their 
citizenship policies, we should observe that the cross-national variation in the 
integration costs of citizenship decrease over time. To test this, Figure 4.1 plots the 
ICCI’s total and dimensional standard deviations in each year from 1970 through 
2014. As we can see, the total standard deviation generally decreases in the early 
1980s until the turn of the millennium, at which point it increases rapidly from 1.82 
in 1997 to 3.13 in 2009. This period of convergence seems on the surface consistent 



















































































Corresponding p-values are given in parentheses, after which is also included the number of observations. The Total 
Cross-Index Correlation is based on taking the inverse of the ICRI and CPI indices so that all indices were similarly 
oriented in terms of restrictiveness. Naturalization rates derive from data from national statistical offices and Eurostat's 
'Foreign-Born Population (migr_pop3ctb) and 'Acquisition of Citizenship' (migr_acq) statistics, calculated as the 
reported number of citizenship acquisitions per reported foreign-born population for the sixteen countries in the dataset 
from 1970 to 2014. Because of missing data for certain years, the following country-years are restricted as follows: 
Germany (1973-2014), Greece (1980-2014), Ireland (2000-2013), Italy (1985-2014), Norway (1977-2014), Portugal 




with previous findings by others such as Koopmans et al (2012), who find 
convergence in naturalization rights until the turn of the millennium, followed by 
subsequent divergence.  
However, looking at the two dimensional trends, we see a slightly different 
story unfold. While the total standard deviation spikes at the turn of the millennium, 
it has been driven entirely by the increased variation on the manifest dimension 
from a low point of 0.86 in 1994 to its peak of 2.34 in 2011. The standard deviation 
for the latent dimension has instead charted a rather consistent decline, from 1.90 in 
1985 to 1.33 today. These opposite trends suggest that, on the one hand, countries 
have been slowly and consistently converging in an absolute sense on similar latent 
cost criteria to confer membership: dual citizenship, jus soli/sanguinis orientation, 
residence requirements, spousal acquisition, and ethnic exceptions. This continues 
unabated today. On the other hand, the recent flurry of citizenship policy making 
has introduced a panoply of new manifest costs that had hitherto remained 
relatively untouched. However, this new civic turn appears exceptionally 
heterogeneous, signifying little commonality across policies to date. Nonetheless, 





Figure 4.1: ICCI Standard Deviations, 1970-2014 
 






Figure 4.3: Average Citizenship Cost, Latent Dimension 
 




To test the liberal aspects of the convergence hypothesis, I have plotted the 
average ICCI scores across the same time period in Figure 4.2. We would expect 
integration costs to decrease with the liberalization of policy. Overall, the total 
average cost of citizenship across Europe remained fairly constant from the early 
1970s until 1992, after which it began increasing to its high of 8.49 in 2013. Looking 
at the sub-dimensions, however, we see a secular liberalization among the latent 
cost components since 1982, reaching a historic low of 2.89 in 2014. Glimpsing 
within this latent dimension (Figure 4.3), we observe that every component but 
ethnic cost has markedly decreased over the period. The average cultural cost (dual 
citizenship) score has decreased most drastically, from 1.47 in 1970 to 0.54 today. 
Therefore, lower average costs alongside less variation suggest strong liberal 
convergence on this latent dimension since the early 1980s. Conversely, as Figure 
4.4 portrays, manifest integration costs of citizenship have increased consistently 
since 1982, and more precipitously since the early 1990s. They have even surpassed 
the latent integration requirements in terms of overall share of the total average 
cost. The most dramatic increases have come in the form of familial costs, i.e. 
requiring spouses to demonstrate their integration. Overall, higher costs alongside 
higher variation thus signify restrictive divergence on this dimension. These 
opposing trends thus imply more European states no longer ascribe eligibility for 
membership on the basis of latent integration criteria, and have clearly begun 
evaluating eligibility for membership on the basis of manifest integration criteria. In 
other words, while the aggregate scores reveal that citizenship has become more 




that employed high latent costs with strategies that incentivize demonstrable 
integration prior to citizenship.  
But are a handful of already more liberal, inclusive, and multicultural 
countries simply driving this liberal convergence? If liberal convergence is 
occurring, we should observe change in a lower-cost direction across most countries 
over the period of analysis. However, this liberalization should be especially 
pronounced in traditionally more restrictive countries: it would be rather 
misleading if previously liberalized countries were simply becoming more so. To 
investigate this, I graph the latent integration cost scores in 1970 and 2014, seen in 
Figure 4.5.30 Looking at the graph, the Western European average was 4.18 in 1970, 
with ten countries to the left of the mean possessing more costly membership 
strategies on this dimension and six countries to the right with less costly strategies. 
But from 1970 until 2014, the restrictive ten posted an average decrease of 2.13, 
nine of which reduced the costliness of citizenship over the period, while three of 
the six most liberal countries actually increased the costliness of citizenship by an 
average of 0.09 across the period. Even among the most restrictive quartile in 1970– 
Germany, Greece, Denmark, and Austria – the average cost decrease was 2.04, while 
the least restrictive quartile in 1970 – Portugal, Ireland, Great Britain, and France – 
increased by an average of 0.25 points.
                                                        
30 I focus on this dimension because liberal convergence is only occurring along this dimension. To 
diminish idiosyncrasies might arise with a starting point of 1970, I perform similar calculations using 










The most restrictive quartile will decrease further in the near future when 
Denmark’s reform permitting dual citizenship goes into effect. Overall, the 
correlation between the 1970 latent score and magnitude of change is negative and 
significant (Pearson's r= -0.73, p= 0.0007). Strikingly, then, the most traditionally 
restrictive countries have enacted the most pronounced liberalization over the 
period, while the most traditionally liberal countries were actually those levying the 
greatest cost increases on this dimension. Liberal convergence, in other words, is 
not simply a product of liberal countries becoming more liberal. 
Finally, how stable have citizenship policies remained over time? That is, do 
policies reflect and reinforce long-established national models of citizenship and 
incorporation, or have new policies evolved over time and replaced traditional 
orientations? Testing hypotheses regarding the evolution of national models is not 
straightforward, given the multitude of theoretical conceptions and the difficulty of 
ascertaining their attributes and parameters.31 However, the two dimensions of the 
ICCI provide a systematic means of identifying four general state strategies for 
incorporating new members into the national club, represented in Figure 4.6. We 
can also begin to test hypothesis H.CP3 from Chapter 3. Countries with high latent 
costs correspond broadly with two forms of ethnic, particularistic, and often 
assimilationist approaches to citizenship. In the lower right quadrant, country 
policies with high latent costs and low manifest costs incentivize membership along 
unobserved, assumed, and often relational lines. Individuals with weak homeland 
                                                        
31 For example, compare the definitions and distinctions of different models of Brubaker (1992), 
Favell (2001), Castles and Miller (2003), and Koopmans et al. (2005). For a discussion of the 





ties, coethnics abroad, relatives, and descendants of nationals may access 
citizenship relatively easily because latent costs actually incentivize membership 
instead of screening it as for other foreign nationals. These policies thus entail a 
state strategy of awarding ‘citizenship through latent integration’. Countries with 
high latent and manifest costs are even more demanding because they require both 
latent qualifications and observable verification of integration. The cost of 
membership in these countries is highest on both dimensions, denoting complete 
assimilation – in other words, both latent and manifest adaptation – into society is 
sequentially prior to membership. These countries may thus be pursuing a 
‘citizenship through assimilation’ strategy. Countries with low latent cost scores fall 
into two general ideal-types as well. Those with low latent but high manifest cost 
are similar to the previous two strategies in that they confer citizenship as a reward 
for integration. However, this ‘citizenship through manifest integration’ approach 
awards citizenship according to demonstrated integration rather than assumed 
integration by virtue of heritage, ties, or relations. This is a more conditional 
(Goodman 2010a) strategy that exchanges membership for visible integration. 
Finally, policies with both low latent and low manifest costs reverse the sequence of 
the previous three strategies. Such a strategy provides relatively easy access to 
citizenship and thus incentivizes mass acquisition among immigrants regardless of 
heritage or civic orientation. Rather than latent or manifest integration serving as a 
condition for membership, membership in these states is a condition for integration. 





Figure 4.6: A Typology of Citizenship Strategies 
multicultural (Kymlicka 1995; Entzinger 2003) or ‘enabling’ model of citizenship 
(Goodman 2010a). 
If continuity and path-dependent accounts are correct, we should first 
observe that these strategies remain relatively consistent with their respective 
national origins. That is, the position of different country policies should remain 
relatively fixed within their respective quadrants over time. Wide deviations from a 
policy’s point of origin, or complete movement into another quadrant, would 
suggest a replacement of strategy. To test this hypothesis, I plot the trajectory of 




1970 to the present.32 Each country-year is thus located within one of the four 
strategies above, designated by axes set at the midpoints of the two dimensions. 
Figure 4.7 displays these trajectories. As we can see, the starting points of eleven of 
the sixteen countries cluster within the lower-right ‘citizenship through latent 
integration’ quadrant in 1970, with variation between Greece, Italy, and Germany at 
the extremes. While the location of many of these countries is not altogether 
surprising, many of the subsequent trajectories are illuminating. Austria and 
Denmark both moved solidly into the upper-right quadrant over the last 45 years, 
fueled by profound movement on the manifest dimension. Because of little shift 
along the latent dimension, this suggests reinforcement of an already closed policy 
rather than complete replacement of a previous strategy. While Greece moved into 
the assimilationist quadrant in 2004, it has clearly since replaced this orientation 
with a new law in 2009. Finland and Sweden both shifted to the lower-left quadrant, 
demonstrating complete replacement of the traditional ethnic model in the opposite 
direction. Belgium and Italy likewise shifted to the multicultural quadrant in the 
1980s and 1990s, before finally shifting to the ‘citizenship through manifest 
integration’ model in 2013 and 2009 respectively. Finally, Germany and 
Luxembourg, two historical archetypes of the ethnocultural model, both abandoned 
this strategy in favor of a more liberal and individualistic one in 2000 and 2009, 
respectively. Only two countries, Norway and Spain, remain within this low-right 
quadrant in 2014, while Spain’s trajectory appears to be shifting from it.  
                                                        
32 For clarity I plot strategies at fifteen-year intervals (1970, 1985, 2000, and 2014), although 




The remaining five countries all have their initial orientations in the lower-
left ‘integration through citizenship’ quadrant. Given that the approaches of France 
and Britain, and often the Netherlands, have been contrasted for their dissimilar 
historic orientations, it is notable that they begin in such proximity to one another. 
Britain and France both begin the 1970s with an exceptionally similar approach, at 
least formally, granting membership with relatively few integration requirements 
attached. But by 2005 and 2006 respectively, both had replaced these lenient 
strategies, increasingly demanding evidence of integration prior to membership. 
The Netherlands also fully replaced its multicultural-oriented policy in 2003. Only 
Ireland and Portugal remained within the lower-left multicultural quadrant by 
2014. 
Overall, then, it appears that at least ten of these sixteen countries had 
replaced their initial strategies of incorporation by 2014. Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, and Luxembourg all fully replaced initial policies that prioritized latent 
integration requirements with policies weak on latent integration and 
overwhelmingly emphasizing manifest integration requirements. Finland and 
Sweden replaced similarly prohibitive policies with those that attached relatively 
few latent or manifest conditions to membership. France, Great Britain and the 
Netherlands all replaced policies meant to enable integration after membership 
with policies that demand integration as a condition for it. Only six seemed to 
reinforce their initial approaches, either changing little to date (Norway, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain), or doubling down on already costly policies with additional costly 








Figure 4.8: Evolution of European Citizenship Strategies 
 
citizenship policy stasis over time as a product of path dependence seems to find 
little support from this evidence. 
Figure 4.8 charts these same dynamics, but at the aggregate level. With each 
country-year assigned to one of the four policy strategies, I tabulate the annual 
frequency of these four different models and plot the corresponding percentages 
over time. As we can see, the ‘citizenship through latent integration’ strategy was 
the predominant approach to citizenship until the mid-1980s, accounting for nearly 
70 percent of all policy approaches at its height, while the ‘integration through 
citizenship’ accounted for the remainder. Yet we witness the ascendance of this 




to the observed rise of multicultural policies across Europe (Kymlicka 1995). 
Strikingly, the fully assimilationist and manifest integration models were mostly 
absent from Western Europe until the late 1990s; in other words, it was rare to 
imposing high manifest integration costs on immigrants before this time as a 
prerequisite for citizenship. By the late 1990s, however, these models had begun to 
challenge both of the previous two. Today, while the ‘citizenship through manifest 
integration’ strategy has become predominant in Europe, the other three have all 
decreased in prevalence. The traditionally prevailing latent model accounts for 
roughly ten percent of policy approaches in Western Europe today, and the strong 
multicultural advance of the 1980s has since retreated to below levels last seen in 
the 1970s. From this aggregate perspective, we can conclude that the citizenship 
policy landscape in Europe today hardly reflects initial strategies of incorporation. 
In fact, the evidence here strongly suggests that four distinct European models have 
emerged in Western Europe from two initial approaches to incorporation. In 
addition, as the manifest integration strategy ascends in dominance, it may be 
increasingly appropriate to conclude that countries are converging on a common 
incorporation strategy, if not on specific policy requirements. 
How well do these four difference country strategies explain citizenship 
acquisition in Europe?  Figure 4.9 plots the mean predicted value of the 
naturalization rate for each country in the analysis from 1980 until 2014 according 
to these four strategies.33 Using the ‘citizenship through assimilation’ strategy as the 
baseline, we can see that the strategies closely conform to what we would expect.  
                                                        
33 These were calculated by OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors, controlling for 




Figure 4.9: Mean Predicted Naturalization Rate by Citizenship Strategy 
 
The ‘citizenship through latent integration’ strategy is only slightly higher than the 
fully assimilationist model, and though the effect is not significantly different, this is 
not surprising since the latter is largely a reinforcement of the former, rather than a 
fully different strategy. However, the predicted effect of the other two strategies is 
precisely as we would expect: the ‘citizenship through manifest integration’ strategy 
provides a strikingly higher degree of access to citizenship, and the ‘integration 
through citizenship’ provides the least restrictive level of access. This lends 




yields. Chapter 6 will explore the relationship between the ICCI and naturalization 
in more detail. 
Conclusion 
The debate over integration and citizenship in Europe continues apace, as do 
efforts to redress the policies that govern these domains. In the midst of these 
changes, a theoretically straightforward and temporally expansive understanding of 
the comparative origins and evolution of these policies is of utmost importance for 
drawing subsequent conclusions about their causes and their future implications for 
citizenship in Europe. To this end, this chapter had two objectives. First, it advanced 
a new conceptualization of citizenship policy that casts its requirements in terms of 
integration cost to immigrants. I argued that citizenship policy both reflects formal 
state strategies of incorporation and structures the incentives of immigrants seeking 
to acquire it. On the one hand, states use citizenship policies to define membership 
in the polity, and establish the criteria by which such membership is granted. These 
criteria naturally varies across time and place, with some states seeking to screen 
immigrants according to defined latent or manifest criteria, while others impose few 
preconditions at all. On the other hand, these criteria, or integration costs as I have 
defined them, likewise provide the institutional parameters governing which 
immigrants acquire citizenship and under what conditions. While some criteria 
incentivize relational-based acquisition, others prioritize acquisition according to 
demonstrable individual achievement.  
Second, the chapter introduced a new quantification of citizenship policies to 




offered one of the most detailed quantitative assessments of the simultaneous 
processes of convergence and divergence in European citizenship policy to date. I 
found states have overwhelmingly jettisoned traditional strategies that rely on 
unobservable latent integration requirements, often in favor of more measurable 
manifest integration requirements as criteria for membership. While the most 
traditionally exclusive countries have driven this converging movement away from 
latent-based criteria for membership, there is clearly strong divergence in terms of 
the criteria adopted to replace them, reflecting what Goodman (2014) termed ‘a 
reality teeming with variation underneath a superficial veneer of convergence’ (p. 
63). Wide variation in the number of manifest integration requirements seems to be 
the defining feature of the last decade, even if some minor convergence has occurred 
in recent years. In this evolving context, the findings here suggest little continuity 
between past and present approaches. While institutional and electoral variables 
may still define the specific national trajectories I observed, there seems to be only 
the weakest resilience of traditional national models of incorporation across 
Western Europe over time. Yet it would be premature to conclude this trend 
represents a new convergence upon a shared set of robust integration criteria or a 
singular European incorporation strategy. Instead, the picture that emerges, at least 
for the moment, is one of diverse strategic adaptation. 
Although the ICCI seems to be a methodologically reliable tool with which to 
answer these questions, it is not an exhaustive measurement of the supply-side of 
integration and citizenship processes in Europe today. It purposefully omits 




phases of residence and legal status, each of which clearly structure the immigrant 
integration process but have little to do with membership cost. Addressing and 
including these variables on the supply-side could be promising extensions as well. 
Nonetheless, the conceptualization and quantification of citizenship policy provided 
here should improve our ability to draw inferences about policy changes, their 
proximate and long-term causes, and their immediate effects on integration and 
naturalization outcomes in Europe. 
With this conceptualization and measurement of citizenship policy, we may 
now test a number of additional hypotheses and broader causal questions specified 
in Chapter 3 regarding the making of citizenship policy and its effects on immigrants 
acquiring citizenship. It is to the empirical testing of these hypotheses and questions 




 Parties, Competition, and Citizenship Policy 
Citizenship policy formally define the integration-related membership 
criteria that structure the lines of inclusion and exclusion in a polity. In some 
countries, policymakers adopt a stringent ‘citizenship through latent integration’ or 
‘citizenship through assimilation’ strategy that demands immigrants exhibit high 
levels of integration in many domains of life in order to acquire citizenship, while in 
other countries policymakers may adopt an accessible ‘integration through 
citizenship’ strategy that offers citizenship as a means to integration. In either case, 
these policies determine who belongs, who does not, and the criteria used to 
adjudicate between the two. The naturalization process is thus the nexus between 
the regulation of citizenship supply and the terms of citizenship acquisition. In this 
chapter, I examine and test how citizenship policymaking occurs in Europe. 
Citizenship Policy and Electoral Politics 
As first articulated in Chapter 3, I situate citizenship policy change within a 
context of electoral politics that motivates policy makers to extend access to 
citizenship, or restrict access to it. From an ideological perspective, leftist, and 
especially social democratic and communist, parties generally favor more open 
citizenship policies because of social egalitarianism, solidarity with the working 
class, and the correspondence of their policy agenda and the interests of immigrants 
generally (Messina 2007). More accessible citizenship also grants immigrants access 
to political, economic, or social structures of a country in efforts to stimulate their 
integration (Joppke 2003a, 430-31; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010, 774; Bird et al. 




more restrictive citizenship policies, whether due to concerns about welfare 
dependence, crime and terrorism, or national identity (Bale 2003; Ireland 2004). 
Conservative parties also tend to advance the neoliberal prospect that citizenship 
should serve as a reward for successful integration and thus should be restricted to 
those most able and willing to assimilate (Schuck 1998). Electorally, conservative 
parties often have an interest in playing on nativist sentiments that the median 
voter tends to hold in advanced democracies (Cornelius et al. 2004; Lahav 2004; 
Ivarsflaten 2005). By this traditional logic, citizenship policy should liberalize when 
leftist parties are in power, and become more restrictive when conservative parties 
are in power.  
However, this is not necessarily the case, especially in the more fluid 
parliamentary systems of multiparty European politics. With the rise of the far right 
in recent years (Givens 2005; Mudde 2007), conservative parties that would 
otherwise avoid the issue of citizenship entirely may have a greater incentive to 
adopt a more extreme position. Similarly, a left-of-center government may find it 
necessary to adopt a more restrictive position on citizenship and immigration 
because their otherwise pro-immigrant positions may cost them the votes of the 
native-born working class who find far right parties more attractive on the issue 
(Givens and Luedtke 2005; Howard 2009; Bale et al. 2010; Alonso and Fonseca 
2012). Thus the ‘contagion from the right’ means that neither mainstream 
conservative nor leftist parties would favor policy liberalization and policies may in 




In addition, the presence of other left and far left parties, such as the Greens 
in recent years with clearly pro-immigrant agenda, might have similar effects for 
policy liberalization. On immigration issues generally, left parties are threatened 
electorally not only by conservative and far-right demands for restriction, but also 
by Green and far-left advocacy of more liberal, egalitarian, and multicultural polices. 
as the experience of the Dutch Labour party (PvdA), the Austrian Social Democrats 
(SPÖ), and Danish Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet) have revealed (Bale et al. 
2010).  
Therefore, unlike previous work by scholars that focuses on the particular 
ideological orientation of the government, or the strength of the radical right in 
particular, I argue that concerns about electoral competition on both sides of the 
spectrum drive citizenship policymaking. On the right of the political spectrum, all 
right-of-center parties may be tempted to politicize the immigration issue if it 
strengthens their electoral position vis-à-vis other right-of-center political parties. 
In an electoral atmosphere dominated by heightened electoral competition on the 
right, for example from a radical right party or from another conservative party, I 
would expect right-of-center governments to be most likely to enact policies that 
restrict access to citizenship and increase the requirements to acquire it. Where far 
right parties join the government, citizenship policy is highly likely to be restricted.  
At the opposite end of the political spectrum, I expect electoral competition 
on the left to incentivize left-oriented governments to liberalize citizenship policy. 
This is because immigrant voters function as an important constituency for 




on the left may be increasingly adopting pro-immigrant and multicultural positions 
on the issue as well. In these contexts with multiple left parties or where new left 
parties like the Greens emerge to challenge traditional left-of-center parties, left-
oriented governments and governments with far left party participation should be 
more likely to liberalize citizenship policy in an attempt to curry favor with left-
libertarians and potential immigrant voters. Because parties of the far left do not 
usually threaten to steal votes from traditional right-of-center parties, left party 
competition should have little effect on right-of-center governments. 
Empirically, then, this logic leads us to conclude that respective policy 
changes should be most likely to occur under governments that emerge from the 
side of the spectrum where competition is strongest. Recall our initial hypothesis 
from Chapter 3: 
H.CP1: Policy change should be most likely to occur under governments that 
emerge from the side of the spectrum where competition is strongest.  
This suggests the following testable hypotheses: 
H.CP1a: Right-of-center governments in party systems with greater right party 
competition should be more likely to restrict their citizenship policies. 
H.CP1b: Left-of-center governments in party systems with greater left party 
competition should be more likely to liberalize their citizenship policies. 
A rival explanation to the one just discussed stems from a path dependency 
perspective (Goodman 2012a; Mouritsen 2013). This explanation for citizenship 
policy maintains that domestic politics interacts with the inclusive or exclusive 




articulate preferences on citizenship and belonging, but previous policy decisions 
set the parameters within which they debate and enact policy change. As Goodman 
(2014) argues, “[c]itizenship orientations not only reflect state priorities for 
inclusion or exclusion through formal rules, but also implicit understandings of 
nationhood and other scripts of belonging” inherited from past institutional legacies 
(78). In this way, government orientations are constrained by the national 
understandings of membership, where traditionally exclusive citizenship legacies 
set the parameters of acceptable policy that leftist governments may pursue and 
enact, and vice versa with conservative parties in inclusive policy environments 
(Goodman 2014). Thus the earlier starting point of citizenship policy largely 
explains the future development of it.  
However, this proposed mechanism by which this policy context actually 
impinges on the preferences and actions of elected officials seems undertheorized. 
Why would leftist parties limit their support for dual citizenship, for example, based 
on what policies were handed down to them from governments of decades prior? 
Why would conservative governments accept a highly accessible citizenship policy 
formulated decades ago? If path dependence is the explanation, then it at least needs 
a mechanism by which it occurs. I argue that one such mechanism the size and 
influence of the naturalized immigrant population. Because vote-maximizing elected 
officials have every incentive to cater to vocal and well-organized constituents at the 
expense of the restrictionist but generally unorganized mass public, well-organized 
groups of voters with immigration backgrounds may have leverage in moving policy 




relatively open immigration and citizenship regimes in the post-war period, such as 
the United Kingdom or France, developed sizable and increasingly organized 
immigrant electorates in the subsequent decades that may have helped encourage 
pro-immigrant policies and sustain them over time. Conversely, countries like 
Germany, Denmark, or Greece did not, and hence have lacked the electoral pressure 
from voters with immigrant backgrounds to legislate pro-immigrant policies in later 
periods. Instead, larger immigrant populations in early restrictive countries of the 
postwar period might spark a backlash against such a large non-naturalized 
immigrant population, driving them to retain if not formulate even more restrictive 
policies. This leads to my second hypothesis, restated from Chapter 3: 
H.CP2: Larger immigrant populations in countries with generally liberal 
citizenship policies in the post-war years will help sustain accessible, liberalized 
policies in subsequent decades, while larger immigrant populations in countries 
with generally restrictive citizenship policies in the post-war years will be 
unable to forestall pressures for restrictive policies in subsequent decades. 
Also recall the path-dependent hypothesis as an alternative explanation for 
citizenship policy stasis from Chapter 3: 
H.CP3: Citizenship policies will remain largely similar in their degree of 
accessibility or restrictiveness to citizenship policies of the postwar period. 
Testing the Electoral Politics Model of Citizenship 
To test the theory presented above, I employ the Integration Cost of 
Citizenship Index (ICCI) which quantifies the citizenship policies of sixteen Western 




immigrants must bear in order to acquire citizenship.34 In the following analysis, I 
will analyze the magnitude of the change in ICCI score from one year to the next. The 
dependent variable in each case is the summed magnitude of the policy 
liberalization or restriction under a given government, with reductions in cost given 
negative values and increased costliness given positive values.35 
Because I am interested in the electoral motivations of policy change, most of 
my explanatory variables derive from electoral data aggregated in the ParlGov 
database (Döring and Manow 2015). Capturing the relevant data for my theory – 
relative vote shares, the degree of left and right party competition in the electoral 
system, and the orientation of individual cabinets in a given year – could be 
achieved in a number of ways and required a series of methodological choices. First, 
the decision to focus on a bifurcated left-right competition scale obviously simplifies 
the nature of party ideologies and party competition in Europe. Nonetheless, in 
                                                        
34 To remind the reader, the countries of analysis include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
and Great Britain. The nine domains include linguistic, economic, civic, legal, social, cultural, lineal, 
familial, and ethnic costs of citizenship, which correspond with specific requirements to be fulfilled 
within that domain. 
35 There are multiple ways one could calculate this change variable. Because the policy requirement 
scores may not be directly comparable across different components, it may be the case that assigning 
these values based on aggregate changes in the ICCI is inappropriate. Because changes in policy often 
entail changes across multiple components in a given year, often in contrasting directions, one 
alternative coding procedure may be to sum the number of liberalizations and restrictions across the 
domains and score overall changes according to net number of changes. In other words, each 
observation would be coded dichotomously as a Policy Restriction or a Liberalization based on 
whether the number of individual restrictions/liberalizations exceeded the other. However, this 
results in a loss of information about the magnitude of the changes, and is methodologically difficult 
to justify because the number of changes might not actually reflect the nature of the change. For 
example, four small changes may be less substantive than a single large shift in policy. Because the 
scores are comparable for each component across countries, even if they are not directly comparable 






addition to being central to my theory, this decision was also based on previous 
literature showing that the right-left scale remains the most salient dimension of 
party competition in Europe up to the present day (Budge et al. 2001). Second, I had 
to classify the universe of different parties according to this basic Left-Right 
orientation. To do this, I largely adopted the recognized party family names from the 
ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2015),36 which classified Conservative or 
Christian Democratic parties on the right, and Labour, Social Democratic, and 
Socialist parties on the left. Communist, Green, and other ‘new’ leftist parties on the 
far left and populist parties of the far right were designated as Radical Left or 
Radical Right accordingly (March and Mudde 2005; Mudde 2007). Liberal and other 
centrist parties not conforming to a clear right-left orientation were largely 
excluded from subsequent calculations primarily because I am interested in 
competition on strictly the right and left of the political spectrum. For example, a 
party like the Finnish Centre Party (KESK) was founded and coded as an Agrarian 
Party in the ParlGov database, and its politics continually reflects a centrist political 
position. It was therefore excluded from my right/left party calculations for 
Finland.37 
                                                        
36 Party families and descriptions were corroborated by data from the European Election Database 
made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) (2015). NSD is not responsible 
for the analyses/interpretation of the data presented here. I also cross-checked data against the 
Parties and Elections in Europe database (Nordsieck 2015). 
37 Nonetheless, a left-right scale poses problems in a number of party cases. For example, despite 
policy positions that are often to the right of many other conservative parties, Denmark’s Liberal 
Party (V) and the Dutch People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) were both founded and 
consequently coded as members of the classical liberal party family. They were likewise omitted 
from these right/left calculations but included in liberal party calculations. Other parties, such as the 
Austrian Party of Freedom (FPÖ), may have been founded as liberal parties, but have shifted in 




Lastly, because elections are held at different times in different countries, 
and cabinets form and fall sporadically throughout the year, I had to rely on coding 
rules that aligned election and coalition data with the appropriate government-year. 
Here I assigned a government-year at time t in which an election was held prior to 
August in year t with those election results, while I assigned a government-year in 
which a late-year (post-August) election was held with results from t-1, and those 
election results were lagged until the following year at time t+1. Similarly, a new 
cabinet was coded upon any change of parties with cabinet membership or any 
change of prime minister.38 I assigned cabinets formed and prime ministers in office 
before August to that year, while I lagged them for those assuming office after 
August, unless the coalition dissolved early in that subsequent year, in which case 
that cabinet is largely excluded from the analysis. Generally, cabinets of less than 
three months were not included. Caretaker cabinets lasting a majority of months in 
a given year were assigned as centrist coalitions for that year.  
With this data, I then created measures of electoral competition within a 
party system. My first variable of interest reflects the respective electoral 
competition or threat faced by the dominant parties on either side of the political 
spectrum. I first identified the traditional/dominant right-of-center or left-of-center 
party in each country that emerged in the post-war period, and tabulated the vote 
                                                                                                                                                                     
positions. Thus the FPÖ was coded as a liberal party until the late 1980s, after which it was coded as 
a radical right party. 
38 For sake of comparability, data for France reflects the electoral results, prime ministers, and 
cabinet composition of the National Assembly. Except for three periods of cohabitation between a 
President and Prime Minister of another party (1986-88, 1993-95, and 1997-2002), the right-left 





share of that dominant right party (DRPVS) or left party (DLPVS) with respect to the 
total share of votes for all right or left parties. Thus the DRPVS for a dominant right 
party facing no right-of-center competition in an election would be coded a 100, 
while one facing stiff competition on the right – potentially from radical right parties 
– would receive a score between less than 100 but greater than 1. Then, in order to 
capture the changing magnitude of electoral gain or loss experienced by the 
dominant party over a series of election contests, I calculated the averaged 
difference in vote share from the current election against the previous two elections, 
thus DRPVSt -0.5(DRPVSt-1+DRPVSt-2). I expect that as the dominant right party loses 
vote share from one election to the next (DRPVS decreases), ICCI scores should be 
expected to increase, signaling a policy restriction. Similarly, as the dominant left 
party loses vote share from election to the next (DLPVS decreases), the ICCI score 
should decrease. I calculated similar averaged difference measures for Radical Right 
(RRPVS) and Radical Left (RLPVS) parties in each election cycle, and for all other left 
(OLPVS) or right parties (ORPVS), but their effects on the ICCI score should be 
opposite of the dominant party variables. The second measure of right and left party 
competition is a variation of the effective number of parties measure by Laakso and 
Taagepera (1979), arguably the most straightforward and widely used measure in 
comparative research that represents the number of parties in competition. Here, I 
adapt the standard formula (1/ΣVotei2) to calculate an effective number of right 
parties (ENRP) and an effective number of left parties (ENLP) where Votei refers to 
the vote share of each right or left party in a particular election, respectively. As 




side of the political spectrum, and thus an associated increase (decrease) in the ICCI 
score. An adjusted ENRP (ENLP) variable was also created to capture the balance of 
right-left electoral competition dichotomously: Right Competition was coded 1 if 
ENRP-ENLP was positive (ENRP>ENLP), suggesting more right parties than left 
parties in a given election, and 0 otherwise; Left Competition was coded 1 if ENRP-
ENLP was negative (ENLP>ENRP), suggesting more left parties in competition than 
right parties.  
I coded three variables to capture the ideological orientation of a 
government. LRScore3 reflects the relative right/left political orientation of the 
governing coalition in each year on a three-point trichotomous scale. A government 
comprised of any combination of left, extreme left, and centrist parties was coded as 
Leftist (1), any combination of liberal, centrist, left and conservative parties, or a 
grand coalition, as Centrist (2), and any combination of right-of-center, 
conservative, radical right, and centrist parties as Rightist (3). The variable Leftist 
Government collapses LRScore into a dichotomous variable scored 1 if LRScore was 
Leftist and 0 otherwise; similarly, Rightist Government was scored 1 if LRScore was 
Rightist and 0 otherwise. Finally, LRScore5 creates two additional categories from 
LRScore: Left is separated into mainstream left governments and left governments 
with a radical left party, and Right is separated into mainstream right governments 
and right governments with a radical right party. 
To test whether electoral variables other than party competition and 
government ideology predict citizenship policy change, I also performed 




electoral cycles for Right, Radical Right, Left, Radical Left, and Liberal parties. I also 
coded GreenGov, RRGov, and RLGov as dichotomous variables, scored one if a Green, 
Radical Right, or Radical Left party is in the governing coalition, respectively, and 
zero otherwise.39  
Finally, I include a number of control variables that might also affect 
citizenship policymaking. I first include a control variable for foreign born stock as a 
percentage of the total population drawn from national statistical offices (see 
Appendix A), Eurostat (2015f), the OECD (2015c), and the United Nations (2009, 
2013b), since the size of the foreign population would more than likely cause 
policymakers to consider adjustments to citizenship policy. Because the flows of 
migrants across national borders might also spur citizenship policymaking, I include 
a control for the annual adjusted net migration rate, lagged by one year (Eurostat 
2015d). To capture economic conditions in the country that might affect the 
propensity of policymakers to adjust citizenship policy, I include a variable for 
annual GDP Growth (World Bank 2016a). Because the countries of interest vary by 
how urban or rural they are, and because highly urban populations may be more 
politically and socially progressive, Percent Urban captures how much of the 
national population lives in cities (World Bank 2016b). Finally, a control variable 
reflecting the 1965 ICCI strategy identified for each country in Chapter 4 is intended 
to reflect the historical starting point of each country, which according to path 
dependence accounts may affect how subsequent policies are changed. 
                                                        
39 Unless noted in the analysis below, none of Vote Share, Seat Share, or Gov variables attained 





In this series of models I present here, I have annual government policy 
outputs nested within countries, election cycles, and governments. Given the nested 
structure of my data, straightforward statistical procedures such as OLS regression 
are inappropriate for the analysis because of correlations within countries’ election 
cycles and within respective countries. This would lead to biased and inefficient 
parameter estimates. Instead, I take two different precautions to deal with these 
potential problems. To reflect the nested structure of the data, I use a subset of the 
data that corresponds to individual governments clustered within election cycles. 
Although there are a number of singletons (governments corresponding with single 
election cycles), most elections in Europe include more than one government within 
a single election cycle.40 Furthermore, using national elections as my second level 
also accounts country correlations as well, which is fortunate because the sample 
size is insufficient to include three levels in the models. Thus each unit of analysis is 
a single government nested within an election cycle. I use multilevel mixed-effects 
that provide a flexible and general approach to distinguish between levels of 
analysis at the individual government level and at the election cycle level. Thus I 
distinguish between Level I fixed-effects (variables related to the Government-year), 
and Level II random-effects (the specific Election). To account for correlations 
within election cycles, I employ heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered by 
Election (number of clusters = 216).41 
                                                        
40 For a statistical justification for including a large number of small clusters, even with a moderate 
number of singletons, see Snijders (2005) and Bell et al. (2010). 
41 As a robustness check, I did run the same mixed models with Level II random effects by the 
individual Country, with corresponding robust standard errors clustered by Country. These 





Analysis and Results: Party Competition 
Let us turn to the results from the first set of models, analyzing total change 
in citizenship policy since 1965, found in Table 5.1. Beginning with Model 1, we 
analyze the effects of our first set of electoral competition variables. Let us consider 
first the effects from the left side of the political spectrum. In Model 1, we find that 
the DLPVSL variable attains statistical significance. A one unit increase (decrease) in 
the average change in the dominant left party’s vote share is associated with a 0.014 
unit increase (decrease) in the total ICCI score. In other words, a one standard 
deviation decrease in the dominant left party vote share (almost 6 percentage 
points) is associated with a 0.06 unit liberalization of citizenship policy. As the 
dominant left party’s vote share increases in comparison to the previous year, the 
degree of citizenship liberalization thus appears to diminish. This may appear 
counterintuitive but it actually reflects the theoretical expectation: because a 
stronger left party faces less competition overall from other left parties, it has less 
incentive to liberalize policy in such electoral circumstances, and may thus be 
associated with a higher ICCI score than if it were facing reduced vote share. 
The effects of OLPVS and RLPVS variables are also significant and signed as 
expected in Model 2 and Model 3. Here, as the average change in vote share for 
Other Left parties and for Radical Left parties increases, we observe associated 
decreases, or liberalizations, in citizenship policy. The magnitude of the effect of the 
latter, reflecting the electoral gains and losses of Radical Left parties in particular, is 
even stronger than for all Other Left parties. As these variables increase in 
magnitude, this implies more electoral competition on the left. Because immigrant-




Table 5.1: Estimated Effects of Party Competition on Citizenship Policy Change 
DV: Total Change in 
ICCI Score 

























            





















































































































































































































































            























            























            
























            












































































            























            























            























            







































































            
























            























            







































































            
















































Observations (n) 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 
Degrees of Freedom 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 9 7 9 7 
Chi2 7.10 10.2 10.8 16.6 10.3 15.8 10.6 20.1 13.4 18.1 13.6 
p 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.021 0.17 0.027 0.16 0.017 0.064 0.034 0.059 
Standard errors in parentheses; *  




positions, citizenship policy can be expected to liberalize when more left-oriented 
parties are competing electorally, facilitating much greater access to citizenship 
among immigrants in turn. By means of comparison, Models 4 and 5 show the 
effects of all Left Party strength in parliament and the seat share of the Radical Left 
in parliament. In neither model do the variables attain statistical significance, even 
though they are signed correctly. This suggests that it is not simply the electoral 
strength, or parliamentary strength, of left parties or radical left parties on 
citizenship policy liberalization, but the competition between them that accounts for 
citizenship policy shifts. 
In Models 6, 9 and 10, I test the effect of my second competition variable, the 
effective number of left parties (ENLP). In Model 6, ENLP by itself is insignificant. 
However, my initial hypothesis was that left-of-center governments in party 
systems with greater left party competition should be more likely to liberalize their 
citizenship policies, suggesting an interaction between competition and leftist 
governments. These interactions are displayed in Models 9 and 10. In Model 9, left-
oriented governments have the expected robust association with policy 
liberalization, but more importantly for the theory, the interaction between 
LRScore(1) and ENLP is also significant and signed correctly. This implies that under 
left-oriented governments, a one unit increase in the ENLP score is associated with a 
0.56 unit liberalization of citizenship policy. The interaction between left-oriented 
governments and leftist electoral competition in Model 10 further confirms the 
competition hypothesis: during election cycles with more left party competition 




government is associated with a 0.31 greater liberalization in citizenship policy than 
under non-Leftist Governments. In these models, at least on the left side of the 
political spectrum, electoral competition seems robustly linked to citizenship policy 
liberalization.  
Given the increased attention on Radical Right parties in recent years, it is 
somewhat surprising that several of the right-oriented competition variables have 
relatively weak associations across the initial models in Table 5.1. Indeed, neither 
the average change in dominant right party vote share (DRPVS, Model 1), nor the 
average change in Other Right (ORPVSA, Model 2) and Radical Right (RRPVS, Model 
3) vote share had any statistically significant effect on citizenship policy change. The 
only statistically significant association in this changing vote share models is that 
between the share of Radical Right party seats in parliament (Model 5) and 
citizenship policy restriction, but the magnitude of the effect is quite weak. These 
results, at least as captured by my vote share variables, undermines the expectation 
about relative right party competition driving policy change. However, the second 
set of competition variables provide evidence of the hypothesized mechanism. 
While the ENRP score and the interaction of ENRP and LRScore also fail to achieve 
statistical significance in Models 6 and 7, Right Competition and Rightist Government 
as well as the interaction of the two does reach statistical significance in Model 8. 
Hence under conditions of greater electoral competition among right-of-center 
parties (ENRP>ENLP), a government comprised of right, center, and even radical 
right parties may be more likely to restrict policy according to the hypothesized 




statistical support in Model 8, although not in any other model for right party 
competition found in Table 5.1. 
Given the extensive amount of previous research conducted on the influence 
of the radical right on immigration politics in Europe, the comparative significance 
of left parties and left party competition on citizenship policy is surprising. Why 
would electoral competition with the radical right have such a weak effect on policy 
restrictions in Europe? One answer to this question may be that its influence is 
exacted on different sub-dimensions of citizenship policy. To investigate this 
relationship further, I analyze the same set of models in Table 5.2, but with the 
dependent variable first set to Latent Change. Before we discuss the right party 
effects, let us first analyze look at the effects of various left party influence. In Model 
1, 2, and 3, the average changes in the dominant left party vote share, other left 
parties’ vote share, and radical left party vote share from one election to the next 
have a significant estimated effect on latent change, and are signed correctly. In 
other words, if the dominant left party gains one percent more in terms of votes 
from one election to the next, it is under less electoral pressure and is thus 
associated with marginally a higher (+0.008) latent policy change during that cycle. 
Conversely, as other left parties and radical left parties gain one unit of electoral 
strength, latent policy can be expected to liberalize by 0.02 and 0.025 units 
respectively. While these magnitudes appear small, remember that the latent index 
runs from 0 to 8 at policy increments of approximately 0.25 per policy change. Thus 
a strong increase in other left party support in an election could easily account for a 




interaction terms on the left party variables are associated with statistically 
significant policy liberalizations. For instance, in Model 10, under conditions of 
greater left party competition (ENLP>ENRP), a Leftist government can be expected 
to have a 0.11 unit effect on policy liberalization compared to non-Leftist 
governments. Again, this offers strong evidence of party competition as a factor 
structuring latent citizenship policy change.  
In terms of right party competition, the variables are less robustly associated 
with citizenship policy restrictions than those for left party competition. Growth in 
radical right party vote share in an election cycle (Model 3) as well as an additional 
percent in radical right seat share are associated with small restrictive changes. 
Furthermore, the ENRP variable in Model 6 achieves significance here where it did 
not previously, as does the interaction term between a Right Competition 
(ENRP>ENLP) and Rightist Government in Model 7 similarly to Table 5.1. Hence 
under conditions of greater electoral competition among right-of-center parties 
(ENRP>ENLP), a government comprised of right, center, and even radical right 
parties may be more likely to restrict policy. Finally, note that in Model 10, 
governments that include a radical right party appear to have an effect on 
citizenship policy restriction according to LRScore5, but no other types of 
governments did. Taken together, it seems that right party competition actually is 
evident in explaining citizenship policy change along this latent dimension.  
Looking at Table 5.3, which presents the same models for the manifest 
dimension, we actually see very little effect of party competition on either side of the 




Model 10, again where the presence of a radical right party in government has a 
large significant estimated effect (+0.36) on citizenship policy restrictions compared 
to centrist governments. The left party variables across most of the models are all 
signed as we would expect under our hypotheses, but they fail to achieve statistical 
significance. The dominant right party’s change in vote share in Model 1 is 
significant, but if the competition hypothesis were correct, we would see a negative 
effect, not a positive one. This is likewise the case for average change in radical right 
vote share in Model 3, where a unit increase is associated with more liberalized 
policy, contrary to expectation.  
Thus while we can be fairly confident that the left and right party 
competition variables generally explain overall citizenship policy change, and 
certainly contribute to latent dimension change, we find in this last table that party 
competition does not seem to be driving changes on the manifest dimension in 
either direction. Why might this be the case? One possibility is that there is little 
bidirectional movement on the manifest dimension: indeed, as we have seen in 
Chapter 4, the manifest dimension has charted a secular shift toward greater 
restrictiveness over the last several decades. Thus the variation to be explained on 
this dimension is fairly weak, and thus the variables of interest here are only weakly 
related to policy change on this dimension. Instead, what matters here seems to be 
simply the presence of radical right parties, and especially their presence in 
government. Although the radical right has been growing in strength over the last 
decade, perhaps their influence is not so much through competition with other 




policymaking. It may also be the case that their influence is felt across the party 
spectrum, rather than confined to one political corner or the other. Indeed, 
governments of all political stripes in Europe have introduced changes on the 
manifest dimension of policy, not simply conservative ones. And in contrast, radical 
leftist parties such as the Greens appear to have less inflammatory rhetoric with 
which to pull policy in the other direction, regardless of their electoral threat or 
potential to compete with mainstream left parties. In other words, there may in fact 
be electoral threats of competition from the radical right influencing all parties in a 
single direction on manifest policy. 
One final result to note from a comparison of the three tables above centers 
on the differential effects of the foreign population. Although included here more as 
a control variable than a variable of interest, it is nonetheless revealing for our 
hypothesis about demographic change (H.CP2). In Table 5.1, the logged percent of 
the foreign born population is negatively signed and highly significant across all but 
one of the models, suggesting that as the size of the foreign born population 
increases, associated policy changes move in a restrictive direction. When the ICCI is 
disaggregated into its two dimensions, however, a more nuanced relationship seems 
to emerge. In Table 5.2, the logged percent of the foreign born population is 
negatively signed, suggesting a larger foreign born population is associated with 
more liberal changes. While the coefficient is only significant in one model, this is 
revealing in contrast to Table 5.3, where again the size of the foreign born 
population has an estimated, and highly significant, restrictive effect on citizenship 




Table 5.2: Estimated Effects of Party Competition on Latent Policy Change 






















           













































































































































































































































           





























































           











































Table 5.2 (Continued) 




















           





























































           





















           




















           





























































           









































           




















           




















           










































Observations (n) 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 
Degrees of Freedom 7 7 7 7 7 9 7 9 7 8 
Chi2 11.0 11.9 12.9 12.8 14.9 11.5 10.7 14.8 12.6 8.28 
p 0.14 0.10 0.075 0.078 0.038 0.24 0.15 0.097 0.082 0.41 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 5.3: Estimated Effects of Party Competition on Manifest Policy Change 
DV: Change in Manifest 
Score 






















           












































































































































































































































           
















































































           























Table 5.3 (Continued) 




















           






























































           





















           




















           






























































           





















           
LRScore5 = Radical Leftist          
0.015 
(0.21) 
           
LRScore5 = Leftist          
-0.053 
(0.076) 
           
LRScore5 = Rightist          
0.028 
(0.069) 
           
LRScore5 = Radical 
Rightist 
         
0.36* 
(0.21) 






















Observations (n) 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 
Degrees of Freedom 7 7 7 7 7 9 7 9 7 8 
Chi2 12.1 10.7 13.0 10.2 9.55 14.4 11.4 13.4 10.1 12.2 
p 0.098 0.15 0.073 0.18 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.14 
Standard errors in parentheses 




of greater immigrant populations does influence policy, compelling liberalization on 
the latent dimension and restrictions on the manifest dimension. Such a finding 
offers modest support to hypothesis H.CP2, although the hypothesized dynamics are 
examined in more detail below. 
Analysis and Results: Path Dependence 
We now turn to the empirical test of broad citizenship regimes and path 
dependence formulated in H.CP2 and H.CP3 largely as theoretical alternatives to the 
political competition framework I just investigated. First I analyze the influence of a 
country’s total ICCI score in 1970 (ICCI Total 1970) as well as the size of its foreign 
born population in 1970 (ForBornPercentStart) on its total scores in subsequent 
decades, each modeled by decade in Table 5.4 below.42 However, I bifurcate the 
analyses according to one of two general citizenship strategies that each country 
had adopted in the postwar period as identified in Chapter 4.43 This enables us to 
compare the potentially different dynamics operating among these two groups and 
test the validity of H.CP2. Let us first compare the path dependent dynamics in the 
models on total ICCI score. Several variables are worth noting. First, a country’s 
citizenship policy in 1970 is strongly associated with policy in subsequent decades 
across both groups. For every unit more restrictive in 1970, the citizenship policy is 
on average between one and two units more restrictive today. Interestingly, 
                                                        
42 The variable ForBornPercentStart is a crude measure of the naturalized (and thus enfranchised) 
foreign born population in 1970. A better measure would be the size of the naturalized population in 
1970, but such data is unfortunately unavailable. 
43 The group designated Citizenship through Latent Integration includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. The group designated 





however, the strength and significance of the estimated effect seems to diminish 
over time for the more restrictive group of countries on the left (Citizenship through 
Latent Integration), while it increases for the latter more liberal group (Integration 
through Citizenship). This suggests that for those countries that were traditionally 
more restrictive, their initial starting point is overall less consequential for their 
current policy, while the opposite appears true for the latter group: these countries 
are becoming more restrictive. While this is consistent with the findings in Chapter 
4 documenting how countries have largely deviated from their starting points, it is 
hardly grounds to fully reject hypothesis H.CP3. Furthermore, on the basis of this 
table, we might also find reason to question H.CP2 regarding the role of the foreign 
born population in 1970. In fact, the variable ForBornPercentStart is only significant 
in more recent decades for the traditionally more liberal countries, but is signed in 
an unexpected direction. Having a larger foreign born population early in the 
postwar period is a significant predictor not of sustained liberalization, but of 
restrictions decades later. While this finding does not automatically contradict the 
theory, it may be an indication that the large initial immigrant populations in these 
more liberal countries have not been able to sustain pro-immigrant citizenship 
policies over time, and in fact their long-rooted presence is a contributor to more 
restrictive citizenship policies in the long run rather than a guarantee against it.  
One relevant constituency that has seemingly sustained more restrictive 
policies over time are radical right parties. As we can see, the role of the radical right 
in sustaining and pressing for restrictive policies is evident among the already 




theoretical expectation of H.CP2: among restrictive countries, no sizable 
enfranchised population exists and radical right parties emerge as a backlash 
against future liberalization. Of course, the influence of the radical right finally 
emerges in the last half decade in the more liberal countries as well, as evidenced in 
the last column of the table. Finally, although outside the scope of the theoretical 
framework, it is worth noting that the economy may affect the contours of 
citizenship policy: negative GDP growth is associated with higher total ICCI scores in 
the latter two models. This would make intuitive sense, as economic woes might 
incentivize policy makers to render citizenship less accessible in an attempt to 
restrict immigrant access to economic opportunities that would rival those of 
natives.  
Because the ICCI is coded along two dimensions – a Latent and Manifest 
dimension – I now run the same analysis of the hypothesized effects on these two 
dimensions in order to better understand the underlying dynamics of how these 
starting points might influence subsequent policy. Table 5.5 examines path-
dependent effects on the latent dimension. Viewing the ICCI Latent 1970 score in 
Table 5.5, we see that a country’s 1970 latent dimension is rather weakly and 
positively associated with subsequent decades. For every unit a country was more 
restrictive in 1970, they are slightly more restrictive today. Among the more 
restrictive countries in the left columns, this estimated effect of the 1970 latent 
score loses its significance after the 1990s, suggesting little correspondence across 
decades and little path dependence after the 1990s. For the countries with more 









Table 5.4: Influence of Path-Dependent Effects on Aggregate Citizenship Policy 
DV: Total ICCI Score 
Citizenship through Latent Integration Integration through Citizenship 
1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
















































































































































Observations 110 110 110 55 50 50 50 25 
Number of Clusters 39 40 36 23 22 15 16 9 
Degrees of Freedom 6 6 7 7 6 6 7 7 
Chi2 448.5 62.7 38.0 13.6 350.0 37.7 125.5 36927.1 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors are clustered by Election and are given in parentheses 









Table 5.5: Influence of Path-Dependent Effects on Latent Citizenship Policy 
DV: Latent ICCI Score 
Citizenship through Latent Integration Integration through Citizenship 
1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
















































































































































Observations 110 110 110 55 50 50 50 25 
Number of Clusters 39 40 36 23 22 15 16 9 
Degrees of Freedom 6 6 7 7 6 6 7 7 
Chi2 740.5 35.7 33.3 28.8 1317.1 162.2 535.3 4675.3 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard errors are clustered by Election and are given in parentheses 









Table 5.6: Influence of Path-Dependent Effects on Manifest Citizenship Policy 
DV: Manifest ICCI 
Score 
Citizenship through Latent Integration Integration through Citizenship 
1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 
















































































































































Observations 110 110 110 55 50 50 50 25 
Number of Clusters 39 40 36 23 22 15 16 9 
Degrees of Freedom 6 6 7 7 6 6 7 7 
Chi2 62.0 22.2 26.4 63.4 226.6 66.3 671.0 7737.1 
p 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard errors are clustered by Election and are given in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 





estimated effect on subsequent policy outputs: a country that is one additional unit 
more restrictive (liberal) in its policy in 1970 is associated with a 0.77 more 
restrictive (liberal) in the most recent decade. Overall then, these results lend some 
rather weak support to the path dependence hypothesis among these countries. 
Also, the hypothesized mechanism by which such path dependence occurs – 
the size of the foreign born population in 1970 – finds strong support on this sub-
dimension across both groups. A larger foreign born population in 1970 is 
associated with more liberalized citizenship requirements – such as dual citizenship, 
years to naturalization, jus soli, and ethnic criteria - in subsequent decades. 
Although we anticipated this relationship to hold among the traditionally more 
liberal countries, that it holds across all countries does not disconfirm our 
theoretical expectation: a greater foreign born population naturalizing in previous 
decades and supporting and voting for parties in subsequent decades might make 
citizenship more accessible over the long-run. This is also consistent with the 
findings from Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. It is also notable that the influence of the 
radical right remains significant among the traditionally more restrictive countries, 
but is less robust on this dimension, both compared to the previously early foreign 
born population as well as its influence on the total ICCI total score. Hence the 
radical right still matters for traditionally more restrictive countries on this 
dimension, but a larger initial foreign born population may help counteract moves 
to restriction and may even help incentivize citizenship policy liberalization. The 
combination of these foreign born and radical right dynamics lend support to our 




Finally, in Table 5.6, we observe that among the traditionally more restrictive 
countries with more manifest requirements in 1970, this dimension is hardly 
associated with manifest requirements adopted after the 1980s. Among the 
traditionally more liberal countries who included few if any manifest requirements, 
however, the association is much more robust. For every unit more restrictive in 
1970, these countries are on average adopting restrictions twice and thrice the size 
of those restrictions in 1970. The distinction between the two groups is statistically 
clear: the traditionally more restrictive countries have adopted manifest policies 
since the 1980s that deviate from their starting points, while the traditionally less 
restrictive countries have adopted manifest policies that also deviate from their 
traditionally accessible policy origins. However, the initial foreign born population 
does not seem to have the anticipated level or kind of influence on subsequent 
policies, and in fact policies in countries with larger initial foreign born populations 
are associated with additional restrictions on this dimension in subsequent decades. 
Furthermore, the radical right remains significant, at least among the traditionally 
more restrictive countries. Similar to the results in Table 5.3, this may be an 
indication that large initial immigrant populations operate as a long-term 
contributor to radical policy responses from the right and more restrictive manifest 
requirements rather than a guarantee against them, especially if this settled 
population demonstrates difficulty integrating over time. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tested and analyzed the hypotheses about citizenship 




electoral competition to the right of the political spectrum may compel some 
conservative parties to push for restrictions on citizenship, electoral competition to 
the left of the political spectrum may likewise compel some leftist parties to 
advocate for and liberalize citizenship policy. This is due to the electoral incentives 
parties face with respect to their voting constituencies. In the presence of 
competition from radical right parties, neither mainstream conservative nor leftist 
parties may favor policy liberalization, and policies may in fact become more 
restrictive because both stand to lose constituents to these more extreme parties if 
they do so. Similarly, in a party system with increasing numbers of left parties and 
stiffer electoral competition among them, these parties may find themselves 
competing with one another over the immigrants whose votes benefit them 
electorally. The liberalization of citizenship policy may be one mechanism to win 
present and future immigrant votes in light of this competition.   
The empirical analysis found in in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 above offered general 
confirmation of the aforementioned hypotheses. On the one hand, there seems to be 
a strong correlation between the left-of-center electoral competition and my 
measure of citizenship policy across time and across countries. Each of the 
competition variables – from changes in relative left party vote share to the effective 
number of left parties and interactions between these variables and respective 
governments – had a statistically meaningful and confirmatory predicted effect on 
citizenship policy change, at least in terms of the overall ICCI score and the latent 
dimension. To my knowledge, the role of the left and radical left on citizenship 




immigration and citizenship literature is novel. On the other hand, the electoral 
competition variables on the right side of the political spectrum also were estimated 
to have a significant effect on the overall score, and also especially on the latent 
dimension. While almost no electoral dynamics were observed to have an effect on 
the manifest dimension, this does not wholly undermine the theory, for reasons 
already discussed. On the manifest dimension, all parties across the spectrum have 
in fact introduced language, civic, economic, and legal requirements for citizenship, 
likely under direct threat or competition from the radical right. Thus on the manifest 
dimension, it may not be the absolute electoral strength of other right parties in 
general, or the strength of radical right competition, that incentivize restrictions, but 
rather their vociferous presence.  
The findings certainly call into question a traditional understanding of 
radical parties’ influence on citizenship policy. While the magnitude of the radical 
right’s influence was observed in the statistical analyses of path dependence by 
examining its absolute vote share, in line with the findings of Howard (2010) and 
Koopmans et al. (2012), the comprehensive analysis of citizenship policy suggests 
that the share of seats won by radical right parties is not a very robust explanation 
for citizenship policy change, except for perhaps the manifest dimension. Thus we 
may need to rethink how that influence is considered for citizenship policy change. 
Altogether, the statistical findings suggest that citizenship policy making in Europe 
operates not simply due to the absolute vote share of radical parties, but according 




electoral competition on the left and right for changes in citizenship policy, with 
weaker competitive dynamics on the manifest dimension.  
The statistical findings do find confirmation across a number of cases of 
liberalization in recent years in which we witness in the time period prior to the 
time of policy liberalization both a generally declining vote share for the 
predominant left party (signifying new parties on the left seizing growing shares of 
the respective vote), as well as a general lack of electoral competition from the far 
right. The case of Germany exemplifies the theory well. In the two decades prior to 
its liberalized Nationality Act in 2000, the Social Democrats (SPD) had lost nearly 
twenty percent of their vote share to new left parties, including the Greens and the 
PDS/Left, while the Christian Democratic Union faced no electoral threat from the 
far right. During this period, the ENLP score rose from 1.02 to 1.66, and the Greens 
spent the greater part of a decade advocating for policy liberalization. By 1999, the 
left-oriented Social Democratic and Green coalition that assumed power the year 
before had formulated and passed a significant liberalization of several components 
of Germany’s hitherto exclusive citizenship regime. In Finland prior to its 
liberalizing Nationality Act in 2003, the Social Democratic party was consistently 
receiving only sixty percent of the left-party vote share while the right-of-center 
National Coalition Party was experiencing little to no far right party competition, 
representing strongly left-of-center electoral competition. In the decade before the 
passage of the 2001 Swedish Citizenship Act, which liberalized citizenship 
significantly, the hegemonic Social Democrats saw general declines in vote share 




experienced an increase in its respective vote share. Increased politicization of the 
citizenship issue on the left may have compelled this liberalization. With robust left 
party competition in each of these cases, these dynamics exemplify the theorized 
electoral conditions for policy liberalization. 
In the Netherlands, Dutch citizenship policy began to shift during debates on 
integration, multiculturalism, and citizenship during the late 1980s and 1990s that 
culminated in the 1997 policy change. During this time, the Dutch Labour party 
(PvdA) was losing sizable shares of votes to the Green Left and Socialists, without 
any noticeable rise in far right support until the end of the decade. After the 2002 
elections resulted in a massive shift in the vote from the mainstream parties of both 
left and right to the far right, the 2003 Netherlands Nationality Act took the 
Netherlands in a far more restrictive direction. 
Austria and Denmark both experienced strong restrictive changes around the 
turn of the century following what appears to be a combination of declining 
predominant right party support (and an associated rise in far right support) and of 
steady or gradually declining left party electoral support. In Austria, while the Social 
Democrats were under pressure from the Green party and the Liberal Party to 
liberalize policy during the 1990s, the rise of the far right Freedom Party (FPÖ) 
ultimately raised the rhetorical heat of the debate and compelled a restrictive 
Austrian Citizenship Act in 1999. As we see in Denmark, general stability on the left 
of the political spectrum was trumped by increased competition on the right due to 
the rising Danish People’s Party prior to the 2001-02 naturalization restrictions. In 




period at the expense of the mainstream parties. Nonetheless, despite its 
intermittent history with Social Democratic governments in the past, a Danish Social 
Democratic government was able to take office in 2012 office facing a historically 
high ENLP score of 2.22, serving as a fertile context in which the government could 
pass Denmark’s first liberal citizenship policy in its postwar history. 
The cases of the UK and France might also support the alternative 
mechanism by which competition and threat on the right operate on citizenship 
policymaking. In the UK, we see a generally stable level of left party and right party 
vote share, with rather consistent ENLP and ENRP scores, and yet a low but potent 
share increasingly going to the far right British National Party and UK Independence 
Party beginning in the early 2000s. This may have provided an impetus for Labour 
to pass the more restrictive Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act in 2002, as 
well as for subsequent restrictions in 2009 and 2013. UKIP received 1.5 percent of 
the vote in 2000, 2.2 percent of the vote in 2005, and 3.1 percent of the vote in 2010 
but won no seats in any of these elections. However, despite its lack of electoral 
competition and non-existent representation in Parliament, it may well exercise its 
influence on the citizenship policymaking of the mainstream right through its 
rhetorical and political threats from the radical right, as it has done to set the terms 
of the debate on citizenship in Britain for much of the last decade. Likewise in 
France, the effects of the far right Front National have clearly contributed a 
restrictive tone to citizenship policy debates during the 1980s and 1990s when the 




history served as the primary form of competition on the mainstream Socialist or 
mainstream Gaullist party.   
Finally, the alternative path-dependence hypothesis to my political 
competition theory find relatively little support in the data analyzed here, while my 
proposed mechanism of demographic change finds mixed support in the evidence. 
Although the analysis of the total ICCI score suggested path dependence from 
citizenship starting point to the present might be a significant factor in explaining 
the general contours of citizenship policy over a few subsequent decades, the 
analyses of the two sub-dimensions largely cast this in doubt. Citizenship starting 
points do not provide much leverage in understanding where citizenship policy is 
going today. Thus the findings undermine the path dependence identified by 
Koopmans et al. (2012) and Goodman (2014). While the former authors find also 
evidence that a population of immigrant origin in earlier periods helps sustain and 
compel liberal citizenship policies over time, my crude measure of a similar dynamic 
only found support for the latent dimension of policy. Larger initial populations 
compel subsequent liberalizations in latent policies, but actually compel restrictions 
in manifest policy in later decades. Thus larger immigrant populations in earlier 
decades are unable to forestall restrictive change in later decades, especially as the 
radical right develops into a significant force. This does not settle the debate of this 
explanation for long-term citizenship policy change, but rather raises the question 
for scholars to examine more intricately in the future. Combined with the evidence 
presented in Chapter 4, however, this study reveals little support for the path 




While the results presented in this chapter are generally confirmatory of the 
theorized dynamics of citizenship policymaking in Europe over the last several 
decades, additional quantitative as well as qualitative work could uncover precisely 
how these two electoral mechanisms operate. Nonetheless, if the theory advanced in 
this project is correct, it suggests that the far right is not the only driving force 
behind the rather volatile trends in citizenship policy sweeping Europe in the last 
two decades. Instead, we may need to consider the broader electoral realignments 
taking place within European political systems and the changing electoral incentives 
and interests of all parties across the spectrum if we are to understand how, when, 




 The Cross-National Variation in Naturalization in 
Europe 
As I first discussed in Chapter 2 (recall Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3), 
naturalization rates since the 1970s exhibit remarkable variation across time for 
most countries of Europe. Some countries, such as Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg, 
have had consistently lower naturalization rates over time, while others, such as 
Great Britain, Sweden, and Portugal, exhibit much higher naturalization rates on 
average. Even countries with similar post-war histories, immigration policies, and 
even cultures often have divergent naturalization rates: those in Austria dwarf those 
in Germany, and those in Great Britain consistently exceed those in France, for most 
of post-war history. Beyond general country comparisons, year-to-year changes 
within countries have also been quite striking in many cases. The naturalization rate 
in Belgium, for example, spiked dramatically from 8.7 in 1984 to 93.02 in 1985, a 
tenfold increase across a single year. In Denmark, the naturalization rate in 2000 
nearly doubled over the year prior, from 48.7 to 74.5 naturalizations per 1,000 
immigrants. There have been drastic reductions as well. In Austria, the average 
naturalization rate in the first five years of the new millennium was 48.8; that same 
average was 7.22 in the last five years. The 1990s were heady days for 
naturalization in the Netherlands, with an average rate of 76.58 acquisitions per 
1,000 immigrants; that same figure now stands at 39.54 in the last decade. What 





Understanding Citizenship Acquisition 
Answers to this question have come from three general approaches. One 
approach draws on theories of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972) and 
focuses on the individual-level characteristics and motivations of immigrants. A 
number of political, civic, economic, and social rights and privileges accrue to 
citizens that are often denied permanent residents, and a number of financial and 
procedural costs must also be born in order to naturalize. From this perspective, as 
successful economic, social, and cultural integration within the receiving country 
increases, the benefits of acquiring political membership in the receiving country 
increasingly outweigh the costs of severing former country ties or applying for 
citizenship. Looking strictly at economic incentives, immigrants may also perceive a 
‘premium’ that derives from citizenship, as citizens often earn more, have greater 
access to certain types of employment or educational opportunities reserved for 
citizens, or experience less potential job discrimination based on citizenship status. 
It may serve as a device that naturalized immigrants may use to signal a level of 
integration, investment in a country, and reliability to employers who may 
otherwise question an applicant’s commitment to long-term residence (DeVoretz 
2008; OECD 2011, 17-18). For this reason, empirical analyses show that immigrants 
with higher socioeconomic status, higher levels of education and language 
proficiency, and longer periods of residence are more likely to acquire citizenship 
(Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Jasso and 1986; Portes and Curtis 1987; Yang 1994; 
Jones-Correa 1998; Bevelander and Veenman 2006; Chiswick and Miller 2008; 




Yet while individual-level characteristics and immigrants’ personal 
incentives certainly shape immigrants propensity to naturalize, we must also puzzle 
over the factors that shape these characteristics and the sources of these incentives. 
It may be that institutional and contextual factors set the terms for political, 
economic, social, and cultural participation within countries of settlement, 
facilitating the naturalization of some immigrants while restricting or discouraging 
others. As Jones-Correa (2001a) argues, scholars should “pay significantly more 
attention to the institutional and social context in which immigrants make decisions 
about participation” (Jones-Correa 2001a, 54). And indeed, a number of scholars 
have studied citizenship acquisition from this perspective. One variant of this 
approach, discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 2, focuses on contextual variables 
in the countries of settlement or origin that serve to either ‘push’ or ‘pull’ 
immigrants toward citizenship. These variables may include cultural, political, or 
linguistic differences between countries of origin and settlement (Liang 1994; 
Bueker 2005; Chiswick and Miller 2008), social settlement patterns among 
immigrant groups (Logan et al. 2012), or  economic context (Dronkers and Vink 
2012; Vink et al. 2013). A second variant surveys the institutional context of 
citizenship acquisition. This perspective stems largely from earlier theoretical work 
on national models of incorporation and citizenship (Brubaker 1992; see also Favell 
1998; Castles and Miller 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005; Schain 2008), and has 
developed a growing body of empirical analysis in recent years. Not surprisingly, 
most empirical studies within this approach focus on the citizenship policies of 




attention (Jones-Correa 1998, 2001b; Bloemraad 2004; Faist 2007; Chiswick and 
Miller 2008; Mazzolari 2009; Vink et al. 2013), although the provision of birthright 
(jus soli) citizenship has now been tested as well (Dronkers and Vink 2012).  
Unfortunately, there are a number of limitations to the current empirical 
investigations of these contextual variables, and especially institutional factors. 
While non-comparative, American-focused studies obviously run into single-case 
limitations, much of the empirical work focused on Europe has also been either 
country case studies (Diehl and Blohm 2003; Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 
2012; Euwals et al. 2010) or cross-national investigations based on survey data 
limited to a few years (Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink et al. 2013). The latter are 
particularly problematic for drawing inferences about the policy context of 
naturalization. For example, (Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink et al. 2013) use pooled 
hierarchical models of select waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) to assess 
the effects of institutional variation across countries on the citizenship status of 
non-native respondents. Unfortunately, reliance on these survey instruments have 
inherent problems that may be ill-suited for scrutinizing citizenship acquisition. 
First, the ESS, like most surveys, does not tell us when the respondents acquired 
citizenship, or how they acquired it, meaning that we cannot assess the specific 
institutional context that actually facilitated their acquisition with any degree of 
precision. This means that most studies thus assume single-year scores for 
citizenship policy, such as from MIPEX, or dichotomous variables for dual 
citizenship and jus soli, will be a reasonable reflection of the fluid institutional 




has changed quite frequently in recent years, rendering this assumption potentially 
invalid: the context for naturalizing Austrian respondents in the 1980s is indeed 
radically different from those acquiring citizenship in the 1990s and in 2014.  
Second, reliance on extant survey data also cannot cast light on the changing 
circumstances of citizenship acquisition: whether policy adjustments or the 
introduction of new requirements affected the citizenship acquisition of 
respondents, for example. The longitudinal limitations of most survey instruments 
thus prevent us from comparing the effects of policy across time. Finally, as the 
authors recognize, using the ESS (or any other survey instrument) to examine 
citizenship acquisition may lead to inaccurate inferences because of selection bias: 
only well-integrated immigrants are likely to be included in the sample. This makes 
it difficult for us to accurately gauge the effects of integration-related requirements 
on naturalization if our sample is restricted to well-integrated immigrants only. 
Janoski’s (2010) analysis of naturalization rates across 14 European 
countries from 1970 to 2006 is the most comprehensive to date on the subject. In it 
he employs his Barriers to Nationality Index (BNI) to estimate the effects of 
citizenship policy across a number of statistical models of naturalization rates. Yet 
the BNI is only coded for four years within that period (1970, 1980, 1990, and 
2002). As pointed out in Chapter 2 in my discussion of existing policy indices, such 
decades-wide longitudinal gaps between policy measurements are problematic if 
we are interested in proximate effects of citizenship policy on annual acquisitions 
within those decades. Over the last decade, citizenship policies have changed on a 




bookends of each decade as Janoski does means that the BNI functions largely as a 
control variable in the analysis, and we thus miss these intra-decadal dynamics that 
often have immediate and observable impact on naturalizations in any given year.  
The other limitation is a lack of theoretical attention to different policy 
requirements and subcomponents. The BNI quantifies citizenship policies across 12 
different components, many of which overlap with the ICCI presented in this project, 
yet it includes several items that have ambiguous theoretical effect on 
naturalization. For example, Janoski (2010) claims the inclusion of “the discretion 
on the part of the state… may deter immigrants from pursuing [citizenship]” (38). 
However, state discretion may also be used to increase and facilitate naturalizations 
in many contexts, regardless of the formal rules on the books. This, then, becomes 
an empirical question to be investigated rather than assumed. But, relatedly, his 
study he only employs the aggregated BNI scores to assess the effects of policy on 
naturalization. It is therefore unclear what effects each of his components have on 
naturalization. A more insightful analysis of naturalization should arguably also 
disaggregate citizenship policies into component requirements so that scholars may 
isolate those requirements that influence citizenship acquisition from those that 
have little to no influence.  
As diverse and extensive as this institutional and context-focused literature 
has become, a number of questions remain, the answers to which would greatly 
enhance our understanding of citizenship acquisition. The first set of questions 
regards the effects of policy. How exactly does policy matter for naturalization 




naturalize, and which do not? How do annual policies changes affect acquisitions 
over time? The second set of questions regards the effects of integration context in 
the country of settlement and the various factors that shift immigrant demand for 
citizenship and political supply of citizenship first postulated in Chapter 3. How 
might the integration context in which immigrants find themselves incentivize or 
disincentivize their citizenship acquisition? Can politics affect citizenship 
acquisition beyond policy? The study conducted in this chapter and the next 
resolves some of these aforementioned shortcomings in the existing literature in 
two ways. First, because the ICCI is coded on an annual basis, we can better account 
for year-to-year variation in citizenship policies that provide the institutional 
structure of naturalization strategies. And since we can also control for annual 
changes more precisely, this should permit a more precise estimation of other 
supply and demand variables that may have an observed effect. Second, by 
examining naturalization trends with recourse to the various dimensions and 
components of the ICCI, I will reveal which requirements shape naturalization 
strategies and which exert little influence. As I demonstrate below, not all 
citizenship requirements are equally influential.  
Furthermore, the following analysis tests the overall theoretical framework 
advanced in Chapter 3 and specifically examines the effects of the political supply of 
citizenship and immigrant demand for citizenship on naturalization across European 
countries. We recall there were four factors theorized to shift immigrant demand: 
socioeconomic context, future value of citizenship, current and future value of non-




demand for citizenship that I test here are thus based on how immigrants respond 
to these factors deriving from their integration context: 
H.D1: The strength of the socioeconomic context of a country should be 
positively associated with the immigrant demand for citizenship, which should 
increase commensurate naturalization rates. 
H.D2: As the perceived future economic or political value of citizenship status 
in the country increases, or as the expected future cost of citizenship increases, 
immigrant demand for citizenship in the current year should increase, reflected 
in increased naturalization rates.  
H.D3: As the relative value of non-citizenship decreases, immigrant demand for 
citizenship – and consequently naturalization rates – should increase. 
Similarly, I theorized how the political supply of citizenship would manifest itself 
indirectly through the determinants of citizenship policy as well as directly through 
the motivations and incentives of policy makers in exploiting ambiguities in given 
policies. My hypotheses for the political supply of citizenship were thus based on 
how politicians’ motivations become manifest through policy and through political 
influence on policy implementation: 
H.S1: As the costliness of citizenship supplied increases, the commensurate 
naturalization rates should decrease. 
H.S2: As the result of political influence beyond formal citizenship policy, left-
oriented governments should be positively associated and right-oriented 




H.S3 As the degree of legal discretion over the implementation of citizenship 
policy decreases, naturalization rates should decrease under left-oriented 
governments and increase under right-oriented governments. 
H.S4: Left party competition should be positively associated with 
naturalization rates and right party competition should be negatively 
associated with naturalization rates. 
I summarize my expectations first enumerated in Chapter 3 in Table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1: Determinants of Demand for and Supply of Citizenship 
 
Testing the Supply and Demand of Citizenship  
In the remaining pages of this chapter, I will test these hypotheses 
systematically, both relying on naturalization and immigration statistics gathered 
from the countries under investigation and on qualitative evidence gathered 




of the fundamental components of the theoretical framework, captured by 
hypotheses H.D1, H.S1, H.S2, and H.S3. Subsequently, I conduct a detailed analysis of 
H.D2 and H.D3 using the case of the Euro crisis to exemplify how changing the value 
of citizenship may motivate naturalization in Europe. In the following chapter, I 
illustrate the local context of immigrant demand and political supply through a 
subnational investigation of naturalization within Germany and Austria, where 
federalism enables us to glean additional insights from the theory. 
Now I begin with a cross-national analysis of naturalization rates as a 
product of the political supply and immigrant demand for citizenship across Europe. 
My dependent variable is the annual naturalization rate (NatRate) for country-years 
spanning 1980 through 2014, calculated as the number of total citizenship 
acquisitions per the immigrant population, and multiplied by one thousand.44 Data 
for the number of naturalizations, immigrant populations, and lagged annual 
migration rate (MigRateLag) were collected over the last two years from the 
websites of and emailed correspondence from the main statistical offices in each 
country (see Appendix A). Unfortunately, many countries collect and/or retain 
inconsistent or sparse data on these subjects, and for this reason all national data 
collected was cross-validated and missing data corrected with data from Eurostat 
                                                        
44 Note that the rate includes total acquisitions, which implies the inclusion of jus soli acquisitions. 
While no country to my knowledge collects or publishes such figures, I performed a jus soli 
adjustment of my own for those countries that have or had jus soli as a means of acquiring citizenship 
in the present or in the past, including France (1970-1997), the United Kingdom (1970-present), 
Belgium (2000-present), and Germany (2000-present). I followed the formula employed by Janoski 
(2010, 31), which involves calculating the size of the foreign population weighted by the birth rate in 
the population. In the case of Germany, children known as Optionskinder, those born to foreign 
parents who qualify for partial jus soli under the option model, have been recorded according to the 




(2015a, 2015e, 2016), the OECD (2015a, 2015b, 2015c), and the United Nations 
(2009, 2013b).45 
To operationalize the conditions in the country that constitute the economic 
context of immigrant demand, I include variables for annual GDP Growth (World 
Bank 2016a) and annual Unemployment (World Bank 2016d). In some models 
include a variable for Recession indicating if that country experienced a negative 
growth rate that year, as well as a factor variable for the EuroCrisis for the years 
2009 to 2013. I also control for GDP per capita (World Bank 2016c) in some models. 
For my political variables, I use most of the same variables from Chapter 5, derived 
from the electoral ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2015). Finally, I again 
employ the Integration Cost of Citizenship Index (ICCI), but most directly as a 
control rather than an explicit test of H.S1. 
Because there is no clear hierarchical structure to the panel data, the analysis 
is conducted using pooled OLS regression. However, partial correlograms reveal 
that the NatRate variable is an AR(1) process for all countries in the panel with 
autocorrelation between the NatRate and NatRate lagged by a single year. 
Furthermore, there appear be different error variances across the different cross-
sections in the panel, meaning that such heteroskedasticity will render the 
straightforward OLS standard errors inconsistent. Therefore, to deal with the AR(1) 
autocorrelation as well as panel-level heteroskedasticity in the errors, the models 
                                                        
45 Because of missing data limitations, I exclude Ireland from the analysis because I was unable to 
locate any of the aforementioned data for the country prior to 2000. Greece, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal, all new countries of immigration, had data missing for select years for the sample period, 
but not extensive enough to be of concern methodologically. They are withheld from the analysis 




presented here use linear OLS regression with lagged dependent variables (one 
year) and panel-corrected standard errors advocated by Beck and Katz (1995) 
which are commonly used with time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data.  
To get an initial sense of how different components of policy operate on 
naturalization rates, I first present Figure 6.1, which plots the average marginal 
effects of different levels of the various cost components of the citizenship index. 





As we see, all of the components generally conform to expectations, even if some of 
the categories of the components were not significant.46 Thus we have a strong 
sense already that increased restrictiveness along most of citizenship’s associated 
integration costs affect the naturalization rate, consistent with hypothesis H.S1.  
Table 6.2 contains a series of 8 regression models that test the economic 
motivations of naturalization in various permutations of economic variables, with 
Model 1 serving as the empirical baseline. As we can see, the ICCI index performs as 
expected in the baseline and in all subsequent models, already lending support to 
H.S1. Higher scores are associated with fewer naturalizations. In terms of economic 
variables, the coefficient on Unemployment is consistently negative across all models 
and statistically significant. In the isolated Model 2, a one-point increase in the 
unemployment rate is associated with nearly a one point decrease in the 
naturalization rate, holding all other variables constant. As we include other 
economic variables in Models 3-6, it retains its statistical significance, even if its 
predicted effect on naturalization is understandably diminished. Interestingly, GDP 
per capita is positively associated with naturalization rates across all models. 
Although the magnitude of the effect appears small against the size of the variable, it 
is not negligible. For example, the GDP per capita of the UK increased from $40,199 
to $40,967 from 2013 to 2014, which translates into an estimated effect of roughly 
0.08 on naturalization rates in that year. While not entirely as strong as 
                                                        
46 The category numbers are not the actual scores on these various components, but rather reflect 
categories of scores grouped according to prominent breaks in the score distributions. Each marginal 
effect was estimated using panel-corrected standard errors, controlling for logged foreign born 
percent and lagged naturalization rate with country fixed effects. Those categories that do not attain 
significance include Civic (category 3), Economic (all categories), Ethnic (category 2), Legal (all 




unemployment, it may lend credence to hypotheses H.D1 and H.D2. Wealthier 
countries of course attract more immigrants, and have more to offer immigrants, 
and thus have higher naturalization rates on average than poorer countries. This 
may also suggest that economically stronger countries may be more comparatively 
dynamic than poorer countries. If wealthy countries indicate that immigrants can 
better afford the commensurate costs of political and cultural integration required 
to naturalize, or offer the economically integrated immigrant more optimistic 
socioeconomic, political, or cultural prospects in the future, then they may find that 
the context in wealthier countries is conducive to citizenship acquisition rather than 
remain an immigrant or return to his or her country of origin. Thus this statistic is 
consistent with H.D2.47 
Unfortunately GDP Growth does not reach significance in this or any other 
test I conducted, which does not bolster the previous findings. Finally, the dummy 
year variable for Recession was significant and positively associated with annual 
naturalization rates. This is surprising, since it seems to directly challenge H.D1. 
However, upon closer investigation, this partial correlation could be due to the 
inclusion of Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, who are outliers in terms of 
unemployment, GDP growth, and other economic variables, particularly during the 
recent years of the Euro crisis. To account for this possibility, I tested for the Euro 
crisis in Model 6 and found it was not significantly associated with naturalization 
rates in these strictly economic models.
                                                        
47 I also conducted the same models using logged Unemployment and logged GDP per capita, but 





Table 6.2: The Economic Determinants of Immigrant Demand for Citizenship 





























































































































         

















         



































Observations 525 507 504 521 504 504 368 368 
R2 0.19 0.29 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.41 0.81 
Number of 
Clusters 




3 4 6 6 7 7 
4 7 
Chi2 13.0 35.4 945.7 980.9 954.9 956.5 39.5 592.0 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.00 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 6.3: The Political Determinants of the Supply of Citizenship 





































































































      
        















        
















        















        
















































        
















































        
































Observations 504 504 504 504 504 507 507 
R2 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.39 0.33 
Number of Clusters 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
7 6 6 6 6 7 7 
Chi2 983.1 994.3 919.0 978.2 980.7 50.4 45.4 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Because of the possibility that these statistical country outliers could be 
driving the results of the other models, I ran two additional models, Sub1 and Sub2, 
which are subsets of the original models without any of these states (henceforth, 
with Ireland, GIIPS). Omitting them from the analysis and rerunning the models 
again, the predicted effect of Recession disappears. Notably, however, the magnitude 
of the effect of Unemployment on naturalization rates is strengthened in both 
subsetted models. From this analysis, I thus have evidence that the economic 
context – captured at least by the unemployment rate in a given year – is a 
statistically significant predictor of naturalization. 
As with the economic context of immigrant demand, Table 6.3 presents a 
series of models testing principal hypotheses regarding the political supply of 
citizenship. Let us begin with Model 1, where I first test whether the political 
orientation of a government (LRScore) affects naturalization (H.S2). As 
hypothesized, left-oriented governments are positively and significantly associated 
with increases in the naturalization rate across these countries and these decades. 
Holding all other variables constant, moving from a centrist government to a leftist 
government is associated with a 3.02 unit increase in the naturalization rate in a 
given country-year. That is quite sizable considering the reference category is 
centrist coalitions, which usually contain at least one leftist party. This is even more 
reaffirming considering citizenship policy (ICCI Total) is also included in the model, 
and while the inclusion of the political variable reduces the magnitude of the 
policy’s effect from a baseline model without it (not shown), it by no means renders 




significant effect on naturalization rates, although the sign of the coefficient is 
negative as hypothesized. These findings are consistent with the theory, and thus we 
can interpret this as evidence that leftist politics does influence naturalization rates. 
In Models 2 through 5, I test for the effects of cumulative left party strength in 
parliament, radical left party strength in parliament, cumulative right party strength 
in parliament, and radical right party strength in parliament that have been 
proposed as explanations for citizenship acquisition in  previous research (Janoski 
2010). While the associations are in the correct direction – leftist seats are 
associated with higher naturalization rates and rightist seats are negatively 
associated with naturalization rates - unfortunately, very few attain statistical 
significance.48 Only cumulative right party seat share in a parliament appears to 
have a statistically significant negative effect on naturalization, although it appears 
to be a much weaker one than that of leftist governments. Nonetheless, that a one 
point increase in right party seat percentage in parliament might have the expected 
effect of reducing a country’s naturalization rate by one tenth in a given year is not 
minor. Clearly, however, government power matters more. And these two findings 
together and their comparative strengths make intuitive sense, for governing power 
should enable leftist policymakers to influence the supply of citizenship much more 
directly and effectively than simply having a sizable share of seats in parliament.  
                                                        
48 I also conducted similar tests using my other variables from Chapter 5, including party vote shares 
rather than seat shares, changes and averaged changes in party vote share, and combinations thereof, 
but likewise found no significant effects for these variables even though many were signed in the 
correct direction. Given the clustered nature of these variables, this may suggest that better model 
specification may be able to account for these differences, and thus this constitutes one important 




Models 6 and 7 test for the effects of party competition on naturalization. The 
variables are all signed correctly: a leftist government facing stronger left-oriented 
competition is associated with higher rates of acquisition (Model 6), while the 
converse is true of right-oriented governments facing stronger right-oriented 
competition. However, none of the coefficients on the interaction terms are 
significant in the models presented here. When I removed the ICCI variable from the 
analysis (not shown), the coefficients remained signed correctly and the interaction 
terms did become significant for right party competition. This suggests that party 
competition is relevant for citizenship acquisition, but its relevance is likely through 
citizenship policy outputs that structure the supply of citizenship, rather than 
through political discretion or influence. Thus while I found various modes of party 
competition seem to influence citizenship policy, I find little similar statistically 
significant evidence that party competition influences citizenship acquisition. 
Based on the previous table, we observe that governments – and leftist 
governments in particular – seem to exert an influence on naturalization rates, even 
holding citizenship policy constant. How do we know that the influence may be a 
result of political discretion, or the ability to influence policy implementation, as 
hypothesized? To investigate this, I make use of the citizenship policy index itself. 
Recall from Chapter 4 that the manifest dimension is composed of fundamentally 
descriptive elements: rather than ascribe to immigrants certain characteristics that 
may render them more or less qualified for citizenship, states use the components of 
manifest integration policy to observe and measure integration directly. In other 




concrete evidence through active assessments. The coding rules in Table 4.1 
highlight this descriptive and evidentiary basis of the manifest dimension, but also 
underscore how policy change on the manifest dimension is often in the direction of 
circumscribing and regulating this descriptive and evidentiary basis of citizenship 
acquisition. In other words, low scores on components such as linguistic proficiency, 
civics knowledge, or legal/behavioral standing are often assessed on vague 
evaluations of the bureaucracy, who may have instructions or guidelines circulated 
by the government of the day. Thus we should observe the political influence on 
naturalization likewise decrease as the discretionary aspects of policy decrease over 
time or across countries. Specifically, we should expect that only those shown to 
have political influence (in our case, Leftist coalitions) experience statistically 
significant reductions in their association with acquisition rates as policy discretion 
diminishes.49 
To test this hypothesized relationship (H.S3), I analyze another series of 
statistical models in Table 6.4 in which I interact the different governing coalition 
scores (Leftist and LRScore3) with the scores from the manifest dimension and from 
the total ICCI index. In Models 1 and 3, we see again that Leftist governments have a 
significant main effect on naturalization rates, but a negative effect when interacted 
with the ICCI manifest dimension. Substantively, Model 1 indicates that compared to 
rightist governments, leftist governments have a positive estimated effect on 
naturalization rates, but a negative one as the manifest policy score increases in 
                                                        
49 This is because, although H.S3 predicts the opposite relationship with conservative parties, the 
lack of significant association between such parties and citizenship acquisition in the preceding 





magnitude. Similarly in Model 3, compared to centrist governments, leftist 
governments have a positive estimated effect on naturalization rates, but that effect 
is moderated in a negative direction as the manifest dimension becomes more 
restrictive. The conditional effect even holds in Model 6 when interacted with the 
total citizenship score. By contrast, in Model 2 and Model 3, Rightist governments 
have neither a significant main effect nor a significant interaction effect on policy, 
which is consistent with the initial findings from Table 6.3, where they had no 
observed political effect on naturalization rates. Furthermore, we would not expect 
to find this conditional relationship on the latent dimension, where there is little 
ability to influence the interpretation or implementation of policy and Models 4 and 
5 confirm that this relationship does not hold when applied to the latent dimension 
of citizenship policy. Thus by means of comparison, we see that the influence of 
Leftist coalitions is precisely on the dimension where we would expect it, and not on 
the other dimension where we would not. Likewise, the influence of Rightist 
governments is also insignificant along both dimensions, as we would predict. 
Figure 6.1 illustrate this relationship by showing the conditional marginal effects of 
Leftist and Rightist governments on naturalization rates plotted by increasing ICCI 
manifest cost scores. The figure shows the discrete change in Leftist and Rightist 
governments’ effect on naturalization rates from the base level (Centrist) at each 
value of ICCI Manifest. As we see in the upper left panel, the effect of Leftist depends 
on the level of the manifest score, and is significant where we would expect it to be – 
at the lower levels of manifest policy where high levels of discretion are present – 




Table 6.4: Political Interactions with Citizenship Policy  
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Observations 525 525 525 525 525 525 
R2 0.29 0.19 0.29 0.36 0.40 0.31 
Number of clusters 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Degrees Freedom 5 5 7 5 7 7 
Chi2 15.3 15.3 15.4 43.4 50.2 25.8 
p 0.009 0.009 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.001 
      Standard errors in parentheses 















score moves beyond 5, where most manifest policy scores have sufficiently 
circumscribed policy discretion. In the upper right panel, we also see that the Leftist 
influence filters into the Total ICCI score up through a score of 8, likely by means of 
the Manifest dimension, before losing its significant effect. In contrast, the two lower 
panels reveal that Rightist governments apparently have little significant influence 
on either the Manifest dimension or Total ICCI score. This is not to claim that 
Rightist governments do not attempt to affect naturalization, but only that from the 
statistical evidence presented in the previous analyses does it appear that the 
influence of Leftist governments beyond formal policy is most discernible from the 
data gathered.  
Before moving on to the next section of the analysis of naturalization rates in 
Europe, I will summarize the evidence uncovered and the status of the hypotheses 
thus far. Harkening back to the Jones-Correa’s (2001a, 54) call to scholars to pay 
more attention to the context which structure immigrant decisions about 
citizenship, the evidence presented here suggests the economic and political context 
does in fact matter. In terms of economic context, contrary to the findings of Janoski 
(2010), Dronkers and Vink (2012) and Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers (2013), 
my analysis suggests GDP per capita in the receiving country does matter for 
structuring naturalization at the aggregate level, and likewise finds evidence that 
the employment context does also. Immigrant demand for citizenship appears to be 
higher in countries that are economically stronger (GDP per capita) and have lower 
comparative rates of unemployment.  Thus hypothesis H.D1 finds relatively strong 




also matters. Like Janoski (2010), I find that politics does exert an influence on the 
political supply of citizenship (and thus naturalization rates) independent of 
citizenship policy. But unlike Janoski (2010), I find no evidence that left party power 
in parliament affects citizenship acquisition. Right party power does, but with the 
opposite effect. However, rather than left party power in parliaments, it is instead 
left party government control that appears to be the decisive element. Furthermore, 
this influence is discernible by means of the manifest cost dimension of the ICCI, 
where administrative and bureaucratic discretion is most directly applicable to the 
conduct of citizenship acquisition and conferral. As I demonstrated, left party 
influence seems to exert its strongest influence at the lower range of the manifest 
dimension where discretionary space is the widest, while it diminishes rapidly and 
becomes insignificant once such discretionary space has been regulated away. 
Although we reject H.S4 on the basis of a lack of statistically significant evidence, 
hypotheses H.S1, H.S2, and H.S3 are all accepted based on the evidence presented 
here. 
Now that I have evaluated the building blocks of the theoretical framework, I 
turn now to the case of the Euro crisis, where I explore hypotheses H.D2 and H.D3.  
Immigrant Demand for Citizenship in the Shadow of the Euro Crisis  
The Euro crisis profoundly altered the European political and economic 
landscape. Austerity, slow growth, and persistently high unemployment plague 
countries such as Spain, Greece, and Italy and have upended governments in many 
of them. Many Eurozone countries still cannot escape the Brussels-inspired 




greater Eurozone demise, and even exaggerated predictions of the collapse of the 
European Union (EU) continue to bring political and economic uncertainty to 
citizens and governments across the continent. Trust in national governments and 
EU institutions has bottomed out in many EU countries, especially in those hardest 
hit by the recession. On its face, the European sovereign debt crisis, or the Euro 
crisis, might seem like an unlikely context in which to assess the supply and demand 
of citizenship in Europe. But as I demonstrate below, the economic and subsequent 
political crisis that began in Greece at the end of 2009 and soon spread throughout 
the continent is in many ways an important case in which to test how changing 
dynamics of demand for citizenship operate.   
The introduction of formal European Union citizenship in 1992 and the 
incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 is one 
unique institutional context that has challenged the traditional understanding of 
citizenship in Europe and altered the context for the acquisition of citizenship 
among intra-EU migrants (Hansen and Weil 2001). EU citizenship has always been 
conceived as a means to foster popular support and allegiance to the EU as well as a 
sense of European identity beyond the nation-state. The Commission on Citizenship 
of the Union (2001) described it as “both a source of legitimation of the process of 
European integration, by reinforcing the participation of citizens, and a fundamental 
factor in the creation among citizens of a sense of belonging to the European Union 
and of having a genuine European identity.”  In its report on the Year of the Citizen 
in 2013, the Commission (2013b) proclaimed that its citizens “are and must be at 




Economic and Monetary Union toward eventual political union. Many scholars and 
policymakers initially greeted, and continue to treat, European citizenship with a 
degree of skepticism, considering it as purely symbolic and more representative of 
the EU’s market-oriented character than a viable alternative to national citizenship 
(Everson 1995; Downes 2001). Others have viewed it as an ideological and political 
effort to address the democratic deficit or simply inspire stronger identification 
with Europe (Jessurun d’Oliveira 1995; O'Leary 1996, 1999; Vink 2005). Weiler 
(1996, 57) boldly dismissed it as “a cynical exercise in public relations” in that it 
conferred no new rights to intra-EU migrants. Hansen (2009) has likewise 
maintained that as “a derivative status that creates no new rights, EU citizenship in 
no way challenges national citizenship” and is rather devoid of “empirical content 
and theoretical importance” (6). Yet other scholars have countered that EU 
citizenship has matured over the years both in terms of legal status (Kostakopoulou 
2001, 2008, 2012; Joppke 2010) and as embodiment of post-national citizenship 
(Soysal 1994; Jacobson and Kilic 2003; Bosniak 2006). The European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) has been instrumental to this evolution. Through a series of court 
decisions, the ECJ has endowed European nationals with an ever-widening scope of 
economic and social rights that may be exercised beyond national borders within 
the wider EU polity. The 2004 Citizenship Directive (2004/58/EC), the entry into 
force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2006, and the establishment of an EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency to monitor those rights have all formalized this 
development. These accessory rights have furthermore developed alongside and 




derivative status into a source of rights in itself. As Joppke (2010) argues, EU 
citizenship is “reinforcing the lightening of citizenship that is happening 
independently at member state level… the future of citizenship is bound to be light, 
and lighter still with the help of ‘Europe’” (22).  
If, as Yang (1994) maintains, demand for citizenship is premised on the 
tangible benefits it confers to those acquiring it, then many of the conventional 
benefits of naturalization have disappeared for intra-EU migrants. Alongside the 
freedom of movement and facilitated right to permanent residence, EU citizens are 
entitled to a number of other benefits in other EU states, from non-discrimination 
protections to varied forms of social assistance to voting for and standing in local 
municipal elections. By this reasoning, European nationals today can move to and 
settle in another member state and enjoy a range of benefits in that member state by 
virtue of their EU citizenship. Even though a growing number of member states offer 
relaxed, or facilitated, naturalization requirements for other EU nationals, acquiring 
citizenship would be a relatively costly behavior with relatively inconsequential 
benefits for most intra-EU migrants. This logic seems to hold empirically as well. For 
example, Dronkers and Vink (2012) hypothesize that acquiring citizenship in 
another EU member state “would provide relatively little in terms of substantive 
benefits of citizenship” (395) and they indeed find that European citizens “are 
clearly less motivated to acquire another European citizenship” in their country of 
residence (409). Naturalization rates also tend to decrease among intra-EU migrants 




How might the Euro crisis affect the citizenship acquisition dynamics in 
Europe? I contend that the Euro crisis has in fact altered this incentive structure 
among European citizens and has renewed the demand for national citizenship in 
another member state. First, according to the logic of H.D2, the perceived future 
economic and political value of citizenship in the country has increased. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, Europeans are ever more uncertain and distrustful of 
national-level and EU-level political elites and institutions. As Figure 6.2 shows, 
distrust in EU institutions across all populations began reaching historic highs in 
2010, immediately corresponding with the eruption of the Greek debt crisis. On a 
nearly daily basis, Europeans have heard countless reports about the precarious 
future of the Eurozone, speculations about a possible “Grexit” or other club 
departures, and even exaggerated fears “that the euro crisis may end up destroying 
the European Union.”50 Anti-immigrant policies and xenophobic public sentiment, 
much of it directed toward intra-EU migrants, is also on the rise in a number of 
European countries. In the context of mounting political uncertainty and distrust of 
institutions back home, which countries may or may not belong in the future, and 
the status and acceptance of EU migrants living abroad, holding EU citizenship may 
provide little comfort. If the EU benefits deriving from their own national passport 
may soon be curtailed or dissipate entirely, intra-EU migrants have every incentive 
to acquire the citizenship of their country of residence.  
                                                        
50 George Soros, “How to Save the EU from the Euro Crisis,” The Guardian, 9 April 2013. Examples of 
less exaggerated speculations include The Economist, “Is Grexit good for the euro?” Jun 16th 2012, 





As we see in Figure 6.3, furthermore, these changing political sentiments 
vary in magnitude between pre-crisis and post-crisis years among different 
European subpopulations. Whereas average pre-crisis distrust differs only 
moderately among all EU nationals from post-crisis distrust, it more than doubled 
among populations in Europe’s periphery – Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain (henceforth the GIIPS) – and nearly so in the A-12 countries. In fact, before the 
crisis, only two countries – Sweden and the United Kingdom – had average distrust 
levels that exceeded 50 percent, whereas thirteen countries, including all the GIIPS 
countries, have exceeded this level in the post-crisis years. This variation clearly 
suggests that increasing distrust is a political sentiment strongly associated with the 
temporal onset and geographic severity of the crisis in the EU.51 By this logic, 
sharply rising uncertainty and distrust in those countries of origin hit hardest by the 
crisis may most strongly incentivize naturalization abroad. For example, it may be 
that a Greek citizen would acquire citizenship abroad to safeguard against the 
potential loss of the rights and privileges of EU citizenship among persistent fears of 
a Grexit from the Euro zone, or to escape the political and economic uncertainty 
rampant in Greece in recent years. Naturalization may also then be a form of 
political and economic insurance should the hitherto advantages of EU citizenship 
diminish or disappear. In this context, holding a new national passport may be more 
                                                        
51 This is not to claim that manifest distrust of the EU as a phenomenon is only associated with the 
Euro crisis in any one country. Indeed, persistent and deep-seated Euroskepticism has long existed to 
varying degrees across many countries, and uncertainty and distrust may certainly be caused by 
longer-term factors that may precede or extend beyond the crisis. While existing data do not permit 
one to fully disentangle these deeper forms of distrust from crisis-induced distrust, distrust of the EU 
nonetheless seems to be a proximate and short-term phenomenon and one direct and observable 
consequence of the Euro crisis. Thus its use as a proxy variable for the crisis and its effects on 




valuable for some intra-EU migrants than relying on the rights and privileges of EU 
citizenship derived from one’s old passport. 
Second, the relative value of retaining citizenship in the country of origin 
(non-citizenship in the country of settlement) has decreased. The acute effects of the 
Euro crisis may have increased the economic benefits of naturalization for many 
immigrants within the EU. Although migration flows are also often closely tied to the 
business cycle and migrants are among the most vulnerable during recessions like 
the Euro crisis (Orrenius and Zavodny 2009, 1-2) many intra-EU migrants may be 







Figure 6.3: Distrust of the EU, by Select Region
 
Source: European Commission. 1995-2014. Standard Eurobarometer, Nos. 54-57, 59-82. Brussels; 
European Commission. 2001-2004. Candidate countries Eurobarometer (CCEB), Nos. 2001, 2002, 







Figure 6.4: Average Pre- and Post-Crisis Distrust and Unemployment Rates, by 
Region
 
Source: Distrust levels from Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, 
European Commission (1995-2014) and European Commission (2001-2004); Unemployment rates 








Figure 6.5: Unemployment Rate, by Select Region
 




Because many European countries continue to suffer under the yoke of 
austerity, anemic growth, and high unemployment, the return migration that often 
occurs during times of recession may be an undesirable option, as the economies of 
many countries of origin may be even worse off than those in the country of 
residence (Papademetriou and Terrazas 2009; Papademetriou et al. 2010). Indeed, 
as Figure 6.4 and 6.5 reveal, the unemployment rate in many EU migrants’ region of 
origin makes the prospect of returning home relatively unappealing in the post-
crisis years. Furthermore, in terms of access to welfare assistance, EU migrants may 
also qualify for more social benefits by naturalizing in their country of residence 
than remaining bound to precarious welfare systems back home. As formulated in 
hypothesis H.D2, rather than return to dismal economic prospects at home, many 
EU migrants with established lives in another member state may rationally opt for 
new citizenship, perceiving little value in the rights afforded them by their national 
passport or EU citizenship abroad. If there is a ‘citizenship premium’ in the host 
country that non-citizens do not receive – citizens are perceived to earn more, 
achieve higher status, or are more upwardly mobile in a competitive labor market 
than non-citizens – the economically motivated migrant may opt for naturalization 
to earn this potential premium (DeVoretz 2008; OECD 2011, 17-18). The rights and 
privileges of EU national abroad may not be enough during a time when post-crisis 
competition for stable and upwardly mobile employment is fierce.  
Because it punctuated recent European history so dramatically and had such 
continental economic and political effects, the Euro crisis serves as a unique critical 




First, I expect that as uncertainty and distrust of political institutions in one’s 
country of origin increases,52 especially in response to the Euro crisis, migrants 
should be less inclined to remain politically attached to these institutions. I thus 
expect increased demand for citizenship among EU migrants in their respective 
countries of residence. However, distrust in the country of residence should be 
associated with fewer acquisitions, since this may indicate depressed confidence in 
the political stability or status of that country and its passport within the EU. Thus 
the two should have opposite effects. If political distrust of the EU is positively 
associated with demand for citizenship abroad where distrust of national-level 
institutions is not, this would suggest that the perceived value of EU citizenship 
itself has declined and not simply one’s national citizenship. Confirmation of this 
hypotheses would offer some support to the idea that the crisis has changed the 
perceived value of citizenship and altered aggregate for it. 
Second, the crisis has yielded economic recession and distressingly high 
levels of unemployment in migrants’ countries of origin compared to the years 
before it, which should likewise incentivize citizenship acquisition among intra-EU 
migrants. Specifically, the economic context in the country of origin should be 
inversely related to citizenship acquisition. Economically stronger countries of 
origin should be associated with fewer naturalizations, not only because in these 
contexts there is less economic and political incentive to be gained from 
                                                        
52 Of course, the crisis has unleashed and exacerbated many political sentiments in addition to 
uncertainty and political distrust, and uncertainty and distrust may also be caused by factors other 
than the crisis. However, from the evidence presented above, measuring political distrust as one 
sentiment to capture the political consequences of the Euro crisis in home and destination member 




naturalization, but also because the prospects of returning home to such an 
economy are not as discouraging. As the economy of origin becomes worse, 
however, migrants should have greater incentive to naturalize because the 
perceived gains from naturalizing abroad increase over the benefits of remaining a 
national tied first and foremost to their economy of origin. Reversing the logic, as 
the economy of one’s country of residence worsens, return migration may be a more 
viable strategy for intra-EU migrants than putting down roots in an economically 
unstable country. Confirmation of these hypotheses would also lend credence to the 
broader theory that the economic benefits of acquiring another national citizenship 
trump the current value of EU citizenship. 
Finally, I hypothesize that the effects of the crisis should be highly contingent 
on the countries of origin and destination during the crisis. This means first and 
foremost that the effects of the crisis should vary across different groups of intra-EU 
migrants, with the strongest effects associated with migrants from the most crisis-
stricken parts of Europe, and no effect for those from less affected regions. In 
destination countries, I expect that aggregate acquisitions among intra-EU migrants 
should increase in the years following the crisis in countries that have weathered 
the crisis most successfully. However, in the GIIPS countries – those most severely 
affected countries of the European periphery – we should observe overall relatively 
fewer acquisitions during the crisis years. This is because the crisis has left a level of 
economic and political uncertainty in its wake that largely negates any economic or 
political advantage of acquiring new national citizenship. Other strategies like 




than citizenship acquisition in an economically and politically precarious country 
context. 
Assessing the Effects of the Euro Crisis on Naturalization 
To compare how naturalization trends have changed as a consequence of the 
Euro crisis, I collected data on migration flows, stocks of foreign population, and 
citizenship acquisitions in fourteen Western European countries between 2000 and 
2013.53 Most of this demographic data comes from a combination of national 
statistical offices (Appendix A), Eurostat (Eurostat 2015a, 2015d, 2015e), and the 
OECD’s International Migration Database (OECD 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). While some 
sources were more or less incomplete for certain selected countries, for the most 
part the significant comparability among them corroborated the reliability of the 
data gathered. Unfortunately, for a few country-years in the sample, notably France 
and the United Kingdom, there were higher levels of missing data in the population 
statistics whose omission might bias the estimates in the following analysis. Rather 
than omit these two important European countries and lose observations in an 
already small sample, I used the Amelia II program by Honaker et al. (2009; 
Honaker and King 2010) appropriate for time series cross-sectional analyses to 
multiply impute the missing values (m=15). With the completed datasets, I 
conducted a series of pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions in these countries 
                                                        
53 I exclude Greece and Ireland from the analysis because of the lack of data regarding these 
subpopulations. Thus the countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. While 
Norway is admittedly not a member of the European Union, it is a member of the Schengen area and 
EU and Norwegian nationals may travel passport-free across their shared border. For this reason its 




over the period in question. To deal with potential heteroskedasticity across 
country-years, I employ robust standard errors.54 Below I describe how I 
operationalize the variables in my analysis. 
I gathered data for three groups of immigrants: all EU migrants, GIIPS 
nationals, and A-12 nationals. Assessing citizenship acquisition among these 
subgroups of intra-EU migrants enables an important test of the potentially 
disparate effects of the Euro crisis on different migrants. If the benefits of EU 
citizenship have largely eliminated the incentive to acquire the citizenship of 
another EU state, we should observe few significant effects among the explanatory 
variables in all-EU migrant models. Because post-crisis political and economic 
trajectories of the GIIPS and A-12 countries have differed before and after the crisis, 
and have been observably worse among the former, we might reasonably expect 
that the theorized dynamics of the Euro crisis to be more observable among the 
former and less so among the latter. 
Unlike previously, I use the number of citizenship acquisitions in a given 
country-year rather than the naturalization rate as my dependent variable, with size 
of the respective immigration population included as a control variable.55 My 
                                                        
54 In addition to using robust standard errors, I re-run the same analyses on the smaller, non-
imputed dataset using panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) advocated by Beck and Katz (1995). 
Although not shown, the conclusions from this alternative specification are broadly similar to the 
findings using the presented models unless otherwise noted. 
55 The choice to rely on the number of acquisitions per country-year rather than naturalization rates 
per country-year (total number of citizenship acquisition/intra-EU migrant population) may seem 
questionable, in that it could bias the analysis due to differences in relative sizes of intra-EU migrant 
populations. Unfortunately, due to the relatively small magnitude of the naturalization rates among 
these subpopulations, the dependent variable is not very sensitive to changes in the dependent 
variables included here. Rather than including population size as a control in the denominator of the 
dependent variable, I therefore include it as an independent control variable, which should address 




primary independent variables represent measures of specific economic and 
political correlates of the crisis that best approximate its nature. Variables for 
distrust of the EU, distrust of national parliaments, national unemployment rates, 
foreign unemployment rates, and change in GDP per capita in each country-year for 
the country of settlement seem to be reasonable indicators of the Euro crisis 
generally. The distrust variables are drawn from annual Eurobarometer surveys 
conducted by the European Commission (1995-2014) and are percentages of the 
national population expressing distrust of the EU in a given year.56 Economic 
variables were drawn from Eurostat (Eurostat 2015b, 2015c, 2015g). From these I 
calculate a series of weighted distrust, unemployment, and GDP change measures 
for the EU, GIIPS, and A-12 regions that adjust these figures according to the size 
and composition of the immigrant population in that country-year.57 Aggregate 
levels of distrust and unemployment in the region of origin (country of residence) 
                                                        
56 The survey question reads, “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in 
certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend 
not to trust it: The European Union?” Because Eurobarometer did not conduct its surveys in Norway, 
the distrust scores were included as either imputed values or as averages of the other Scandinavian 
countries in the sample. Neither specification changed the results. A-12 trust levels were drawn from 
the separate Candidate Countries Eurobarometer surveys from 2001 to 2003 (European Commission 
2001-2004) and from Standard Eurobarometer surveys (European Commission 1995-2014) for the 
remaining years. 
57 For example, the weighted GIIPS distrust value for Germany in a given year is the average of the 
distrust levels in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain weighted by the relative size of each 
population of nationals living in Germany in that year. In this way, we capture a respective distrust 
level perceived by that population of GIIPS nationals in their region of origin. This makes no 
assumption that naturalizing GIIPS migrants share this same degree of distrust as co-nationals at 
home, but rather that the reported levels of distrust at home are at least perceptible to these migrant 
abroad and sufficient enough to inspire some of them to acquire citizenship acquisition abroad. For 
country-years for which data was unavailable, the relative weights were interpolated based on 
relative population figures and projections in available adjacent years. Although interpolation results 
in more imprecise country-year weights, there is no reason to expect that the loss of precision in a 




should be positively (negatively) associated with acquisitions abroad, while annual 
GDP change in the region of origin should be inversely related. In one model I 
include a Crisis categorical variable with three levels: 0 for all country-years from 
2000 to 2008, 1 for non-GIIPS country-years from 2009 to 2013, and 2 for GIIPS 
country-years from 2009 to 2013. If the theory is correct, we should observe a 
positive effect in non-GIIPS post-crisis country-years as migrant demand for 
citizenship increases, and a negative effect for GIIPS post-crisis country-years where 
migrant demand falls, compared to the baseline country-years before the crisis. To 
capture any independent effects of the GIIPS countries on citizenship acquisition, I 
include a GIIPS dummy variable for the Spain, Italy, and Portugal observations in 
several models. 
I include the ICCI index as a control for institutional context. I also control for 
the size of the corresponding immigrant population, given very disparate population 
sizes across countries, as well as the migrant inflow in each country-year where 
appropriate.58 I include logged GDP per capita for the country of residence as an 
economic control as well. For the all-EU and A-12 models, a final dummy variable 
represents the two recent rounds of Enlargement during which demand for 
citizenship may have changed more idiosyncratically, coded for the years 
2004/2005 and 2007/2008 respectively. 
                                                        
58 Immigrant inflows are highly correlated with and are often predicted by other explanatory 
variables in the models, especially immigrant population size, which introduces multicollinearity into 




Analysis and Results  
The distrust models for all immigrants, GIIPS nationals, and A-12 nationals 
are summarized in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 below. Model 0 in both tables represents the 
baseline model for each group without any of the main explanatory variables 
included, while subsequent models add the explanatory variables of interest to test 
the various hypotheses generated by the theory. Model 1 for each group captures 
broadly the average aggregate differences in acquisitions across various country-
years after the Euro crisis compared to the pre-crisis country-years. For the most 
part these differences are significant across the different EU national populations. 
Acquisitions in non-GIIPS countries during crisis years are significantly higher for all 
EU migrants and GIIPS nationals compared to pre-crisis years, while among all 
intra-EU, GIIPS, and A-12 nationals in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, there are 
significantly fewer acquisitions compared to pre-crisis years. The years after the 
Euro crisis are thus associated with more acquisitions on average in the northern 
European countries, and fewer in the more troubled periphery. These two findings 
together suggest that the intervention of the Euro crisis has made the acquisition of 
citizenship in the country of residence more attractive intra-EU migrants, despite 
their status as EU citizens. While the difference in A-12 acquisitions in GIIPS post-
crisis country-years is on average lower than before the Euro crisis, it is neither 
positive nor significant. Instead, the crisis years seem to shift the number of 
acquisitions downward, regardless of destination. This result is unsurprising, given 
that many A-12 migrants were recent post-enlargement arrivals and thus not yet 
eligible for citizenship. Also, since the crisis has not been as devastating for many A-
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Observations (n)              196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
Average R2       0.51 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.82 0.83 
Adj. Average R2       0.50 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.80 0.81 















Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  †=Estimated coefficients achieve significance at the p<0.05 level in the 
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(n)              
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Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01    




considered return migration a better option, regardless of country of residence. 
The remaining models in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 report various estimated 
effects of distrust on citizenship acquisition during the period. The distrust 
hypotheses find strong confirmation in the results. For both all-EU migrants and 
GIIPS migrants, increasing levels of distrust in the EU reported in other EU countries 
and in the GIIPS region are associated with statistically significant increases in 
citizenship acquisitions, while the opposite association results from increasing 
levels of distrust in the EU reported in the country of residence (Model 2, both 
tables). It is especially striking that this phenomenon is statistically significant 
among all EU migrants, which supports the more general hypothesis that acquiring 
national citizenship still matters in spite of the legal and political evolution of EU 
citizenship in recent years. Furthermore, the seemingly small coefficients are not 
inconsequential. For example, for every additional percentage point increase in 
weighted aggregate distrust in the GIIPS countries, we should expect 31 more 
acquisitions among GIIPS nationals abroad in an average country-year, holding all 
other variables constant. Given that distrust of the EU in the GIIPS countries 
increased by roughly 33 percentage points from 2008 to 2013, as seen in Figure 6.2, 
this is in fact a quite sizable number of acquisitions.59 The estimate for origin region 
distrust among intra-EU migrants is also significant in the fixed effects model which 
controls for individual countries (Model 5). However, distrust also seems to have 
                                                        
59 As a robustness check, I ran the same models (Model 3) with aggregate weighted trust variables 
instead of distrust and the results are very similar. In addition, to address concerns that measuring 
distrust in the EU may be a conceptually problematic indicator of the crisis and to disentangle it from 
preexisting distrust sentiments, I ran these models with a variable measuring the difference between 
the annual distrust level and the baseline level in 2000. This also had little significant effect on the 




had little effect on acquisitions among A-12 nationals. This result could likewise be 
due to the fact that levels of reported distrust remain much lower in the A-12 
countries than in the EU or GIIPS countries, as Figure 6.2 demonstrates, or they may 
constitute large populations in countries like Italy and Spain where distrust of the 
EU is an even stronger deterrent to naturalization than origin country distrust is an 
incentive. 
How do we know that the culprit is a lack of confidence in the EU as an 
institution rather than a general lack of confidence in the country of origin? In other 
words, it may be that these estimated effects on changes in the number of 
citizenship acquisitions actually result from growing uncertainty about political 
institutions back home, such as parliaments, rather than specific misgivings about 
the EU. Unfortunately, these two sentiments are highly correlated, and therefore 
comparing their relative effects in the same model is not possible. Nonetheless, to 
provide an indirect comparison, I rerun the same models with similar weighted 
distrust measures of the national parliaments in the regions of origin, and if this 
alternative hypothesis were true, we would expect the results to at least 
approximate the previous results. The results are reported in Models 4 and 6 for all 
EU migrants in Table 6.5 and Model 4 for the GIIPS and A-12 nationals in Table 6.6.60 
Beginning with all EU migrants, let us first compare Models 2 with 4. The estimated 
effects of the two pairs of variables are indeed very similar. Holding all else 
constant, for a one percentage point increase in aggregate weighted distrust of 
                                                        
60 This variable was drawn from the same Eurobarometer surveys and coded equivalently. The 
survey question reads, “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain 
institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to 




national parliaments we can expect a significant increase of approximately 106 
additional acquisitions by intra-EU nationals, which is slightly larger in magnitude 
than the predicted acquisitions associated with a similar increase in distrust of the 
EU. Comparing fixed effects Models 5 and 6 reveal similar correlations, although 
distrust of the parliament in the country of residence is also significant in Model 6. 
From this we might tentatively conclude that the relationship between general 
distrust and uncertainty about the political situation at home – regardless of 
institution – and broad acquisition trends among EU migrants as a consequence of 
the crisis lends support to H.D3 about the demand for citizenship. 
However, comparing Models 2 and 4 for both the GIIPS and A-12 nationals 
casts some doubt on this alternative hypothesis. Changing levels of distrust of the 
national parliament in neither the region of origin nor country of residence are 
associated with a change in citizenship acquisitions among these populations. While 
this non-finding is expected in the respective A-12 model, it is quite surprising in the 
model for GIIPS nationals: after all, this is precisely the region of the EU where we 
would most expect distrust and uncertainty of all forms to be most salient and 
observable. Rather, it appears that distrust of only the EU has a statistically 
significant correlation with citizenship acquisitions by GIIPS nationals. We can 
therefore interpret this as evidence, albeit tentative, that among those hardest hit by 
the Euro crisis, it is not simply general distrust and uncertainty wrought by the 
crisis, but specific distrust and uncertainty directed toward the EU in particular, that 




Turning to Table 6.7 and 6.8, which reports the estimated effects of economic 
factors on citizenship acquisitions, the economic hypotheses seems to find 
confirmation as well. From Model 1 across the two tables, we see that the weighted 
EU and GIIPS unemployment rates are associated with a large and significant 
increase in citizenship acquisitions among EU nationals. While the weighted 
unemployment rate in the A-12 region is also signed as expected, the association 
does not achieve significance. In the country of residence, conversely, there is a 
significant negative correlation between the unemployment rate and acquisitions 
for all EU migrants and A-12 nationals, yet not for GIIPS nationals. This further 
strengthens the notion that high unemployment in the country of residence inspires 
return migration rather than naturalization, with immigrants exiting difficult 
economic times rather than weathering them as new citizens. This may especially 
explain the significant finding for A-12 nationals, the population whose migratory 
patterns in Western Europe have been so highly responsive to enlargement and the 
subsequent Euro crisis. However, it may also reflect the fact that many European 
countries include financial conditions, such as employment, income, and welfare 
use, in their requirements for citizenship acquisition, and thus many immigrants 
may be indirectly disqualified by these policies as a side effect of the Euro crisis. 
Foreign unemployment rates in the country of residence seem to offer a more mixed 
picture. For A-12 nationals, a higher foreign unemployment rate is still associated 
with a lower number of naturalizations, suggesting unemployment disincentivizes 
citizenship acquisition. Yet among all EU nationals, the estimated effect is not 
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Table 6.8: Estimated Effects of Economic Factors on GIIPS and A12 Citizenship Acquisitions 
DV: Citizenship 
Acquisitions among: 
GIIPS Migrants A12 Migrants 
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and significant, which runs counter to the theorized direction. 
Finally, only annual GDP change in the GIIPS region has a significant effect on 
acquisition. In this case, for a one percent increase in annual GDP growth in the 
GIIPS region, there are approximately 90 fewer naturalizations among GIIPS 
nationals in a country-year, if all other variables are fixed. Conversely, as GDP 
growth falls – due to the Euro crisis or otherwise – we can expect a corresponding 
increase in naturalizations among these migrants. Given the sharp negative growth 
rates in this region after 2008, this result is most expected and offers some 
confirmation of the hypothesis, even if the effect is not significant among the other 
two populations. In terms of changes in resident country GDP growth, this factor 
only achieves significance among A-12 nationals, suggesting stronger economic 
growth might incentivize citizenship acquisitions. However, this variable’s lack of 
significance among the other populations suggests it is not an important predictor 
of citizenship acquisition among most Europeans generally. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This final section has examined the relationship between the Euro crisis and 
citizenship acquisition trends across the EU in order to illustrate more uniquely how 
the theoretical framework might operate, even among a population for whom such 
incentives to naturalize should be relatively small.  The prevailing assumption in the 
literature has been that Europeans prior to the Euro crisis were much more 
disinclined to acquire the citizenship of another EU country because their status as 
non-citizens – whether due to the freedom of mobility made possible by Schengen or 




citizenship in the country of residency largely inconsequential. This disincentivizing 
effect of EU citizenship on naturalization among intra-EU migrants has not been 
surprising. However, the statistical analysis in this article reveals that the Euro crisis 
and its political and economic consequences seem to have re-incentivized 
citizenship acquisition among EU nationals living in other European countries 
because the value of their citizenship in their country of origin has changed vis-à-vis 
that of their country of settlement. Many of the consequences of the crisis – rising 
levels of political distrust, economic uncertainties about the future of the Eurozone 
or a country’s future in it, continued economic malaise and austerity - have 
apparently reaffirmed the value of national citizenship acquisition among all intra-
EU migrants. However, it seems the effects vary by the population. On the one hand, 
distrust of the EU in both the region of origin and country of residence has 
observable and significant effects on most populations under study. On the other 
hand, poor economic indicators in the regions of origin seem to incentivize 
citizenship acquisition among most intra-EU migrants, while the same indicators in 
the country of residence have more ambiguous effects. Compared to the other 
populations, A-12 nationals appear either less sensitive to potential economic 
incentives of citizenship acquisition, or simply more prone to return to their country 
of origin.  
In the absence of individual-level data, systematic qualitative evidence from 
these different migrant populations would be necessary to identify the precise 
causal mechanisms at work and further substantiate the conclusions drawn here. 




individual-level demographic profiles of the intra-EU migrants in question are not 
driving these trends? This was partly accounted for in the use of three different 
migrant populations, since migrants from each region of analysis share very similar 
demographics. However, in the wake of the Euro crisis, might simply young, highly 
educated migrants be moving to these more stable countries of the European core 
and naturalizing in higher numbers, thus accounting for the trends observed here? 
This is plausible, but there are two reasons to doubt this is driving the findings in 
the analysis. First, by my calculation using existing citizenship laws, the average 
length of residence required to acquire citizenship in the 14 countries under 
analysis is between five and six years. Hence, even if a wave of young, educated 
GIIPS nationals began migrating into these countries in 2009, the earliest they 
would be eligible for naturalization would be 2014 (notwithstanding some 
exceptions for familial relations). The same reasoning generally holds for A-12 
nationals who first began migrating in large numbers throughout the EU in 2006 
and 2007: this wave would first achieve eligibility for citizenship in 2011 or 2012 at 
the earliest. These dates are generally too late to have any observable effect on 
acquisitions in the period under analysis. Instead, by this logic, it is ostensibly 
permanently settled long-term migrants driving these citizenship acquisition 
patterns rather than highly mobile, short-term migrants. 
Second, even if this new post-crisis wave of young, educated economic 
migrants were driving some component of the findings here, most were inspired to 
migrate by the crisis itself and its political and economic effects, not by the allure of 




after the crisis began, the more relevant variables accounting for their acquiring of 
citizenship derive from conditions in their country of origin and country of 
destination rather than their demographic profile per se. Without the political and 
economic incentives fostered by the crisis, neither their migration nor 
naturalization would arguably have occurred. It thus seems unlikely that 
demographic variables correlated with the crisis itself and omitted in the aggregate-
level analysis account for the findings here. 
One could also question whether it is the changing value of the citizenship 
rights of intra-EU migrants in the country of settlement, or the growing insecurity of 
these citizenship rights, that is driving the results. In other words, recent legal 
limitations on social and economic rights enjoyed by intra-EU migrants in a growing 
number of EU countries, rather than the renewed value of such rights associated 
with national citizenship, may be the cause of the naturalization trends observed 
here. 61  Indeed, a number of countries, such as the UK and Belgium, have attempted 
in recent years to prevent the full exercise of rights by intra-EU migrants. The 
European Commission (2013a) has also recognized the need for ‘robust safeguards’ 
that ensure intra-EU migrants do not abuse the rights afforded to them and that 
                                                        
61 The mechanism underlying intra-EU naturalization patterns might also be one based on intra-EU 
migrants seeking not to gain particular rights but to avoid particular obligations. Specifically, intra-
EU migrants may be responding to increased tax obligations in their countries of origin, and 
naturalization in other EU countries provides a means to avoid such financial obligations. In Greece, 
for example, governments of various political orientations beginning in 2010 have passed tax 
increases in attempts to boost government revenues and to qualify for additional bailout funds from 
EU and International Monetary Fund lenders. Although my empirical analysis is agnostic on the 
question of rights versus obligations and does not test for this possibility directly, these increases in 
tax rates themselves can be explained by the economic crisis in countries of origin, and hence my 
theoretical explanation about the crisis’ impact on the changing value of future citizenship status 




protect the member states from ‘unreasonable financial burdens’ from claims of 
intra-EU migrants (5), leading some member states to consider restrictions on such 
benefits. To my knowledge, however, only in late 2013 did the UK government begin 
to plan and formulate limitations on EU migrant benefits, coinciding with similar 
policy discussions in other countries around the same time. The UK’s bans on in-
work benefits for intra-EU migrants would also only apply to arrivals after the law 
would come into effect. Furthermore, the Court of Justice of the EU (2014) in Florin 
Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig on Germany’s right to refuse welfare benefits to 
economically inactive EU migrants was issued only in November 2014. However, the 
period of analysis of this paper temporally precedes these national-level discussions 
and court proceedings on citizenship rights restrictions, as well as any legal 
implementation that would be applicable for the naturalization trends I assess. Thus 
such concerns about the limited implementation of EU citizenship rights and 
growing restrictions on those rights is entirely consistent with the theory and 
expected to likewise be associated with increased acquisitions as the EU moves 
forward, but this does not seem to undermine the mechanism stressed here about 
the shifting value of non-citizenship and naturalization intensified by the crisis. 
Finally, the qualitative research I have conducted across several northern 
European countries supports the general theoretical mechanism advanced here: 
acquiring the citizenship of the country of settlement may be a strategic form of 
political and economic insurance as well as a source of socioeconomic advantage in 
a difficult post-crisis labor market. According to one naturalization official in Berlin, 




don’t want to be viewed as those immigrants now coming from those countries… 
they want to set themselves apart from those now arriving for work. This has meant 
more applications filed by long-term residents from Greece and Spain, for 
example.”62 Other interviews conducted among naturalization officials from 
different cities in the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria confirmed this discernible 
uptick in naturalization inquiries and applications from individuals from Greece, 
Italy, and Spain despite often diminishing numbers of applications overall. Several 
Greek- and Italian-born naturalizing residents of Germany, for example, also 
affirmed to me that their primary motivation for naturalization was the 
discouraging prospect of returning to either country of origin in the wake of the 
Euro crisis.63 Similar trends, for ostensibly similar strategic reasons, seem to be 
occurring in the wake of a potential Brexit, as British migrants throughout Europe 
begin applying for additional passports while intra-EU migrants in Britain have 
done similarly.   
What does this analysis reveal about the economic and political context of 
naturalization decisions in Europe, especially in the shadow of the Euro crisis? The 
analysis performed in this final section seems to offer strong evidence to accept 
both hypotheses H.D2 and H.D3, with clear evidence of certain economic and 
political factors structuring patterns of citizenship acquisition that have either been 
overlooked or found to be relatively insignificant in previous analyses. The crisis 
context has at least moderated the aversion of intra-EU migrants toward acquiring 
                                                        
62 Anonymous interview #1001 with naturalization officer, Staatsangehörigkeitsbehörde 
Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (Berlin, July 5, 2014). 
63 Anonymous semi-structured interviews with naturalizing immigrants were conducted in Germany 




citizenship in another European country: indeed, acquisition patterns reflect 
economic and political dynamics in one’s country of origin and settlement. By this 
logic, the economic and political factors captured in the models represent many EU 
migrants’ uncertainty and loss of confidence in their own country, or confidence in 
their country of settlement. Hence a new citizenship abroad apparently offers more 
net value than one’s previous citizenship status, and remaining a non-citizen in the 
future, for an intra-EU migrant would only bear the additional hassle of acquiring 
another EU member state’s citizenship if that new status offered a benefit not 
already guaranteed by the previous nationality and EU citizenship. 
Combining this analysis with the analysis of naturalization rates across all 
fifteen countries earlier in the chapter, we can conclude that the hypotheses that 
derived from the theory seem to find strong confirmation. Questions of economic 
context and citizenship status seem to strongly structure the immigrant demand for 
citizenship, while the national citizenship policy, the political orientation of 
governments, and the degree of policy discretion structures the political supply of 
citizenship. Together both intervene in the naturalization process to affect 
citizenship acquisitions at the national level across countries and across time. In the 
following and penultimate chapter, I turn my attention to the subnational level 
where I will examine quantitative and qualitative evidence of the same dynamics in 




 Assessing the Local Integration Context: A Subnational 
Examination of Naturalization Rates in Germany and Austria 
Up to this point, I have argued that the integration context of naturalization 
in Europe – specifically the forces undergirding the immigrant demand for 
citizenship and the political supply of citizenship – structure equilibrium 
naturalization rates in a given year. In the previous chapter I presented detailed 
statistical evidence in support of my theoretical framework, showing the effects of 
both immigrant demand and political supply on naturalization rates using panel 
data across 15 countries and some 40 years in Europe. However explaining cross-
national variation in naturalization provides no definitive answer to these 
questions, in large part because the countries under study vary in ways that cannot 
be accounted for in the statistical models presented above. Disentangling 
naturalization rates among disparately organized and selected immigrant 
populations as well as isolating the effects of citizenship policy from the institutional 
jumble of incorporation regimes that vary cross-nationally and subnationally poses 
problems for comparison. Furthermore, relying on national-level data necessarily 
requires the analyst to gloss over the more proximate determinants of 
naturalization that may be significant but are often obscured or indistinguishable in 
cross-national comparisons, what Rokkan (1970) long ago termed “whole-nation 
bias.” In the case of naturalization, it may only be the context of national policies, 
practices, and outcomes, but also the local context, that shapes the integration 
experience and provides the incentives to naturalize in a given country. 
Thus in this final empirical chapter takes the empirical analysis beyond the 




to a within-case analysis of naturalization at the Land (state) level in Germany and 
Austria. In what follows I first provide a qualitative snapshot of these two country 
cases under study to motivate the case selection. Then, in several statistical analyses 
across the sixteen German and nine Austrian Länder from 1990 to 2013, I employ 
many of the same economic and political variables from Chapter 6 used to 
operationalize immigrant demand and political supply at the cross-national level in 
order to assess the subnational variation in the context of the Länder. After 
discussing the results, I then supplement the findings with substantive qualitative 
evidence gleaned from interviews of policymakers and immigrants across the 
German and Austrian Länder conducted in the summers of 2013 and 2014. By 
combining this qualitative evidence with the statistical data, we find stronger 
evidence in favor of the theoretical framework that has been discussed throughout 
this project.  
The Case of Germany and Austria 
Although there might be other valid cases of study in which to conduct 
subnational analyses of naturalization in Europe, Germany and Austria are an ideal 
setting in which to conduct a within-case comparative analysis of these more local 
correlates of naturalization beyond the methodological considerations. From a 
theoretical and methodological standpoint, a within-case analysis of naturalization 
across the German and Austrian Länder offers several advantages. The two 
countries are very similar, not just linguistically, but also culturally, historically, and 
politically. Although they emerged in modern Europe along different trajectories – 




scattered throughout hundreds of principalities and domains in central Europe, and 
Austria as the German-speaking remnant of a larger multiethnic and multilingual 
central European empire – much of their 20th century cultural and political histories 
are much closer intertwined.  Indeed, during the Nazi period from 1938 to 1945, 
they were unified as a single entity through the Anschluss, and even shared the same 
citizenship policy: after the annexation until after the war, all people holding 
Austrian citizenship were automatically declared nationals of the German Reich 
(Stern and Valchars 2013, 7).  
After the war, both reestablished their own citizenship policies, but along 
very similar trajectories. If any countries should typify the theoretical notion of 
exclusive and ethnocentric national approaches to citizenship (Brubaker 1992), it is 
Germany and Austria historically. Both have consistently received the label of 
restrictive, exclusive, prohibitive, and ethnocentric according to their highly 
circumscribed modes of conferring citizenship. Indeed, this is reflected in their 
extreme scores on the ICCI and their persistently demanding requirements for 
naturalization (despite some divergence in the last decade). Citizenship policies in 
both countries have throughout the last century included two main routes to access 
citizenship: through discretionary decision (Ermessensentscheidung)64 and through 
legal entitlement (Rechtsanspruch).65 For both countries, the distinction made has 
been critical: under the former, immigrants ‘can’ be naturalized if it is in the interest 
                                                        
64 Section 8 of Germany’s 1999 Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, Section 10 of Austria’s 1965 
Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz. 





of the federal state, while in the case of the latter, immigrants ‘are to be’ naturalized 
if they fulfill certain legally stipulated criteria.  
For most of the 20th century German citizenship was based on the highly 
restrictive 1913 German Nationality Law (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz), 
which offered a common German nationality for all German nationals hold state-
level citizenship and living within the Reich. After World War II, Germany 
maintained its highly ethnocentric citizenship policy due to political motivations 
related to the returning waves of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and later due 
to the need to retain national continuity with fellow Germans living in East Germany 
(Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009). This law enabled very little Land-level 
discretion over federal citizenship. When reforms came in 1990 and 1993, however, 
Land-level discretion over the interpretation of the new rights to naturalization 
grew (Hailbronner 2012, 4). By the time of Germany’s 2000 citizenship law reform, 
the country’s federal structure reserved a significant degree of power to the 
individual German Länder to implement and interpret this policy (Green 2005; 
Hofhansel 2008; Thränhardt 2008). Consequently, this permitted substantial 
variation in administering, processing, and deciding applications for citizenship, the 
outcome of which is portrayed in Figure 7.1. As we see from the figures, 
naturalization rates are consistently higher in Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen, 
Hamburg, and Hessen, while they remain quite low in Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, 
Berlin, and the former Eastern Länder. There are some noticeable increases in the 
former Eastern Länder, gradual declines in Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westphalen, 




and Hamburg. As Worbs (2008, 21-22) highlights, almost two-thirds of 
naturalizations in 2007 occurred in Bayern, Baden-Württemberg, Nordrhein-
Westfalen, and Hessen, although the highest rates occurred in Bremen, Schleswig-
Holstein, Rheinland-Pfalz, and Niedersachsen. Naturalization rates among Turkish 
immigrants exhibit even greater variability across Länder and over time. In 
response to this federal divergence in implementing citizenship policy among the 
different federal states, more recent legislation has sought to harmonize the legal 
criteria for naturalization and circumscribe Land-level discretion. As a result of the 
2007 Act Implementing EU Directives (EU-Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz) as well as 
further administrative guidelines, the standardization among the Länder is much 
tighter today than in previous years (Green 2005, 931; Hofhansel 2008, 168, 179; 
Worbs 2008, 22; Howard 2008, 73; Thränhardt 2008), although the extent of the 
discretion at the Land-level remains disputed (Hailbronner 2012, 11).  
In Austria, the discretionary power to decide immigrant naturalization was 
strong, and the administrative authorizes in the Länder enjoyed even more 
significant discretion over such decisions historically. In the citizenship law of 1925, 
Austrian citizenship was even conditional on holding the citizenship of the 
individual state (Landesbürgerschaft) in which one resided (Stern and Valchars 
2013, 6). In many cases, the decisions for discretionary naturalization 
(Ermessensentscheidung) did not have to be justified legally by the state. However, 
as in the German case, the political and administrative discretion of the Länder has 








Naturalization decisions must now be justified and can be legally challenged 
in the Administrative Court, and the requirements and justifications for granting 
citizenship through both tracks are now so similar and harmonized that the 
distinction has become much more blurred. Nonetheless, the distinction remains, 
and ambiguities built into the current policies still provide some discretionary 
leeway. As Stern and Valchars (2013) write, “discretion is general and extends to all 
requirements; this means, on the one hand, that all requirements have to be met, but 
citizenship can still be refused; on the other hand, discretion cannot be used to 
waive certain requirements, with the only exception if the Federal Government 
declares the naturalization to be in the national interest” (27). While several 
naturalization officials in Austria told me that the distinction between the two is 
negligible today, and thus the political discretion of the Länder is highly 
circumscribed, there is still influence through provisions such as the Land-level 
administrative fee regulations (Landesverwaltungsabgabenverordnungen). For 
example, Land-level fees for non-discretionary naturalization vary significantly 
across Austria, from 76€ in Vienna to up to 1,357€ in Steiermark (Stern and 
Valchars 2013, 32). The variation in citizenship acquisition at the Land level in 
Austria can also be seen in Figure 7.1. 
In addition to similar political developments, both countries share similar 
migration histories. Until the early 1960s, both Austria and Germany were countries 
of emigration, with more Austrians and Germans migrating abroad than migrants 
moving to these countries. However, facing large labor shortages in the 1950s, 




fuelling its postwar reconstruction. Without colonial empires to source these 
workers, both signed numerous so-called “guest worker” agreements with less 
developed countries of the European periphery through which it could import cheap 
and temporary labor. Germany signed such agreements with Italy in 1955, Greece 
and Spain in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 
1965, and finally Yugoslavia in 1968. With Germany’s postwar Wirtschaftswunder, 
or “economic miracle,” fueled by migrant labor recruited from abroad, its foreign 
population skyrocketed. According to the German Federal Statistical Office (2015), 
there were 686,000 foreigners in Germany in 1960; by 1973 there were nearly 4 
million foreigners living in the country. The German Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees (2005) reckons that from 1956 until the end of its guest worker program 
in 1973, roughly 14 million guest workers had been recruited as labor in Germany. 
Austria similarly signed labor recruitment agreements with Spain (1962), Turkey 
(1964) and Yugoslavia (1966), leading to a similarly sharp increase in foreigners 
living in Austria. The size of the foreign worker population drastically grew from 1.6 
percent in 1965 to 7.2 percent a decade later (Stern and Valchars 2013). Thus the 
immigrant populations have been traditionally based on labor recruitment and 
family reunification, as well as some refugee resettlement from the Balkans and 
further abroad, meaning that most have to apply for citizenship rather than claim it 
based on colonial ties. This also means that many of their naturalizing immigrants 
do not share cultural or linguistic ties, as many immigrants in France, the 




Therefore, because Germany and Austria are so very similar historically, 
culturally, and politically, a within-case analysis permits me to hold many national- 
and cultural-level variables constant, such as historical legacy, culture, citizenship 
policy, and political system, while focusing on local economic and political contexts 
that vary widely across Länder. In other words, this subnational study provides 
additional methodological leverage in assessing the contexts in which naturalization 
and integration occurs and permits more valid comparisons of the proximate 
determinants of naturalization from which to draw inferences (Snyder 2001). Thus 
we might identify more proximate determinants of naturalization that may be 
significant subnationally but are often obscured or indistinguishable in large-n 
cross-national comparisons. This more localized focus distinguishes the following 
analysis from others in the current literature that focus on the national-level only. 
The Statistical Analysis of Naturalization in Germany and Austria  
For my statistical analysis, I use data collected from the German Federal 
Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) for the sixteen German Länder since 
reunification in 1990, and from the Austrian Federal Statistical Office (Bundesanstalt 
Statistik Österreich) for the nine Austrian Länder. Because I am primarily interested 
in assessing the impact of economic and political determinants of demand and 
supply that vary among the different Länder as I did with the cross-national 
analyses, I set up the models very similarly, relying on OLS regression with panel-
correct standard errors. While a multilevel model may arguably have provided the 
ability to control for both subnational and national levels of analysis, with a 




of the models would converge. However, as I just argued, besides the high degree of 
similarity between Germany and Austria on the question of immigration and 
citizenship rendering many of the national-level variables inconsequential for the 
analysis, the level of analysis of interest here is the subnational rather than the 
national level. Although this means I omit many national level variables, such as 
political orientation of the national government that most certainly affects 
naturalization rates within the individual states, these effects should be generally 
homogenous across the states. In order to control for national-level policy context, I 
do include the ICCI policy scores to control for national policy context, and I include 
a dummy variable for Austria in the analysis to account for any cross-national 
differences. To account for correlations within the states, I employ heteroskedastic 
robust standard errors clustered by Land.66 
The dependent variable in the analysis is the naturalization rate. This was 
calculated as the net number of naturalizations occurring within a state in a given 
year, divided by the total immigrant population in that state at the end of the 
previous year, and multiplied by 1000. I also construct an alternative dependent 
variable for the naturalization rate among Turkish immigrants.67 This is not only 
because Turkish immigrants constitute the most significant share of both country’s 
immigrant population and one of the most sizable shares of all naturalizations every 
                                                        
66 As a robustness check, I did run the same models with fixed effects. While in a few models the 
standard errors on the coefficients of interest are larger and thus they lose their significance, most 
are signed similar to the PCSE models. Likewise, several models with Land-level and Country-level 
mixed effects did converge without error, and the results were once again broadly similar. 
67 Unfortunately neither country had data on the number of Turkish naturalizations dating back to 
1990, but only as far back as 2000. Thus the sample size in the Turkish-centric models is smaller than 




year. In addition, this is methodologically advantageous, because I am able to focus 
on a single immigrant group that does not generally enjoy special exceptions to 
standard naturalization regulations (like asylum claims or being an EU citizen). This 
helps to control for significant variation in attributes across Germany’s diverse 
immigrant population that may affect naturalizations in ways that the model does 
not capture. 
My independent variables represent measures of economic and political 
context and are very similar to the ones used in the cross-national analysis. For my 
political variables, I have a number of measures of political orientation for each 
governing coalition in the Landtag, including the vote shares of right, left, radical 
right and radical left parties as well as seat shares for the respective parties. 
LRScore3 calculates the relative left-right position of the governing coalition by 
whether the coalition is Leftist, Centrist, or Rightist. I also have a categorical variable 
RadGov, coded 1 if the radical left is in the government and coded 2 if the radical 
right is in the governing coalition. Variables representing political competition, 
including ENRP and ENLP, and the relative magnitudes of the dominant right and 
left parties, were also included in some models, but achieved no statistical 
significance and are not presented here. For the economic variables, I include 
Unemployment and GDP per capita to capture the relative wealth of the individual 
state. I coded a variable as Downturn, which is coded 1 if GDP growth is negative for 
the year and 0 otherwise, to represent this same economic context. This was also 
not significant in any model and is not presented. Campaign, which I discuss more 




naturalization campaign intended to increase interest in naturalization, and 0 if not. 
Finally, because the historical evolution of the five East German Länder under the 
communist German Democratic Republic mean that their experience with 
immigration in the postwar period differed substantially from the Western Länder, I 
include a dummy variable if a state is from the FormerEast. 
Analysis and Results 
The results of the models for the naturalization rates among all immigrants 
and Turkish immigrants are summarized in Tables 7.1. Models 1 and 2 are the full 
models for all Länder, while Models 3 through 6 and Models 7 through 10 are 
restricted to the years 2000 through 2013 for the sake of comparability between the 
overall rate and the Turkish rate over the same period. 
In general, the economic basis of immigrant demand for citizenship seems to 
find confirmation in the results. We see that regardless of the model or sample, 
Unemployment is consistently negative as expected and statistically significant at 
least at the p < 0.05 level. Across most models, a one unit increase in the 
unemployment rate is associated with a roughly 0.40 unit decrease in the 
naturalization rate, all other variables held constant. The magnitude of the effect for 
Turkish immigrants in Models 7 through 10 is in contrast much higher – actually 
more than 3.5 times as high - than for all immigrants in Models 3 through 6. 
Considering Turkish immigrants naturalize at higher rates than the national average 
and yet are one of the principal groups that Germany has struggled to integrate 
socioeconomically and politically, this relationship is not only expected but is strong 




Table 7.1: Estimated Economic and Political Effects on the Naturalization Rates in Germany and Austria 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 




































































           





















































































































































































































































Table 7.1 (Continued) 
Observations 400 400 332 332 332 332 316 316 316 316 
R2 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Degrees of 
freedom 
9 10 8 10 10 9 8 10 10 9 
Chi2 345.8 384.4 378.3 411.2 454.0 371.7 530.1 583.9 547.6 363.2 
           
Standard errors in parentheses;    




have a more detrimental impact for those immigrants that have struggled 
economically. GDP per capita has a consistently negative relationship with 
naturalization rates, which may result from the general decline in naturalizations 
across time as GDP per capita generally increases across time. However, because 
this variable is not significant in any model, it should not be interpreted as 
confirming evidence of the theory. 
Some of the political variables in the table likewise generally confirm the 
political supply hypotheses as well. Right governments (LRScore3 in Models 1, 2, 5, 
and 9) are consistently associated with lower levels of naturalization across all 
models, and the estimated effect is significant in all but the Turkish model. Although 
not shown, I ran the same analysis for each country separately, and the Rightist 
government category had a highly significant estimated effect of -2.69 (p < 0.001) in 
Germany, while the effect was signed correctly in Austria but not significant. 
Curiously, the Leftist government category was negative and significant in several of 
the models, which does not align with the theoretical expectation. However, this 
may be due to the fact that many Leftist governments have traditionally held power 
in states such as Berlin and Nordrhein-Westfalen that have struggled economically 
in recent years. The variable also includes all those leftist governments in the 
former East Germany, which would not make this result altogether surprising since 
they are electorally strongest in the former East German Länder where immigrant 
populations and naturalization rates are generally lower than they are in the former 
West German Länder. Thus this possibly captures the effects of being a former East 




naturalized immigrants. However, Radical Left governments are significantly 
associated with increased naturalization rates in Model 4, and just barely misses 
statistical significance in Model 8.  
Finally, the naturalization campaigns variable was significant in both models 
for all immigrants and for Turkish immigrants. Compared with those years that did 
not run a campaign, those Länder that did should have observed a sizable associated 
increase in the number of naturalizations, especially among Turkish immigrants, as 
a consequence. As I will highlight in the qualitative section, this evidence suggests 
another mechanism by which governments can inspire increases in naturalization 
rates beyond formal policy or political discretion at the level of implementation. 
According to the theory of this dissertation and the statistical analysis above, 
much of the variation across German and Austrian Länder since 1990 can be 
attributed to the economic and political context within which the naturalization 
process occurs. The economic situation in individual Länder seems to have had a 
significant effect on naturalization rates. Unemployment rates are associated with 
variation in naturalization rates as predicted, with stronger labor market having a 
positive effect on naturalization rates in a given Land. It is most strongly associated 
with naturalization rates among Turkish immigrants in those states. Likewise, many 
of the political variables across most of the models performed as expected. Right-
oriented governments are negatively associated with naturalization rates, while 





Qualitative Evidence and Discussion   
While these quantitative results offer significant support for the theory 
presented in this paper, the specific mechanism linking economic and political 
context to naturalization rates in Germany remains untested by the statistical 
analysis. Exactly how politics plays out in structuring naturalization rates is not 
captured by the models presented here. However, based on the qualitative evidence 
I gathered during nearly 60 interviews over the course of two summers traveling 
through Germany and Austria, some of the causal mechanisms tested in the 
statistical analysis find additional confirmation.  
In terms of the demand for citizenship, nearly every naturalization office I 
visited in Germany (9 of 10) cited the economic circumstances (“Wirtschaftliche 
Verhältnisse”) of the applicants as one of the two most significant reasons why 
applicants are disqualified from naturalization, and all three offices in Austria 
mentioned it as the top reason. Because a large proportion of immigrants are former 
guest workers have been strongly affected by industrial decline in many regions of 
Germany and Austria, their prospects in the country, including prospects for 
citizenship, remain bleak. While for many immigrants Germany’s Citizenship Law of 
2000 had the positive effect of extending jus soli to children born in Germany under 
certain conditions, it introduced a number of prerequisites that rendered 
naturalization much more difficult, like tests, language ability, and proof of 
employment. The latter is especially problematic, because even though many 
immigrants have jobs, many of those jobs are not sufficient to sustain a family 




are often self-employed.68 In other words, it is difficult for many immigrant families 
to earn enough from work to survive financially, which means they must rely on 
social assistance, which disqualifies them from naturalization, which only excludes 
them further.69 From the perspective of some naturalization officials, this was also 
apparent. As one noted: 
When someone draws from social welfare, it makes it difficult for 
naturalization. It was the case during the Euro crisis that many people could not 
naturalize, because they drew from social welfare and the barrier is relatively high, 
and thus it has not been easy to fulfill the income and social welfare requirement. 
Through this some have had no possibility to naturalize during the crisis.70 Some 
immigrants I interviewed also reflected these realities. One Turkish immigrant who 
worked at an immigrant advising center in Kreuzberg lamented, ‘We can’t even get 
jobs, why worry about getting citizenship?”71 
Although manifest requirements such as secure livelihood, linguistic 
proficiency, and criminal background were among the most cited reasons for 
disqualification, the greatest latent obstacle to naturalization is giving up one’s 
former passport. Naturalization rates would surely increase if this requirement 
were dropped. Most naturalization officials across both countries reaffirmed this. 
Asked about the naturalization rate in Germany, one official confidently reported 
                                                        
68 Interview #111 with Kenan Kolat, President of the Turkish Community of Germany (Türkische 
Gemeinde in Deutschland), August 6, 2013.  
69 Interview #0108 with Regina Reinke, Integration Representative for the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg 
District of Berlin (Integrationsbeauftragte Bezirk Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg), July 26, 2013. 
70 Anonymous interview #1001 at the Naturalization Office of the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg District 
of Berlin (Bezirksamt Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg von Berlin Staatsangehörigkeitsbehörde), June 5, 
2014. 




that “the decisive factor is that the most will not naturalize because they must give 
up their former citizenship, therefore, when that is changed the naturalization 
numbers will double, at least.”72 This is at least consistent with the findings from the 
panel in Figure 6.1 as well, where legal moves to facilitate dual citizenship the 1990s 
and 2000 correspond with increased rates. However, from the perspective of the 
German government, permitting dual citizenship would have the effect of 
naturalizing potentially non-integrated immigrants, which is contrary to the goals of 
the government. It seeks integrated citizens, not non-integrated citizens, so I was 
told.73 In Austria, the perspective seems even stronger, likely due to the influence of 
the radical right Freedom Party (FPÖ). I consistently heard that “citizenship is the 
highest good and stands at the end of a successful integration process,” and thus 
dual citizenship would undercut this process.74 In my interviews with FPÖ officials, 
this sentiment was decisive: 
“Of highest priority is the general question regarding what dual citizenship 
among Turks means for their readiness to integrate. The fact is that many 
Turkish immigrants still live in their ancestral milieu. Parallel societies and 
the formation of ghettoes is a reality. Integration looks different than this.”75 
                                                        
72 Anonymous interview #1025 with officials in the Naturalization and Citizenship Office in the 
Regional Authority of Darmstadt (Einbürgerungs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsreferat in 
Regierungspräsidium Darmstadt), July 8, 2014. 
73 Interview #0109 with officials from the Government Representative for Migration, Refugees, and 
Integration (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration), July 30, 
2013. 
74 Quote by Austrian Interior Minister Sebastian Kurz, located front and center of the Ministry of the 
Interior’s naturalization website (http://www.staatsbuergerschaft.gv.at/).  This notion of citizenship 
as the end point of successful integration was reported to me throughout Austria by most 
naturalization officials and politicians, and by most conservative politicians in Germany as well.  
75 Quote by Manfred Haimbuchner, leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitlichen Partei 




The issue of dual citizenship, furthermore, speaks to the question of 
incentives and the benefits of citizenship versus a non-citizenship status. Giving up 
one’s former citizenship is often linked to the loss of travel freedoms to their 
country of origin as well as significant inheritance and property rights in their 
country of origin. While significant material loss is a grounds for potential exception 
to the ban on dual citizenship, the ambiguity of that threshold likely keeps many 
immigrants away from the naturalization office. Furthermore, when considering 
what one gains from naturalization, it seems to relate to the benefits of the new 
status. According to studies cited by the government, it is safe to say that most 
immigrants almost always naturalize for practical reasons.76  These include freedom 
to travel without restrictions, visa freedoms, better labor market access, and access 
to public service professions. Voting is another practical benefit but seems little 
desired. Explaining why immigrants naturalize or do not, one FDP member of the 
Bundestag reported that “incentives haves a lot to do with integration. What you get 
from integration and naturalization must be more than what you earn from social 
benefits. Except for voting rights, if you get everything already, why naturalize?”77 
Another a naturalization official mused in passing that actually “there is little legal 
advantage to citizenship, aside from voting and travel freedom within the EU. Other 
than these, those living here and born here already have all they need.”78 
                                                                                                                                                                     
government offices in Linz, Austria, July 22, 2014. See also www.fpoe.at/doppelstaatsbuergerschaft-
integration-auf-tuerkisch.  
76 Interview #0109 with officials from the Government Representative for Migration, Refugees, and 
Integration (Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration), July 30, 
2013. 
77 Anonymous interview #0100 with Member of the German Bundestag from the FDP, July 16, 2013. 
78 Interview #0106 at the Naturalization Office of the Neukölln District of Berlin (Bezirksamt 




Similarly, I found a wealth of confirmatory qualitative evidence for the 
political supply of citizenship that I have theorized in this project. At the local level, I 
spoke with fourteen naturalization officers across Germany and Austria, and nearly 
all of them admitted that citizenship law permitted some degree of discretion 
(“Spielraum”) for the Länder. In Germany, many officials throughout the country 
reported that some Länder governments use as much discretion in favor of more 
naturalizations, and utilize the upper limits of the citizenship law where possible, 
while others interpret the law much more strictly, utilizing the lowest legal limits 
provided. In these terms, Bayern was consistently reported to be the most 
restrictive in terms of their interpretation of citizenship law, especially by officials 
and politicians in urban areas outside of the south of Germany such as Berlin, 
Hamburg, or Nordrhein-Westphalen.79 This not surprising, since the conservative 
south differs so starkly from the more leftist north. One official reported that 
although the differences between the north and south on these questions is not as 
stark was it was in years past, “it tends to be the case that the more southern the 
Land is, the more restrictive the naturalization criteria.”80 A number of examples of 
such discretion left to the state-level governments were cited. Many referenced the 
issue of ‘sufficient German knowledge’ (ausreichende Deutschkenntnisse) stipulated 
in the 2000 reform was often cited by officials. The law included a language 
prerequisite for naturalization, but the examinations were administered at the local 
                                                        
79 Such evidence is found, for example, in anonymous interviews with senior officials of 
naturalization offices (Einbürgerungsbehörde) in Berlin (Interview #1001), Hamburg (#1007), Essen 
(#1020), Mönchengladbach (Interview #1023), and Darmstadt (#1025), June 2014. 
80 Anonymous interview #1025 with naturalization officials in the Naturalization and Citizenship 
Office in the Regional Authority of Darmstadt (Einbürgerungs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsreferat in 




level, resulting in varying degrees of stringency with regard to demonstrated 
proficiency. As one official remarked, the implementation “developed from North to 
South completely muddled, in the north where they were totally complaisant and 
only a little spoken German sufficed, to the south where fully written dictations 
were standard.”81 In response, the German Constitutional Court in 2005 issued a 
ruling stipulating harmonized criteria throughout the Länder, and in 2007 new 
preliminary instructions were circulated that stipulated a common B-1 level of 
proficiency. 
Germany formally requires immigrants to renounce their former citizenship 
when applying for a German passport, except under conditions of ‘substantial 
disadvantage’ (‘erhebliche Nachteile’) to the immigrant, especially in terms of 
economic or proprietary loss. Precisely what constitutes ‘substantial disadvantage’ 
has become legally stipulated and more precisely circumscribed in recent years, but 
this has not always been the case. Consequently, the incidence of dual citizenship 
among naturalized immigrants has been over fifty percent annually, and yet has 
varied significantly across the sixteen German Länder. When asked about dual 
citizenship variation, many cited the example of Kosovar Albanians, who for 
complicated political reasons associated with Kosovo’s disputed sovereignty still 
hold Serbian passports. Serbia does not permit Kosovar Albanians to give up their 
citizenship, which means that formally they have great difficulty if not an outright 
impossibility of naturalizing in Germany where many sought refuge during and after 
the war. The same general difficulty has also existed in the past for Afghan citizens 





attempting to be released from Afghani citizenship. In such ambiguous cases, 
however, some Länder such as Nordrhein-Westphalen and Hessen permit Kosovo 
Albanians to retain their citizenship and naturalize with dual citizenship, while 
Länder such as Bayern refuse to naturalize them under these conditions.82 One 
naturalization official in Bayern admitted such a posture: “Bayern is an exception. 
Almost all others do it differently, and make exceptions for [Kosovar] Serbians.”83 
But this seemingly conservative position is entirely context dependent. In this 
historically conservative Bayern, the granting of dual citizenship has been resisted 
by politicians in almost every circumstance. Yet for the waves of ethnic German 
Aussiedler who have in the postwar period been readily accepted in Germany, as 
well as for Jewish ‘contingent refugees’ immigrating the far reaches of the former 
Soviet Union that swelled Jewish migrant numbers after Germany’s 1991 Contingent 
Refugee Act, Bayern has been exceptionally tolerant of dual citizenship for these 
groups while other Länder have not been so accommodating in contrast. This 
different application of dual citizenship in Bayern was also confirmed for me by 
officials in Bayern itself.84  
Another example includes the meaning of ‘age-related’ (altersbedingt) 
exceptions to the language requirement: how old, and under what conditions, is an 
applicant too old to learn the German language? Some states make exceptions for 
those over 65, while others do not except under extenuating circumstances. A final 
example is whether students may count their legal habitual residence (rechtmäßige 
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gewöhnliche Aufenthalt) as qualification for German citizenship. Some states count 
student status toward the eight years required for naturalization, whiles others do 
not.85 In 2006, Baden-Württemberg even provided its local naturalization offices 
with guidelines regarding Muslim applicants so that they could be screened more 
thoroughly (Thränhardt 2008, 25). While these differences may seem miniscule 
alongside broader questions of dual citizenship or jus soli, most assured me that 
they could account for substantive differences between the Länder. 
What motivated such postures toward citizenship at the Land level? In 
Germany, most hinted at either the political interests of the parties, while a few 
mentioned the competition over voters. Every official was adamant that no 
politicians or bureaucrats engage in any form of extralegal political influence; rather 
the influence is exerted by means of legal interpretation and means of 
implementation in areas not regulated by the national government. And it is here 
where Land politics slowly emerge. The political orientation of the Land governing 
coalition clearly matters, for the governments are the ones with the means to 
interpret and implement. One official described the process candidly: 
“The political orientation of the Land government and federal government 
has a big effect on citizenship acquisition. The law is passed and circulated 
with instructions for implementation that are oriented by the politics that 
determine it. Either these are made a bit stricter on naturalization rights, or a 
bit more open. And here the politics are very important, whether one has a 
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more naturalization friendly politics or restrictive politics, both at the federal 
and land levels.”86 
The examples of Bayern and Baden-Württemberg versus Berlin and 
Hamburg emerged as points of comparison. In Bayern, perhaps the most 
economically advanced state in Germany with an immigrant population of around 9 
percent yet with a significant pastoral and non-urban land area, the Christian Social 
Union (CSU) has been the hegemonic governing force in Bavarian politics since 
World War II. Due to the peculiarities of German history, it is the Christian 
Democratic party in Bayern, while in the rest of the country that role is filled by the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The CSU is much more conservative than its 
sister party on the question of immigration and citizenship in recent years. Although 
the ENLP score in Bayern has moved upwards in recent years, neither the neither 
Social Democratic Party or Green Party on the left have the strength to challenge the 
CSU, and with a sufficient provincial constituency maintaining its more staunch 
more of conservatism, it need not concern itself with attracting newly naturalized 
voters away from other parties. However, I learned that even the CSU has a political 
interest in the naturalization of some immigrants. As one naturalization official 
remarked: 
“Again here politics plays a role... for each politician, the question is always 
‘these are my future voters, or my future non-voters’… for example, the 
Jewish contingent refugees evidently vote CSU, these are their voters, so they 
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assume. So too are ethnic German repatriates from the Soviet Union 
(Spätaussiedler) similarly packed into the same [CSU] voter container…”87 
With Berlin and Hamburg, both cities that are themselves Länder, the 
contrast could not be starker. Compared to Germany’s south, one word I 
consistently heard to describe to the north was einbürgerungsfreundlich 
(“naturalization-friendly”). Hamburg, a highly developed, wealthy, and densely 
populated city-state with a foreign population of nearly 15 percent, consistently 
pursues what one official termed an offensive Einbürgerungspolitik (“offensive 
naturalization politics”).88 With an ENLP score of 1.94 in 2010 and no competition 
on the right, the incentive to naturalize new voters and attract them to the party 
ranks almost seemed to be a given, both among the naturalization officials and 
among the party elites. This was confirmed for me in interviews with 
parliamentarians from each of Hamburg’s main political parties, including the 
conservative CDU. Whereas in the German south few (with the exception of the 
leftist Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens) were as forthcoming about the Land-
level discretion that existed on the implementation of naturalization, politicians in 
Hamburg were rather outspoken and almost excited about their willingness to use it 
in order to increase naturalization rates.89 Hamburg is particularly known for its 
series of rather successful naturalization campaigns. In its most recent form, Olaf 
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Scholz, the First Mayor of Hamburg and a member of the SPD, sent a postcard to 
every immigrant who had been living in Hamburg for eight years letting them know 
that they may qualify for citizenship and encouraging them to visit Hamburg’s 
updated and streamlined naturalization advising center. The new naturalization 
advising center is meant to welcome in Hamburg’s immigrants, improve their 
bureaucratic relations with this population, and reform the culture of the 
naturalization process so that the bureaucracy and the immigrants share the same 
interest, which is their successful naturalization. Describing the campaign and its 
relative success almost nonchalantly, a head official at the central naturalization 
office reported that “this campaign has led to skyrocketing increase in public 
interest in naturalization, an enormous rise in applications, and naturally at the end 
of the process a much higher number of naturalizations.”90 When asked about the 
SPD-led campaign, politicians from the other parties were not so much dismissive of 
the effort as almost disappointed that they had not had the idea themselves, or 
jealous that it was Mr. Scholz’s name on the postcards – a great advertisement for 
the SPD.91 The CDU politician charged with integration issues for its party was 
especially adamant in informing me that in the fact they had been the party, not the 
SPD, to launch the first naturalization campaign in Hamburg. 
In Berlin, the German capital and another city-state in the northeast, 
immigrants similarly comprise roughly 15 percent of the total population, yet its 
economy is much weaker than that of Hamburg. But like Hamburg, its politics are 
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consistently left-oriented, with a high ENLP score of 2.66 during the current election 
period. As I learned, in this milieu, the conservative CDU is like its counterpart in 
Hamburg and much more naturalization-friendly than the CDU elsewhere. The CDU 
member of the Berlin Senate charged with integration issues, Burkhard Dregger, 
argued that there was little difference between the CDU and SPD on citizenship 
issues in Berlin, and that as a member of the governing coalition the party was 
working to utilize all Spielraum necessary – specifically with regard to 
Ermessenseinbürgerung (“discretionary naturalization”) – to achieve higher 
naturalization figures. The Senator also spoke frankly about the enormous 
Wahlpotenzial (“electoral potential”) of voters with a migration background that all 
parties in Berlin had recognized. A growing priority of the CDU, at least in Berlin, 
was to convince naturalized immigrants to vote for the CDU, not the SPD: “we need 
them to be a part of society, part of the community, part of our [CDU] Volkspartei,” 
the Senator claimed.92 In discussions with Berlin’s naturalization officials, this 
einbürgerungsfreundlich orientation was reaffirmed. According to one Berlin official, 
“The difference [between Bayern and Hamburg or Berlin] is a question of political 
culture, not of extralegal influence on the law or the process… Here there is no 
difference between the CDU and SPD in terms of the naturalization process.”93 Yet as 
another naturalization official confided to me, if the SPD were not stuck in coalition 
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with the CDU at the time, they would be able to make even greater efforts to 
facilitate naturalization.94  
Even the state of Baden-Württemberg, Bayern’s conservative and 
economically dynamic southern neighbor, the story seemed to be changing with the 
political circumstances. A CDU stronghold since World War II, the first non-CDU 
government was elected in 2011. The new Green-SPD coalition, facing an ELP score 
of 2.22 (double that of the ENRP score), has been especially forthcoming about its 
plans to exploit its policy discretion and increase naturalization rates where it can.95 
The Baden-Württemberg government, with the new Integration Ministry under the 
direction of the SPD’s Bilkay Öney, introduced in 2013 new administrative 
guidelines specifying the discretionary rules of the Land to grant citizenship.96 As 
she claimed, “since the beginning of the legislative period we have emphasized the 
features of our new naturalization-friendly climate. We have liberalized 
naturalization policies, systematically used our policy discretion in the federal law, 
and advertised for naturalization actively.”97 As a result, Baden-Württemberg’s 
naturalization rates have skyrocketed, in 2015 reaching their highest number of 
naturalizations since 2003. 
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Finally, in both Austria and in the more restrictive Länder, or smaller, less 
urban locations in the rest of Germany, it became a very consistent theme in my 
interviews that those officials perceived very little discretionary room in the current 
law to affect the naturalization process. In Germany, this may be due to the fact that 
more conservative governments do not attempt to identify it or use it as much as 
leftist ones do, or that the political orientation of the Land or locality helps 
determine whether one observes the existence or relevance of policy discretion. In 
Austria, it may actually be a reflection of the actual lack of Spielraum at the state 
level. Most officials reported that the Länder in Austria had a high level of discretion 
over the naturalization process until the 2006 reform, at which point this was 
regulated away by the federal government. No local politician I interviewed at the 
state level spoke about the discretion of the states over naturalization, and all 
referred me to speak to politicians at the national level. Only two issues remain 
under the discretion of the Länder: the regulation of the citizenship tests, and the 
costs of citizenship, both of which vary widely from state to state. The other 
difference that officials mentioned centered on the amount of finances and 
resources the Länder devote to the naturalization process. Several, especially those 
in less populous Länder such as Salzburg or Oberösterreich mentioned they do not 
enjoy the same level of resources that a city like Vienna has as its disposal, and thus 
cannot naturalize as many people.98 However, a theme I noted in conversations was 
that ‘Red Vienna’ (rotes Wien), so named because its left-of-center Social Democrats 
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have held the mayor’s position and a majority in the Landtag uninterrupted since 
World War II, had been particularly active in using its subnational mandate to 
accommodate of immigrants and their rights in the past. Unfortunately no SPÖ 
member of parliament would suggest to me that they had actively sought to increase 
naturalization rates in years past. 
Conclusion 
Both the quantitative and qualitative case study evidence gathered in this 
chapter lend additional confirmation to the broader theory of citizenship acquisition 
that I formulated in Chapter 3 and applied at the cross-national level in Chapter 6. 
The economic context in individual Länder, at least measured by unemployment, 
seems to have had a significant effect on naturalization rates. A weak labor market 
thus has a negative effect on naturalization rates, and the association was 
particularly strong among Turkish immigrants for whom the economic context is on 
average more precarious than the average immigrant population. The naturalization 
officials with whom I spoke across both countries tended to confirm this hypothesis 
as well. Furthermore, many of the political variables performed as expected. 
Throughout the analysis it was assumed that the political variables operated 
according to the discretionary hypothesis, whereby the prerogative to implement 
policy at the state level enabled states to interpret citizenship policy in a more or 
less restrictive direction. The tests for naturalization campaigns and the qualitative 
evidence of it as well suggests this mechanism is at work. However, it could also be 
that the political climate of the state itself also structures the immigrant demand for 




inhospitable to immigrants than a socially and economically progressive one like 
Hamburg. Although both are likely, these two causal pathways were not tested 
directly in this chapter. 
While the cross-national study has already demonstrated that the theory is 
generalizable at the national level in Europe, can the quantitative and qualitative 
findings from the subnational level be applied to other, non-federal or quasi-federal 
countries in Europe? In most unitary states, the political supply of citizenship may 
be much more circumscribed by national level policy. Belgium, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom each are unitary states, but each have regions with very strong political 
power that nearly qualify them as federations like Germany and Austria. To the 
extent that these subnational units have any discretion over the implementation of 
policy, or to the extent that political culture somehow structures the hospitability of 
a subnational region, then this very well may be the case. The subnational analysis 




 Citizenship and Integration in Europe Today 
As long as humans have settled in communities larger than the immediate 
family unit, the question of who belongs has likely accompanied them. And as long 
as humans have been on the move, the reality of migration has likely forced them to 
answer it. With some 232 million people living outside their country of birth in 2013 
(United Nations 2013a), the question of who belongs is certainly as relevant today 
as ever before.  
With nearly 50 million foreign born residents in the European Union in 2014 
and millions of additional asylum seekers flooding northward across Europe’s 
Mediterranean borders, it certainly is a relevant question in Europe today. The 
states of Europe, hardly strangers to the question of who belongs and the migration 
of peoples that challenge it, were arguably forged through centuries of such conflict 
over this very question. After the mass dislocations and population resettlements 
that followed the political, economic, and social calamity of World War II, European 
democracies inherited the long legacy of wrestling over this question, with many 
falling back on strict citizenship laws that had evolved over the previous centuries 
to exclude foreigners and define a national identity, others on laws that had 
attempted to accommodate the diversity and political exigencies of empire, while 
yet others began searching for new means by which to answer this timeless 
question in the context of a transformed continent. Yet even among the relatively 
homogenous European democracies that crystallized in the postwar period, the 
nationalist, ethnic, and even racial stasis that had emerged as a consequence of the 




for long, if it ever was. Overseas colonies collapsed. Postwar economies demanded 
inexpensive foreign labor from abroad. European integration proceeded apace. Cold 
War tensions and post-Cold War conflicts generated new refugee flows. Economic 
globalization and interdependence increasingly drove people across borders, often 
from neighboring European countries, often from beyond. Seventy years have 
elapsed since World War II, and, transformed by the migratory pressures and 
challenges that these forces have brought to the continent, Europe once again – and 
perhaps belatedly – finds itself confronting this question anew.   
The Theoretical Contribution 
This dissertation has focused on citizenship in Europe, which is inherently 
intertwined with the question of who belongs, who does not, and by what means do 
European states adjudicate between the two. In the introductory chapter, I posed 
two specific questions: what are the causes, and what are the consequences, of 
citizenship policy in Europe? More specifically, I sought to investigate the making of 
citizenship policy and the outcomes of citizenship policy. First, what determines the 
institutional contours of citizenship policy requirements that regulate immigrant 
acquisition of citizenship across countries and across time? Despite a vast literature 
that has developed on the macrohistorical determinants of citizenship policy in 
Europe (Howard 2009; Janoski 2010; Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998; Castles and 
Miller 2003; Schain 2008; Joppke 2003b; Joppke 2010; Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1994) 
as well as the more proximate electoral correlates of citizenship policy change in 
recent years (Howard 2010; Goodman 2014; Janoski 2010; Schain 2008), few 




of such policy change. Second, I asked, given variation in citizenship policies across 
countries, who acquires citizenship, and under what conditions? There is a vast 
body of research on the question, focusing on the individual factors such as the level 
of economic, social, or cultural adaptation to the receiving country, or on 
institutional and other structural factors such as toleration of dual citizenship or 
distinct characteristics of the country of origin (Yang 1994; Jones-Correa 2001b; 
Diehl and Blohm 2003; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink et al. 2013; Ersanilli and 
Koopmans 2010; Janoski 2010; OECD 2011; Koopmans et al. 2012). However, given 
the lack of systematic measurement of citizenship policy across countries or across 
time, there remains much to understand about how citizenship policies, and their 
vast array of requirements, affects citizenship acquisition.   
In Chapter 3, I presented and discussed my theoretical framework for 
integrating the relationship between citizenship policy, citizenship acquisition, and 
immigrant integration in European societies. First, I focused on citizenship 
policymaking. Contrary to one strong strand in the literature, I argued that 
citizenship policy in Europe results not principally from path dependence or 
macrohistorical legacies of the past, but from acute electoral competition among 
political parties and demographic change. In tight electoral systems with numerous 
parties on the left and right of the political spectrum, politicians often find 
themselves in competition with other similarly situated parties for the votes of 
similar constituents. In the competition for vote share, right-of-center parties may 
be tempted to politicize the immigration issue if it strengthens their electoral hand, 




enact policies that restrict access to citizenship and increase the requirements to 
acquire it. Where far right parties gain electoral strength or join the government, 
citizenship policy is highly likely to be restricted. At the opposite end of the political 
spectrum, I expected the opposite dynamics. Electoral competition on the left might 
incentivize left-oriented governments to liberalize citizenship policy because 
immigrant voters function as an important constituency for traditional socialist and 
labor/working-class political parties, but the rise of other parties on the left, for 
instance the Greens, may increasingly adopting pro-immigrant and multicultural 
positions and challenge the traditional electoral dominance of mainstream left 
parties. With heightened left party competition, left-oriented governments and 
governments with far left party participation should be more likely to liberalize 
citizenship policy in an attempt to curry favor with left-libertarians and potential 
immigrant voters. In sum, I hypothesized that policy change would occur under 
governments that faced stronger competition on their side of the political spectrum 
(H.CP1).  
Next, I theorized that the size of the naturalized immigrant population in 
liberal democracies may function as an additional and potentially alternative 
mechanism for citizenship policy stasis or change. Naturalized immigrants within a 
state could function as a well-organized pro-immigrant constituency to help sustain 
accessible citizenship policies, while a lack of them would leave countries open to 
restrictive change.  The countries that had initially open citizenship regimes in the 
post-war period enabled a sizable immigrant electorate to develop in the 




while restrictive countries lacked the initial development of organized immigrant 
constituencies that would serve as a powerful electoral bulwark against restrictive 
change in the future. Thus I hypothesized that in liberal citizenship regimes, larger 
immigrant populations would help sustain liberal, accessible policies over time, 
while larger immigrant populations in initially restrictive regimes would be unable 
to forestall additional restrictions in future decades (H.CP2).  
In my theory, the citizenship acquisition process occurred within the 
intersection of what I called the political supply of citizenship and the immigrant 
demand for citizenship. On the supply side, I argued that the same political 
constellations at work behind citizenship policy would operate on citizenship 
acquisition. Using citizenship policy to set a high integration cost of citizenship, 
conservative governments would attempt to restrict citizenship acquisitions in an 
attempt to incentivize immigrant integration on the path to citizenship, while left-
oriented governments would attempt to reduce the integration cost of citizenship in 
an attempt to incentivize higher numbers of acquisitions on the path to integration. 
Beyond formal policy, however, policymakers would alter the supply of citizenship 
through the administrative and regulatory discretion that accrues to governments in 
deciding how best to implement and interpret citizenship law in practice. Thus left 
and right governments could increase or decrease acquisition rates through policy 
(H.S1), through discretion (H.S2 and H.S3), or through electoral competition (H.S4). 
On the demand side, I focused on those factors that would affect immigrant 
incentives to acquire citizenship. Here I postulated that stronger economic contexts 




value of non-citizenship status (H.D3) would be positively associated with 
immigrant demand for citizenship. In a given country context, the political supply of 
citizenship and the immigrant demand for citizenship determine the naturalization 
rate and level of integration expected of new citizens in any given country context.   
This framework integrating the relationship between citizenship policy, 
citizenship acquisition, and immigrant integration is my first novel contribution to 
the literature on these subjects. Previous scholarship typically focuses on one of the 
three in isolation, or two of the three together. But according to the work here, each 
of these processes should be understood together, for they are all interconnected. 
The causal mechanism explicated in Figure 3.1 suggested a unidirectional pathway 
from citizenship policy through political supply and immigrant demand to 
naturalization and integration. Yet it also acknowledges the temporal endogeneity 
between each of these variables. The naturalization rates and integration outcomes 
of last year affect the size and composition of the naturalized voting population this 
year as well as the electoral incentives and political orientations of parties in the 
following election cycle. Political ideology on the supply side may increase or 
decrease immigrant demand, and economic context on the demand side may 
interact with the supply of certain new citizenship policy requirements. As with all 
political phenomena, such endogeneity is unavoidable. This dissertation sought to 
explore the basic relationships of the framework, but it leaves plenty of unexplored 
territory for future research. 
Furthermore, the application of supply and demand terminology 




immigration in terms of supply and demand forces, the use of these terms for 
citizenship is quite rare; in fact in my work on this project I found the terms used on 
occasion, but never once uncovered scholarship that explored their application to 
the domains of citizenship, naturalization, or integration. This is another 
contribution to the literature, and one that leaves the market for citizenship open to 
be examined by other scholars.  
The theory in this dissertation certainly suggests that citizenship 
policymaking and citizenship acquisition in Europe (and likely in any other 
immigrant-receiving country) often boil down to economic calculus and incentive 
structures, and the empirical evidence gathered in support of the theory strongly 
supports this perspective. Today, for better or for worse, citizenship policy is an 
instrument of the state to achieve the objectives of those who write the policy; 
citizenship acquisition is an instrument of immigrants to achieve the objectives of 
those who acquire it. Among the politicians I interviewed, few spoke of citizenship 
in terms of anything beyond its meaning for integration and incorporation, and 
certainly not in terms of civic virtue, patriotism, and cultural identification. Among 
the immigrants that I interviewed, few saw the acquisition process as anything 
other than a cost-benefit analysis of citizenship versus non-citizenship, and among 
the naturalization officials that over the decades have inquired of immigrants why 
they are naturalizing, the answers they receive sound similar. Whether or not 
citizenship should be the result of economic calculus, or civic virtue, and cultural 
identity is a subjective question best left to political theorists, but one I will briefly 




Yet, to be clear, casting citizenship in terms of a marketplace subject to 
economic forces is not meant as a normative judgment for how citizenship and 
integration should work, nor is it a theoretical justification for the neoliberal 
appropriation of citizenship whereby citizenship is bought and sold according to 
some civic profit motive, even as I suggest below that political intervention in the 
market is an inefficient means of incorporation. Instead, the supply and demand 
framework is but a useful heuristic by which to explain the intricate relationships 
among these endogenous variables. And on the basis of the evidence presented, I 
believe it to be a useful lens by which to view them. Immigrants demand citizenship 
or they do not. Citizenship is supplied on the cheap, or at great cost, or perhaps not 
at all. Politics sets the rules of the nationality acquisition game, which incentivizes 
some able and willing migrants to pay the respective cost of citizenship for 
membership, while they discourage or others from doing so. 
The Empirical Contribution 
Chapters 4 through 7 explored the supply and demand framework 
empirically. In Chapter 4, I first presented the integration cost of citizenship index 
(ICCI), my conceptualization and measurement of sixteen Western European 
countries from 1970 to present. According to my theory, citizenship is the 
institutional device that denotes and distinguishes members of a political 
community from non-members, those who belong from those who do not. It is 
attaining membership in the political club. Citizenship policy, therefore, formalizes 
the degree of integration within that polity an immigrant must exhibit as 




for access. Thus the ICCI casts citizenship policies in terms of the integration-related 
costs of membership in the polity. 
I also began my investigation of the historical evolution of citizenship in 
Europe in the postwar period. Using the ICCI, I offered one of the most detailed 
quantitative assessments of the simultaneous processes of convergence and 
divergence in European citizenship policy to date. Contrary to accounts arguing that 
states’ citizenship policies reflect the resiliency of national historical differences 
(Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998; Castles and Miller 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005; Schain 
2008), or that policies are limited by nationally and historically defined paths 
(Goodman 2012a; Mouritsen 2013), I find little continuity between past and present 
approaches. Where four distinct citizenship strategies have emerged in Europe in 
recent years from several decades ago, there seems to be only the weakest resilience 
of traditional national models of incorporation in Europe today. While the most 
traditionally exclusive countries have driven this movement away from latent-based 
criteria for membership, most European countries have jettisoned their traditional 
strategies that rely on unobservable latent integration requirements in favor of 
more measurable manifest integration requirements. Likewise, my findings in the 
chapter suggest we need to be more nuanced regarding citizenship policy change. 
Rather than liberal convergence (Howard 2010) or restrictive convergence (Joppke 
2007a), I find that both are occurring simultaneously on different dimensions. 
The empirical analysis of citizenship policy was the subject of Chapter 5. 
While most scholars only use party manifestos or government positions as proxies 




in one of the only systematic analyses of citizenship policy change current available. 
I demonstrated that the left and right party competition variables generally explain 
overall citizenship policy change in Europe. Left competition certainly accounts for 
policy liberalization, and especially the latent dimension, while right competition 
similarly accounts for policy restrictions. However, the competition variables were 
largely insignificant on the manifest dimension, along which most parties in Europe 
today find themselves under pressure to levy additional requirements. On this 
dimension, we find simply the presence of the radical right in forging this restrictive 
trend. The radical left, so instrumental in moving policy in a more accessible 
direction on the latent dimension, simply does not have the same degree of 
influence on the manifest dimension. Because most mainstream parties feel the 
effects of the radical right in a way that all mainstream parties do not with the 
radical left, this may explain why governments from across the political spectrum 
have moved to introduced changes on the manifest dimension of policy, not simply 
conservative ones. In other words, there may in fact be electoral threats of 
competition from the radical right influencing all parties in a single direction on 
manifest policy. Nonetheless, party competition does matter, and points the 
literature in a new direction for future research. 
I also found some modest evidence in support of my hypothesized 
mechanism of demographic change. A larger foreign born population in the early 
postwar years is associated with more liberalized citizenship requirements on the 
latent dimension, but this applies to all countries, not just the previously liberal 




radical right support, is also associated with more restrictions on the manifest 
dimension in subsequent decades. In terms of overall path-dependent arguments, 
the predictive power of citizenship starting points and legacies inherited from 
decades past finds little support in the data analyzed here. The strength of the 
estimated effect seems to diminish over time, and hardly explains the contours or 
direction of citizenship policy today. This is an additional contribution to the 
growing literature on citizenship policies in Europe. 
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, I used my citizenship policy index not as the 
dependent variable but as a central explanatory variable in an analysis of 
naturalization cross-nationally and sub-nationally. In each sets of analyses, I found 
strong statistical confirmation of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. The 
integration context of naturalization clearly structured the equilibrium 
naturalization rates across countries. Economic context and changing citizenship 
status strongly structure the immigrant demand for citizenship, while the national 
citizenship policy, a leftist political orientation of governments, and higher degrees 
of policy discretion structure the political supply of citizenship. I found the same 
robust results when applied to the case of intra-EU migrant naturalization as well. 
This was in many ways a hard test case for the theory, since this population should 
be among the least likely to acquire citizenship in another European state. Yet the 
Euro crisis has apparently altered the value of naturalization vis-à-vis remaining a 
non-citizen tied to a precarious economic or political climate at home, and even 
among this subpopulation the theory still finds strong confirmation. Finally, I turned 




additional confirmation of the theory: a weak labor market dampens naturalization 
rates, especially for immigrants such as Turks for whom the economic context is 
often more discouraging. The statistical evidence and qualitative interview evidence 
gathered also reveal that politics also matters beyond the direct mechanism of 
citizenship policy. Parties of all political persuasions have interests with regard to 
citizenship acquisition, and often take full advantage of political discretion in order 
to achieve those interests in practice.  
The Implications for Citizenship in European Democracy Today 
What does this study mean for citizenship in the 21st century in Europe? 
Citizenship is fundamental to our understanding of modern liberal democracy. It is 
the institutional device that defines the people from whom democratic governments 
are constituted, and to whom democratic governments are accountable. It 
distinguishes membership in a political community, providing the institutional 
demarcation of inclusion and exclusion and the boundaries within which democratic 
governance extends (Hansen and Weil 2001, 1). Indeed, as Linz and Stepan (1996) 
argue, “[w]ithout a state, there can be no citizenship; without citizenship, there can 
be no democracy” (28).  
The postwar liberal democracies that emerged in Europe largely adopted the 
liberal and universalistic conception of citizenship theorized by Marshall (1964), 
according to whom citizenship was fundamentally about ensuring equal treatment 
and equal access to the societies of which people were part, regardless of personal 
circumstances or status. Recognizing that the purposeful exclusion of certain groups 




piecemeal expansion of citizenship rights into civic, political, and social domains as 
achieving the demands of liberal democracy. Extending rights to individuals and 
groups previously excluded would, by this perspective, facilitate their full 
integration within the polity. As Kymlicka and Norman (1994) explain, “where any 
of these rights are withheld or violated, people will be marginalized and unable to 
participate” (354). Most liberal theory generally holds to this view. Withholding 
rights and equality of status from certain groups within a liberal community is, in 
other words, illiberal. For Rawls (1971), “in a just society the liberties of equal 
citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to 
political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests” (4). Since liberal democracy 
requires equality and fundamental rights for all members of a political community, 
to withhold such rights or access from such persons living within a democratic 
community would thus require serious ethical justification. As Walzer (1983) 
likewise maintains, no state that denies political rights and equality to anyone, 
especially settled immigrants, could  describe itself as fully democratic; for him the 
“rule of citizens over non-citizens, members over strangers, is probably the most 
common form of tyranny in human history”(62). In his discussion of the required 
institutions of modern liberal democracy, Dahl (1989, 120; 2005, 189) maintains 
that ‘inclusive citizenship’ is essential, and without it a polity falls short of its 
democratic ideal. 
If citizenship is so fundamental to liberal democracies, then how should 
states define who constitutes the people? Who belongs, who does not, and by what 




welcomed, and how best to welcome them? By definition, naturalization is the 
process by which an immigrant acquires the citizenship of a country other than his 
or her birth. It is, therefore, this naturalization process that adjudicates these 
questions. Naturalization for many political theorists and scholars of immigration 
has consistently played a central role in the incorporation of foreigners (Walzer 
1983; Hammar 1985, 1990; Brubaker 1992; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001; 
Bauböck 2006). If liberal democracy presupposes liberal citizenship, as Linz and 
Stepan (1996) argue, then naturalization is the mechanism by which many, if not 
most, foreigners are converted into citizens. It is the mechanism by which 
individuals are endowed with full formal membership of the political community, 
complete with the rights and duties and equality that accompanies it. It is the 
mechanism by which liberal democracies persist across years of migratory 
pressures, population shifts, and demographic changes.  
Naturalization, and the process by which European countries have attempted 
to adjudicate the lines of inclusion and exclusion, has been the focus of this study. As 
I have discussed throughout this dissertation, European countries have pursued a 
variety of strategies to incorporate newcomers. Although in Chapter 4 I identify four 
distinct strategies for the integration of newcomers through naturalization, at their 
most basic level these four strategies emerge from two more fundamental 
paradigmatic approaches to this process. As Kraler (2006) observes, the distinction 
is between ‘one that sees citizenship as a means to integrate newcomers more fully 




citizenship, and a second which sees citizenship as a “prize”, a reward and honour 
granted by the state’ for successful integration (47).  
The distinction is sequential, and yet highly consequential. In the former 
paradigm – what I called ‘integration through citizenship’ – citizenship is a means to 
full integration within the polity, and consequently states grant immigrants 
extensive rights and craft accessible citizenship policies with low thresholds to 
facilitate their integration. This is the predominant liberal approach advocated by 
many political theorists. For the liberal minimalist, stipulating extensive 
requirements or conditions for membership beyond a modest residency 
requirement is illiberal. For Carens (1989, 2005), requiring integration as a 
requirement of political membership violates the foundations of liberal democracy 
based on toleration, pluralism, and freedom of the individual. Walzer (1983) argues 
that with closed naturalization procedures for those already admitted within the 
political community, ‘the political community collapses into a world of members and 
strangers, with no political boundaries between the two, where the strangers are 
subjects of the members” (62). Thus by this logic, language requirements, civic 
knowledge exams, become illiberal obstacles to political incorporation; the refusal 
to grant dual citizenship becomes a means of exclusion rather than a means of 
incorporation. More open and permissive policies should increase integration 
outcomes either by granting immigrants greater access to social and political power 
structures, or render naturalizations less costly, thus opening the door to deeper 




The other paradigm – what I called ‘citizenship through integration’ – 
suggests that citizenship should be the final outcome of the integration process. By 
this perspective, accessible citizenship grants immigrants easy admission to the full 
rights and advantages of membership without any of the requisite expectations, 
costs, or commitments. Accessible citizenship without first requiring integration 
undermines its value and creates passive, dependent, and isolated citizens. Instead 
of promoting integration through citizenship, accessible citizenship rights 
undermine integration because it requires nothing of the immigrant to attain those 
rights (Pickus 1998, 2005; Renshon 2001, 2009). As I discussed in Chapter 3, jus 
domicilii is becoming the norm in many immigrant-receiving democracies that adopt 
the integration through citizenship approach, whereby permanent residents are 
granted domestic rights on the basis of their domicile in the country rather than 
their by blood or birthright. This granting of political, economic, and social rights to 
all who claim residence in the polity has led to a decoupling of formal citizenship 
from much of its substance, as many scholars have noted (Hollifield 1992; Bauböck 
1994; Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1998; Joppke 1999, 2001; Hammar 
1990). Schuck (1998, 1989) has argued that citizenship in the United States, as in 
many parts of Europe, has been devalued over time because it requires little of the 
immigrant to acquire and the rights exclusive to it differ very little from those 
granted to permanent residents. Thus immigrants have little incentive to naturalize 
or integrate and become part of society, ultimately weakening it. By this perspective, 
naturalization should be conceived not as a prerequisite for further integration, but 




This distinction is not simply academic. I found in my fieldwork that all 
countries of Europe have vacillated between these two broad approaches over time. 
In my theory, this entails four distinct strategies: the ‘citizenship through latent 
integration,’ ‘citizenship through manifest integration,’ and ‘citizenship through 
assimilation’ are all approaches developed to incentivize immigrant integration on 
the road to full citizenship, even if they differ on the contours of the criteria used 
and the costs imposed. Conversely, the ‘integration through citizenship’ strategy 
offers citizenship as a step on the road to full integration. But are these two 
approaches effective? The theory developed in Chapter 3 provides a straightforward 
means of assessing the relationship between citizenship policy, citizenship 
acquisition, and integration, and thereby also provides the means of understanding 
the tradeoffs between these different approaches. Let us return to the model of the 
citizenship marketplace, pictured again in Figure 8.1. In it are depicted the two basic 
approaches to citizenship. The more restrictive ‘citizenship through integration’ 
approaches are represented by policy S1, while the more accessible ‘integration 
through citizenship’ is represented by policy S2. As we have examined in this 
dissertation, policymakers select the policies that conform most closely to their 
political ideologies and electoral interests. Not surprisingly, most leftist 
governments would opt for maximally accessible ‘integration through citizenship’ 
policy for both political and electoral reasons, while most conservative governments 
would opt for the more restrictive ‘citizenship through integration’ policy for similar 
reasons. Of course, few parties have the ability to develop policy independent of 




determined through political compromise somewhere on the spectrum between S1 
and S2.  
As European governments feverishly work to develop new immigrant 
incorporation strategies, what does the model tell us about the tradeoffs between 
the two paradigms? First, consider a maximally restrictive policy at S1 or higher. In 
order to acquire citizenship at this level, an immigrant may need to have ten years of 
permanent residency, present a clean criminal record, enroll in language courses, 
pass a civic knowledge exam, demonstrate economic self-sufficiency, and relinquish 
his or her former citizenship. Birthright citizenship would be precluded. Through 
the successful fulfillment of each of these requirements, immigrants will be 
rewarded for their efforts with full citizenship. However, the model suggests that 
this approach will impose what economists might call a deadweight loss in the form 
of fewer integrated citizens and ever larger populations of noncitizens. To see why, 
consider Figure 8.2, which portrays the original immigrant demand curve D, a 
collectively-defined political supply curve S without a formal government policy, a 
baseline citizenship policy CP, and a restrictive citizenship policy CPR. The 
restrictive policy here operates similarly to the price floor in economics. Holding 
immigrant demand constant, if citizenship is priced above its Pareto optimal level, at 
ICR instead of IC*, there will be N*-NR fewer naturalizations among a smaller yet 
more integrated immigrant populace. In other words, fewer immigrants are 
naturalizing, but those that do are able and willing to meet the high demands for 
political membership. This provides satisfaction for those nativists and 




fewer citizenships demanded among the many immigrants who would otherwise be 
willing to acquire it, and at a higher cost ICR than society as a whole would be willing 
and able to confer it at IC*. This then results in a deadweight loss for society, 
represented by the shaded area in the figure. There is a net loss of integration effort 
from immigrants due to the fact that many have been excluded from desired 
political membership at NR, despite an increase in the surplus political benefit that 
the receiving country gains for conferring citizenship at a higher price than they 
were willing. There is also the loss to society of having a larger number of non-
citizens ‘priced out’ of political membership. In this case, restricting citizenship 
policy at CPR results in fewer net numbers of integrated citizens and greater 
numbers of noncitizens.  
Shifting citizenship policy in an even more restrictive direction – perhaps in 
response to domestic radical right political pressures - yields even fewer integrated 
citizens and even more noncitizens. While this is even less efficient in terms of 
deadweight loss, from the perspective of policymakers and those demanding such a 
‘price floor,’ it may be politically viable, since the ‘producer’ surplus accruing to 
policymakers continues to increase at the expense of the immigrant surplus. With 
lagging demand for citizenship being coupled by restricted supply of it, we would 
expect even stronger political pressures to shift citizenship policy in a further 
restrictive direction, because under these conditions it appears that fewer 
immigrants are interested in integrating or naturalizing despite the reality that they 




requiring ever higher levels of integration as the cost of citizenship will result not in 
greater immigrant integration, but permanent exclusion.  
What about the case of an accessible ‘integration through citizenship’ policy, 
set at S2 in Figure 8.3? The motivation of this strategy is to use citizenship as a 
means for future integration. To acquire citizenship at this level, an immigrant may 
earn citizenship with three years of permanent residency and need not demonstrate 
a clean criminal record, language proficiency, civic knowledge, economic self-
sufficiency, or give up one’s former citizenship. Many would acquire citizenship 
automatically by birth. By facilitating access to the political community through full 
citizenship and its attendant rights and privileges, immigrants will face few future 
barriers to integration and will maximally enabled to integrate over the course of 
their lifetime. 
In Figure 8.3, however, the model suggests that this approach may also be 
problematic. A liberal and accessible policy operates more in line with a price ceiling 
in economics Holding immigrant demand constant, shifting policy to CPL generates 
NL-N* additional naturalizations at a lower integration cost ICL, which yields a large 
net increase in new citizens but who are less integrated on average. In other words, 
at the new point 1 more immigrants are acquiring citizenship at a highly discounted 
price for political membership. This provides satisfaction for those immigrants who 
would prefer citizenship without the upfront cost, and for those in society who 
desire increased naturalizations and fewer non-citizens. Because there is no 



















below market equilibrium, there is no deadweight loss as we have with a restrictive 
citizenship policy. However, the state offering citizenship at such a discount is in 
essence giving away or subsidizing political membership to those unwilling or 
unable to pay the integration cost of it, a loss to the state represented by the shaded 
area. While this shift may be more efficient according to this analysis, and more 
desirable in that it does not systematically exclude immigrants from liberal rights, it 
may also be just as costly and less politically viable, since the surplus accruing to the 
state and society decreases at the expense of the immigrant surplus. With lagging 
demand for citizenship being offset by high political supply of it, under these 
conditions we would likewise expect political backlash against immigrants and 
against an accessible citizenship approach, because under these conditions it 
appears that immigrants receiving a net transfer of rights without paying the 
integration cost, even if in the long-term these rights may facilitate their full 
incorporation. 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, this then creates a citizenship-integration 
trade-off that European countries face between these two policy paradigms: a 
population with small numbers of integrated citizens and large numbers of non-
citizens on the one hand, or a population with large numbers of nonintegrated 
citizens and small numbers of noncitizens on the other hand. By adjusting 
citizenship policy, states may either get one, or the other, but not both. In the case of 
the former, which may represent Austria, Germany, or Denmark today, large 
segments of these societies have little access to citizenship, no incentive to acquire 
it, and a political climate that signals exclusion and closure. Too many are 




the Parallelgesellschaften that so many conservative Germans lament. In the case of 
the latter, which may represent Belgium, France, or Sweden today, most immigrants 
have nearly as many rights as citizens, and readily accessible citizenship if they have 
not already acquired it automatically by birth. But here the answer appears the 
same: too many are disincentivized to integrate. Many immigrants likewise remain 
marginalized. That the Belgian and French suicide bombers of recent months had 
such easy access to citizenship obviously did little to set them and their cohorts on 
the path to integration and membership within the political community. In other 
words, set the cost too high and discourage integration; set the cost too low and 
discourage integration. The implication of the model then is that, assuming constant 
immigrant demand for citizenship, policy responses to political pressures for shift 
citizenship policy away from some equilibrium CP in either direction will result in non-
integration and backlashes for restrictions. By interfering in the so-called market for 
citizenship by shifting policy above or below some equilibrium, states not only then 
discourage integration but also introduce inefficiencies that would not otherwise 
exist. 
How, then, can the democratic states of Europe overcome this dilemma? Too 
often, the political response in Europe and in the United States swings between the 
extremes, with liberal progressives demanding easy access to citizenship who are 
yet blind to the lack of integration that inevitably results, and nativist conservatives 
demanding highly restricted access to citizenship who are yet blind to the 
systematic exclusion that their policies inevitably produce. The answer, according to 
the theory, departs from the supply side and focuses on the immigrant demand side. 




integration trade-off by directly addressing any of the determinants of lagging 
immigrant demand for citizenship. The dotted demand curves in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 
demonstrate how this works. In 8.2, assuming that a restrictive citizenship policy 
creates a naturalization equilibrium at point 1 with the expected deadweight loss, 
increasing immigrant demand for receiving country citizenship by a proportional 
amount to point 2 would result in no net reduction in naturalizations, increase the 
integration level of those naturalizing immigrants, and largely eliminate the 
deadweight loss to society caused by the integration price floor created by the 
restrictive policy. Eliminating the restrictive elements of the policy would eliminate 
the deadweight loss altogether. In Figure 8.3, governments would do better to 
replace an inefficient liberal price ceiling below the equilibrium level with an 
increase in the demand for citizenship among immigrants themselves. Rather than 
transfer political membership at a discount at point 1, governments could 
incorporate more citizens at a higher level of integration at point 2.  
The policy implication, then, is that by increasing immigrant demand for 
citizenship, policymakers may be better able to create the conditions for higher 
numbers of naturalizations and more integrated citizens, with less extremist 
political backlash against those immigrants perceived to be setting up parallel 
societies. Yet of the determinants of demand theorized in this project, two stand out, 
although they are not equally beneficial. On the one hand, improving the 
socioeconomic context of immigrants or enhancing the future expected value of 
citizenship would likely do the most to incentivize both naturalization and 
integration. As I demonstrated in this project, economic context, and in particular 




facilitating greater economic opportunities, through employment, education, 
training, and access, immigrants not only become more productive members of 
society, but likely feel greater attachment to the country of residence and view 
future prospects in the country positively as well. This does not imply a lack of 
government: to the contrary, few groups are in need of more government support 
than immigrants as they endeavor to integrate and become productive citizens. 
Thus government intervention is essential here, but one that is costly and too often 
politically controversial.  
The second option though – increasing the costs of alternatives to 
naturalization – may actually be counterproductive for integration and citizenship. 
The example of the United States may be instructive here. The 1990s saw a rise in 
restrictive policies enacted in order to limit immigrant access to certain rights and 
benefits. For example, in 1994 Prop 187, the highly controversial ballot initiative in 
the state of California, was designed to screen illegal aliens from the use of certain 
types of welfare. At the federal level, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) and the 1996 Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) both made immigrants in the 
United States ineligible for a number of state and federal welfare benefits. Largely in 
response to nativist pressures (Tichenor 2002), these laws all endeavored to 
encourage personal responsibility and self-integration by rendering non-citizenship 
more costly, cumbersome, and even painful. While this had the effect of boosting 
naturalizations as a consequence (DeSipio 1996), as the theory would suggest, it 




facilitate immigrant integration in the first place. Of the two options, however, it is 
unfortunately the more politically attractive one. 
The questions investigated in this dissertation – who may acquire 
citizenship, who may not, and what criteria are used to adjudicate between the two 
– are consequential questions for any modern democracy, and certainly for Europe 
today. The incorporation of immigrants is neither easy nor always desirable. But in a 
world of international migration, it is necessary, and for democracies it is essential. 
As Putnam (2007) predicts, “the most certain prediction that we can make about 
almost any modern society is that it will be more diverse a generation from now 
than it is today… [and] immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity 
and inhibit social capital” (138). Europe today confronts its most significant 
challenge in resettling the millions of refugees fleeing conflict and poverty in the 
Middle East, Asia, and Africa, washing up on its shores and crossing over its porous 
land borders. This will transform the continent economically, socially, culturally, 
and politically, and in the short-term will most certainly challenge the solidarity and 
social capital on which European democracy depends. Yet rather than repeat the 
mistakes of the past and respond to progressive calls for costless citizenship for 
these newcomers or to nativist pressures that call for inaccessible citizenship in an 
attempt to exclude them, European countries would do well to find ways to supply 
citizenship for those who desire it, and increase immigrant demand so that the long-





Appendix A: National Statistical Offices of Europe 
Austria: Bundesanstalt Statistik Österreich.  
http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/index.html 
Belgium: Direction générale Statistique. http://statbel.fgov.be/ 
Denmark: Danmarks Statistik. http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik 
Finland: Tilastokeskus. http://www.stat.fi/ 
France: Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE).  
www.insee.fr 
Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt. https://www.destatis.de/DE/Startseite.html 
Greece: Hellenic statistical authority. http://www.statistics.gr/ 
Ireland: Central Statistics Office. http://www.cso.ie/en/ 
Italy: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica. http://www.istat.it/en/ 
Luxembourg: Service Central de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.  
http://www.statistiques.public.lu/fr/acteurs/statec/index.html 
Netherlands: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. https://www.cbs.nl/ 
Norway: Statistisk sentralbyrå. http://www.ssb.no/ 
Portugal: Instituto Nacional de Estatistica.  
https://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpgid=ine_main&xpid=INE 
Spain: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE). http://www.ine.es/ 
Sweden: Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB). http://www.scb.se/ 
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